WEBVTT 00:00:05.080 --> 00:00:08.948 going to begin. We will be on the record. The 00:00:08.960 --> 00:00:13.032 Commission will come to order. Before we get started, I want to 00:00:13.044 --> 00:00:16.982 advise everyone that we have exits in this room in case of an 00:00:16.994 --> 00:00:21.008 emergency. So please proceed out the door. You came and follow 00:00:21.020 --> 00:00:25.018 signs to McAllister Street. When you get to Van Ness Avenue on 00:00:25.030 --> 00:00:28.977 McAllister, turn south. Then proceed to the garden in between 00:00:28.989 --> 00:00:32.803 the Herbs Theater and Opera House. And that's where we will 00:00:32.815 --> 00:00:36.513 assemble in case of emergency. This is the time and place 00:00:36.525 --> 00:00:40.578 for the pre-hearing conference in Phase 2 a Rulemaking 1803011, 00:00:40.590 --> 00:00:44.527 the order instituting rulemaking regarding Emergency Disaster 00:00:44.539 --> 00:00:48.343 Relief Program. I am Administrative Law Judge, Colin Rizzo. 00:00:48.355 --> 00:00:51.981 And with me is Administrative Law Judge Carl Bemistifer. 00:00:51.993 --> 00:00:55.921 Together we're the assigned administrative law judges to this 00:00:55.933 --> 00:00:59.874 proceeding. We're also joined by the assigned Commissioner to 00:00:59.886 --> 00:01:04.266 this proceeding and the President of the California Public Utilities 00:01:04.278 --> 00:01:07.970 Commission, President Mary Bell Batjer. President Batjer? 00:01:07.995 --> 00:01:12.314 Thank you. ALJ Rizzo. Excuse me. We're 00:01:12.326 --> 00:01:17.097 sharing mics this morning. We're a little cheek to jowl up here. 00:01:17.109 --> 00:01:21.727 Thank you. Thank you, Judge. Good morning, everyone. And thank 00:01:21.739 --> 00:01:26.076 you all for appearing today. I scheduled, I think one will 00:01:26.088 --> 00:01:30.409 be fine, I scheduled the pre hearing conference to address 00:01:30.421 --> 00:01:35.343 failures in the communications network infrastructure during fires 00:01:35.355 --> 00:01:39.388 and during public safety power shut offs. Sadly, local 00:01:39.400 --> 00:01:44.107 officials, residents, and indeed the telco-customers and others 00:01:44.119 --> 00:01:48.513 who had, who wanted to be here today and planned to present 00:01:48.525 --> 00:01:53.224 comments in person, are facing yet another PSPS. And therefore, 00:01:53.236 --> 00:01:57.562 and indeed probably in some cases, it's the sixth PSPS, in 00:01:57.574 --> 00:02:01.764 the last two months that they have experienced, they are 00:02:01.776 --> 00:02:06.246 therefore unable to be here. But I was asked to mention that 00:02:06.258 --> 00:02:11.034 they certainly wanted to be. Although PS PS events are triggered 00:02:11.046 --> 00:02:15.375 to prevent a catastrophic fire from starting, these events 00:02:15.387 --> 00:02:19.949 create public safety concerns for communication providers and 00:02:19.961 --> 00:02:24.574 indeed their customers. The Commission is currently addressing 00:02:24.586 --> 00:02:29.211 these and other issues in multiple venues and forums. However, 00:02:29.223 --> 00:02:33.622 today we will focus on fact finding an attention within the 00:02:33.634 --> 00:02:37.971 scope of the Emergency Disaster Relief Measures proceeding 00:02:37.983 --> 00:02:42.599 for which I am the assigned Commissioner. I will not summarize 00:02:42.611 --> 00:02:46.945 these efforts here but direct you to information available 00:02:46.957 --> 00:02:51.138 on the CPUC website. During the PS PS events, this Fall, 00:02:51.150 --> 00:02:55.858 failures in communications infrastructure network occurred on a 00:02:55.870 --> 00:03:00.558 significant scale. For example, Marin County had 57% of its 280 00:03:00.570 --> 00:03:04.977 cellular towers out of service. And at one point during the 00:03:04.989 --> 00:03:09.830 PSPS on October 28th in the Bay Area, San Matteo and Contra Costa 00:03:09.842 --> 00:03:14.328 Counties, 11% of their cell towers failed to work, according 00:03:14.340 --> 00:03:18.884 to reports from the Federal Communications Communication. And 00:03:18.896 --> 00:03:23.084 I underscore that it came from the FCC where we received 00:03:23.096 --> 00:03:27.499 that information. Sonoma Lake, Humboldt, Santa Cruz and Cal 00:03:27.511 --> 00:03:32.147 Veras counties had days where over 20% of the cell towers were 00:03:32.159 --> 00:03:36.623 out. I spent a good deal of time in the Emergency Operations 00:03:36.635 --> 00:03:41.184 Center, the State operations Center at Rancho Cordova. During 00:03:41.196 --> 00:03:45.959 this period of time, we got daily reports, later into the PS PS, 00:03:45.971 --> 00:03:50.453 and indeed, one day the entire county of Humboldt was about, 00:03:50.465 --> 00:03:54.784 was without any landlines or hard lines or cell service or 00:03:54.796 --> 00:03:59.422 VOIP. Lack of communication services not a mere inconvenience. 00:03:59.434 --> 00:04:03.906 It's endangering of lives. California's rely on their phones 00:04:03.918 --> 00:04:08.256 and the Internet, both wireline and wireless technologies, 00:04:08.268 --> 00:04:12.512 to receive emergency notifications, to contact family and 00:04:12.524 --> 00:04:17.001 friends and to reach indeed, first responders. These outages 00:04:17.013 --> 00:04:21.778 were unexpected, given the previous assurances the communication 00:04:21.790 --> 00:04:26.053 companies provided to the FCC, the Federal Communications 00:04:26.065 --> 00:04:30.753 Commission, the California State Legislature and the CPUC. As I 00:04:30.765 --> 00:04:35.319 stated in my November 13, 2019, letter that you all received, 00:04:35.331 --> 00:04:39.731 you have the obligation as well as the privilege and indeed 00:04:39.743 --> 00:04:44.156 the responsibility to provide service to your customers. We 00:04:44.168 --> 00:04:48.999 really must do better. We have received numerous public enquiries 00:04:49.011 --> 00:04:53.267 about these outages, seeking to understand what to expect 00:04:53.279 --> 00:04:57.603 during future PS PS events. We have also, we have also not 00:04:57.615 --> 00:05:02.170 received adequate responses for data we've requested from the 00:05:02.182 --> 00:05:06.723 providers in the first phase of the Emergency Disaster Relief 00:05:06.735 --> 00:05:11.361 Measures proceeding. That would be phase one. As a result, ALJ 00:05:11.373 --> 00:05:15.626 Rizzo and I will initiate Phase Two of this proceeding to 00:05:15.638 --> 00:05:20.197 adopt rules to further address communications network outages 00:05:20.209 --> 00:05:24.675 during emergency events to keep the network functioning. The 00:05:24.687 --> 00:05:29.311 CPUC is working closely with CalOES and CalFire to ensure that 00:05:29.323 --> 00:05:33.869 communications customers are able to access these services at 00:05:33.881 --> 00:05:38.217 all times, of course, at all times, during an emergency. I 00:05:38.229 --> 00:05:42.992 thank the representatives from our sister agencies for attending 00:05:43.004 --> 00:05:47.191 today and for their continued cooperation, collaboration 00:05:47.203 --> 00:05:51.678 with CPUC. I look forward to hearing from the communications 00:05:51.690 --> 00:05:56.397 providers and other parties today as well. Thank you very much. 00:05:56.422 --> 00:05:58.909 Thank you, President Batjer. 00:05:58.921 --> 00:06:01.591 We're also joined today by Commissioner Guzman 00:06:01.603 --> 00:06:04.237 Aceves. Commissioner Guzman Aceves, thank you. 00:06:04.249 --> 00:06:06.614 Do you have any remarks you like to make? 00:06:06.639 --> 00:06:10.066 Thank you. Thank you, 00:06:10.078 --> 00:06:13.518 President Batjer, for making this hearing possible, 00:06:13.530 --> 00:06:16.897 and for all of the carriers that are here today. I 00:06:16.909 --> 00:06:20.090 really look forward to hearing more specificity 00:06:20.102 --> 00:06:23.465 on what you think your coordination was with local 00:06:23.477 --> 00:06:26.589 and state governments on both preparedness and 00:06:26.601 --> 00:06:29.905 response. We certainly have heard from the public 00:06:29.917 --> 00:06:33.365 and from local government in particular of a severe 00:06:33.377 --> 00:06:36.806 lack of coordination. And what your commitments are 00:06:36.818 --> 00:06:40.259 moving forward on improving that. And just briefly, 00:06:40.271 --> 00:06:43.441 I want to share because I'm not sure if some of 00:06:43.453 --> 00:06:46.701 these local representatives will be able to come 00:06:46.713 --> 00:06:49.880 today, as President Batjer mentioned, there's a 00:06:49.892 --> 00:06:53.468 couple of elements. One, as we've learned through the 00:06:53.480 --> 00:06:56.719 fires, is the preparedness of knowing where your 00:06:56.731 --> 00:06:59.983 critical infrastructure is. And then there's the 00:06:59.995 --> 00:07:03.352 inverse, which is what the critical infrastructure 00:07:03.364 --> 00:07:06.602 is for counties and local cities that depends on 00:07:06.614 --> 00:07:10.176 your infrastructure, and so just as an example, we've 00:07:10.188 --> 00:07:13.498 heard from Mayor Simon from Lake County, who gave 00:07:13.510 --> 00:07:17.068 a very critical example where his AT&T infrastructure 00:07:17.080 --> 00:07:19.990 to his waste water system created a problem 00:07:20.002 --> 00:07:23.369 that was almost catastrophic for their county. And 00:07:23.381 --> 00:07:26.693 hopefully you can follow up on that and make sure 00:07:26.705 --> 00:07:29.866 that that type of coordination is smooth moving 00:07:29.878 --> 00:07:33.117 forward for any type of catastrophe. And we have 00:07:33.129 --> 00:07:36.428 many similar examples where, I appreciate many of 00:07:36.440 --> 00:07:39.751 the responses on your identification and critical 00:07:39.763 --> 00:07:43.390 infrastructure, but I don't see where the coordination 00:07:43.402 --> 00:07:46.644 is with the local and state governments on that. 00:07:46.656 --> 00:07:49.891 So I look forward to hearing those responses and 00:07:49.903 --> 00:07:53.350 what you're doing to enhance mutual aid. Thank you. 00:07:53.375 --> 00:07:56.666 Thank you. Commissioner Guzman Aceves. Welcome, 00:07:56.678 --> 00:08:00.034 Commissioner Randolph, do you have any remarks you like to make? 00:08:00.059 --> 00:08:06.935 00:08:13.529 because these poor results that we saw in terms of service and emergency preparedness 00:08:13.541 --> 00:08:19.657 are relevant, of course, not just to PSPS, but things like earthquakes that can 00:08:19.669 --> 00:08:26.103 also be as widespread and present many of the same challenges So the fact that this 00:08:26.115 --> 00:08:32.898 difficulty in meeting the emergency needs of the state has been so challenging for these 00:08:32.910 --> 00:08:39.170 companies is really important to be examined in this proceeding very closely. And 00:08:39.182 --> 00:08:45.588 I appreciate President Batjer for her work on this and look forward to hearing this 00:08:45.600 --> 00:08:52.095 discussion and then carefully following this proceeding as it goes along. Thank you. 00:08:52.120 --> 00:08:55.446 Thank you. Commissioner Shiroma? 00:08:55.471 --> 00:09:02.402 Yes, Thank you. Thank you. President Batjer, Judge 00:09:02.414 --> 00:09:08.801 Rizzo and Judge Bemistifer. The importance of this proceeding cannot 00:09:08.813 --> 00:09:15.379 be overstated. You know, call it karma, but I actually was here during 00:09:15.391 --> 00:09:22.155 the Loma Prieta earthquake. Also happened to be in Tokyo during the 2011 00:09:22.167 --> 00:09:29.101 earthquake and tsunami, and I was up in Lake Tahoe during the Angora Fire. 00:09:29.113 --> 00:09:35.874 And the access to communication was essential to know what roadways were 00:09:35.886 --> 00:09:42.733 open, safe, to get back to our house. And it's been stated before that we 00:09:42.745 --> 00:09:49.605 are the fifth largest economy in the world. And the telco role during the 00:09:49.617 --> 00:09:56.630 PSPSs is essential. I'm also the Commissioner on the Lifeline Program. Life 00:09:56.642 --> 00:10:03.205 Line. Lifeline which of the discount program for phone service for low 00:10:03.217 --> 00:10:10.143 income customers. It's called Lifeline for a reason, and I think it really 00:10:10.155 --> 00:10:16.446 exemplifies the importance of having the infrastructure working, so 00:10:16.458 --> 00:10:24.029 that, despite having the electricity turned off, that we still have communication 00:10:24.041 --> 00:10:30.330 available. We're a constitutionally created body. We have authority 00:10:30.342 --> 00:10:37.086 to assure that the sustainability and reliability is there amongst telco 00:10:37.098 --> 00:10:43.670 providers, and I appreciate the opening of this proceeding. Thank you. 00:10:43.670 --> 00:10:46.841 Thank you. Commissioner Rechtschaffen? 00:10:46.866 --> 00:10:50.430 Thank you, Judge Rizzo and 00:10:50.442 --> 00:10:54.270 President Batjer. As my colleagues have said, while, there's 00:10:54.282 --> 00:10:58.292 been a great deal of focus on the shut offs and how to minimize 00:10:58.304 --> 00:11:01.886 their impacts, all of our efforts to prepare and respond 00:11:01.898 --> 00:11:05.339 depend upon and presuppose a functioning and resilient 00:11:05.351 --> 00:11:09.307 communication network. 80% of 911 calls are made over wireless 00:11:09.319 --> 00:11:13.458 networks. Efforts to activate emergency text alerts or evacuation 00:11:13.470 --> 00:11:16.992 notices are dependent on communications functioning. We 00:11:17.004 --> 00:11:20.947 heard from city managers and emergency personnel how much they 00:11:20.959 --> 00:11:24.725 rely on cell coverage to evacuate residents and, of course, 00:11:24.737 --> 00:11:28.498 customer's face a double, if not, triple whammy. When their 00:11:28.510 --> 00:11:31.967 power goes off, they lose telephone service, they lose 00:11:31.979 --> 00:11:35.673 TV and radio services, so forth. We're still analyzing the 00:11:35.685 --> 00:11:39.203 data we got from the providers in response to President 00:11:39.215 --> 00:11:43.041 Batjer's letter. It's clear, however, that some carriers are 00:11:43.053 --> 00:11:46.954 doing better than others, in some cases, considerably better. 00:11:46.966 --> 00:11:50.904 And we want to understand why that's the case and why everyone 00:11:50.916 --> 00:11:54.426 can't be up to the highest standard. We also heard from 00:11:54.438 --> 00:11:58.131 several carriers that they didn't anticipate the scale and 00:11:58.143 --> 00:12:02.036 extent of the most recent round of shutoffs. without debating 00:12:02.048 --> 00:12:05.549 whether or not that was a reasonable assumption or not, 00:12:05.561 --> 00:12:09.325 That's no longer a viable excuse. We now know that the shut 00:12:09.337 --> 00:12:13.033 offs can extend over great distances in many counties, and 00:12:13.045 --> 00:12:16.878 we have to be prepared for that. And the last thing I'll say 00:12:16.890 --> 00:12:20.704 is we heard from the carriers in their responses some of the 00:12:20.716 --> 00:12:24.479 logistical, environmental permitting and other reasons that 00:12:24.491 --> 00:12:28.311 prevent broader deployment of backup power and batteries and 00:12:28.323 --> 00:12:32.092 generators. And while some of those have a real operational 00:12:32.104 --> 00:12:35.732 nexus and may be very difficult to deal with, others seem 00:12:35.744 --> 00:12:39.070 eminently solvable with the right level of focus and 00:12:39.082 --> 00:12:42.527 attention and coordination with local governments. And 00:12:42.539 --> 00:12:46.500 hopefully we will do a lot more that going forward. Thank you. 00:12:46.500 --> 00:12:49.628 Thank you, Commissioner Rechtschaffen, 00:12:49.640 --> 00:12:52.490 and thank you Commissioners. For some proceeding 00:12:52.502 --> 00:12:55.636 context, in March of 2018, the Commission established 00:12:55.648 --> 00:12:58.387 this Rulemaking 1803011, the order instituting 00:12:58.399 --> 00:13:01.588 rulemaking regarding Emergency Disaster Relief Program 00:13:01.600 --> 00:13:04.511 to adopt an emergency disaster relief program for 00:13:04.523 --> 00:13:08.010 customers of the regulated entities under this Commission's 00:13:08.022 --> 00:13:10.822 jurisdiction. For phase one of this proceeding, 00:13:10.834 --> 00:13:14.080 in advance of this year's fire season, in July of 2019, 00:13:14.092 --> 00:13:16.943 the Commission issued Decision 1907015, curating 00:13:16.955 --> 00:13:19.858 a statewide program for customer disaster relief, 00:13:19.870 --> 00:13:22.726 applicable to all customers of electric, natural 00:13:22.738 --> 00:13:25.755 gas, water, and sewer corporations, subject to this 00:13:25.767 --> 00:13:28.795 Commission's jurisdiction. Then, in August of 2019, 00:13:28.807 --> 00:13:31.421 the Commission issued Decision 1908025, also 00:13:31.433 --> 00:13:34.526 curating a statewide program for customers, disaster 00:13:34.538 --> 00:13:37.435 relief to the customers of communications service 00:13:37.447 --> 00:13:40.821 providers. Now, for Phase Two of this proceeding, we will 00:13:40.833 --> 00:13:43.852 focus on two components. First, developing measures 00:13:43.864 --> 00:13:46.894 for resilient and dependable communications network 00:13:46.906 --> 00:13:49.747 to further address communications outages during 00:13:49.759 --> 00:13:52.845 emergency events. And two, to enable the system that 00:13:52.857 --> 00:13:55.937 promotes transparent communication between industry, 00:13:55.949 --> 00:13:58.749 first responders across the government, and the 00:13:58.761 --> 00:14:01.775 public in a timely manner during disastrous events. 00:14:01.787 --> 00:14:04.639 Now I turn to today's agenda, which includes the 00:14:04.651 --> 00:14:07.613 following. First we will address appearances which 00:14:07.625 --> 00:14:10.715 include public comment and party status. Second, the 00:14:10.727 --> 00:14:13.803 categorization of this proceeding will be discussed. 00:14:13.815 --> 00:14:16.786 Third, we will scope topics for phase two. Fourth, 00:14:16.798 --> 00:14:19.762 we will identify a preliminary schedule as well as 00:14:19.774 --> 00:14:22.751 any of the matters. Given the high level of public 00:14:22.763 --> 00:14:26.065 interest in this proceeding, we will take public comment 00:14:26.077 --> 00:14:28.983 which will be transcribed, but is not part of the 00:14:28.995 --> 00:14:32.070 evidentiary record of this proceeding. Therefore, we 00:14:32.082 --> 00:14:35.110 will suspend the evidentiary portion of the record, 00:14:35.122 --> 00:14:38.019 now, to allow for public comment. The record will 00:14:38.031 --> 00:14:40.882 show that the pre hearing conference evidentiary 00:14:40.894 --> 00:14:43.739 portion is suspended. We will be commence public 00:14:43.751 --> 00:14:46.957 comment. Here are the ground rules for public comment. 00:14:46.969 --> 00:14:50.156 We remind everyone to speak slowly and clearly. Do not 00:14:50.168 --> 00:14:53.133 speak to one another directly or over one another, 00:14:53.145 --> 00:14:55.814 so our court reporters are able to accurately 00:14:55.826 --> 00:14:58.914 transcribe this pre hearing conference. At the first 00:14:58.926 --> 00:15:01.883 moment you speak and each time you speak, identify 00:15:01.895 --> 00:15:04.922 yourselves and your organization. To the members of 00:15:04.934 --> 00:15:08.130 the public who are prepared to make a statement today, 00:15:08.142 --> 00:15:11.000 very shortly, you'll have the time to speak. You 00:15:11.012 --> 00:15:13.907 have approximately two minutes each and your time 00:15:13.919 --> 00:15:17.000 will be called by the Commission staff present. As a 00:15:17.012 --> 00:15:19.680 public agency, the Commission must afford all 00:15:19.692 --> 00:15:23.012 participants in its proceeding due process and fairness. 00:15:23.024 --> 00:15:25.922 Entities that may be affected by the Commission's 00:15:25.934 --> 00:15:29.193 actions are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be 00:15:29.205 --> 00:15:31.992 heard at a public hearing. Consistent with this 00:15:32.004 --> 00:15:35.211 mandate, we established rules for taking of the public 00:15:35.223 --> 00:15:38.120 input here today. Accordingly, we set time limits 00:15:38.132 --> 00:15:41.098 on all public comments. When a speaker exceeds the 00:15:41.110 --> 00:15:44.304 allotted time to speak, that person infringes on other 00:15:44.316 --> 00:15:47.346 speaking time. That's infringing on the due process 00:15:47.358 --> 00:15:50.432 rights of other speakers. Therefore, we ask that you 00:15:50.444 --> 00:15:53.297 please obey our process by limiting your comment 00:15:53.309 --> 00:15:56.214 to two minutes, so everyone has equal opportunity 00:15:56.226 --> 00:15:59.085 to be heard. And now I turn to President Batjer. 00:16:01.010 --> 00:16:04.914 Thank you, Judge. We will know, 00:16:04.926 --> 00:16:08.993 as you have said, turn to the public comment. And for 00:16:09.005 --> 00:16:13.065 those who have signed up to speak, as the judge said, 00:16:13.077 --> 00:16:16.698 you will have two minutes. There will be a sign 00:16:16.710 --> 00:16:20.617 that will be, thank you, that will give you a sense 00:16:20.629 --> 00:16:24.623 of how much time you have left. I will call the name 00:16:24.635 --> 00:16:28.699 of the speaker and then the second speaker, please, I 00:16:28.711 --> 00:16:32.711 will call that name as well. Please make your way up 00:16:32.723 --> 00:16:36.544 near the podium and the microphone, in the sake of 00:16:36.556 --> 00:16:40.540 time. So, our first speaker today will be Chief Mike 00:16:40.552 --> 00:16:44.529 Wilson from the California CalFire Department. Chief 00:16:44.541 --> 00:16:48.455 Wilson, if you could please come forward. And Chief 00:16:48.467 --> 00:16:52.442 Wilson will be followed by Will Abrams. I know there 00:16:52.454 --> 00:16:56.591 are others that have signed up, and I'll address those 00:16:56.603 --> 00:17:00.659 in a moment because I'll be asking you to speak to or 00:17:00.671 --> 00:17:04.663 comment on the scoping version of the agenda. Chief? 00:17:04.688 --> 00:17:09.562 President Batjer, Commissioners, ALJs, thank you for this 00:17:09.574 --> 00:17:14.928 proceeding. Good morning. My name is Mike Wilson, Assistant Chief with CalFire, 00:17:14.940 --> 00:17:20.020 California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. I would like to read 00:17:20.032 --> 00:17:25.057 the following statement. As you well know, wildfires are a natural part of 00:17:25.069 --> 00:17:30.481 California's landscape. But during the past few years, our state has experienced 00:17:30.493 --> 00:17:35.784 the most destructive fires in recorded history. The effects of climate change, 00:17:35.796 --> 00:17:40.812 fire suppression activities, overgrown forests, and prolonged drought have 00:17:40.824 --> 00:17:45.919 resulted in unprecedented tree mortality in the state's forests, as well as 00:17:45.931 --> 00:17:50.873 an increase in the number, size, and severity of these wildfires, loss of 00:17:50.885 --> 00:17:56.107 life, homes, businesses and natural resources, as a result of these fires, is 00:17:56.119 --> 00:18:01.469 tragically at an all time high. The increase in frequency and severity of these 00:18:01.481 --> 00:18:06.709 wildfires has shown how critically important we all are on our communications 00:18:06.721 --> 00:18:12.134 networks during an emergency. California relies on, Californian to rely on their 00:18:12.146 --> 00:18:17.170 phones, Internet connection, and Internet connections to receive emergency 00:18:17.182 --> 00:18:22.468 notifications from public safety officials to contact their family and friends 00:18:22.480 --> 00:18:27.242 and to reach first responders for help. And they expect these networks 00:18:27.254 --> 00:18:32.525 to function during an emergency when they realistically need them the most. It 00:18:32.537 --> 00:18:37.687 is vital that we, as a state, ensure our communications networks continue to 00:18:37.699 --> 00:18:42.843 operate during a disaster, and that our families, neighbors, and communities 00:18:42.855 --> 00:18:47.944 have a reliable way to contact and be contacted by public safety officials. 00:18:47.956 --> 00:18:53.097 To this end, our partners in the communications industry must be prepared to 00:18:53.109 --> 00:18:58.329 maintain service before, during, and after an emergency. This is particularly 00:18:58.341 --> 00:19:03.085 important where communities may have only one means of communications, 00:19:03.097 --> 00:19:08.122 such as voice over IP technology, that has been replace, that has replaced 00:19:08.134 --> 00:19:13.341 traditional copper telephone lines. Loss of communications networks during an 00:19:13.353 --> 00:19:18.504 emergency is a matter of life and death to the people of California. Without 00:19:18.516 --> 00:19:23.460 reliable access to 911 and ability to quickly reach first responders, our 00:19:23.472 --> 00:19:28.831 communities cannot effectively protect themselves during an emergency. CalFire, 00:19:28.843 --> 00:19:34.052 along with our other public safety partners, stand ready to assist in efforts 00:19:34.064 --> 00:19:39.352 to make our networks more resilient to disasters and to ensure that the public 00:19:39.364 --> 00:19:44.446 has access to uninterrupted communications during emergencies. So on behalf 00:19:44.458 --> 00:19:49.484 of CalFire, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to speak today. 00:19:49.509 --> 00:19:52.284 I would just like 00:19:52.296 --> 00:19:55.025 to thank you personally, Chief Wilson, for the 00:19:55.037 --> 00:19:58.080 extraordinary help you provided to the PUC in all of 00:19:58.092 --> 00:20:01.147 our wildfire safety efforts over the past few years. 00:20:01.172 --> 00:20:02.627 My pleasure. Thank you. 00:20:02.652 --> 00:20:08.051 Thank you very much, Chief.. Appreciate it. Will. 00:20:08.063 --> 00:20:12.856 Will Abrams is next, and that will be followed by Louis Rocha. 00:20:12.881 --> 00:20:16.320 Thank you, Commissioners. Thank 00:20:16.320 --> 00:20:21.931 you, President Batjer. Thank you for calling this very important 00:20:21.943 --> 00:20:27.847 meeting. I will be seeking party status, but I'm not there yet, so I didn't want to 00:20:27.859 --> 00:20:33.687 make a public statement. To sort of hammer home the importance of this proceeding. 00:20:33.699 --> 00:20:36.994 So I'm a wildfire survivor. Woke up in October 00:20:37.006 --> 00:20:39.680 8, 2017, and the communication that I 00:20:39.692 --> 00:20:45.657 received were my two young children screaming that our house is on fire and our yard 00:20:45.669 --> 00:20:51.506 was on fire and we needed to leave. This is what we're here to talk about today is 00:20:51.518 --> 00:20:57.419 making sure that the communications that are received are effective, and it's very, 00:20:57.431 --> 00:21:03.274 very important for the lives and livelihoods of the people who live in California. 00:21:03.286 --> 00:21:06.567 I am also in an area now where I am undergoing 00:21:06.579 --> 00:21:09.101 my sixth power safety shut off, and 00:21:09.113 --> 00:21:15.010 my kids are off school today. Their school is closed for the next two days. This is 00:21:15.022 --> 00:21:20.772 not sustainable in terms of the power shut offs. It's not sustainable in terms of 00:21:20.784 --> 00:21:26.687 the wildfires. And I would just submit to you that this is not a choice of choosing 00:21:26.699 --> 00:21:32.446 between having more power shut off, at this rate, and having sustained wildfires. 00:21:32.458 --> 00:21:38.006 We need to find solutions. I challenge everyone in this room to look for those 00:21:38.018 --> 00:21:44.193 solutions. We need to be creative. We need to be innovative. And we need to be thinking 00:21:44.205 --> 00:21:49.830 about the lives of the individuals who live in California. Thank you very much. 00:21:49.855 --> 00:21:51.150 Thank you very much, 00:21:51.150 --> 00:21:54.289 Mr Abrams. And next Loius Rocha from 00:21:54.301 --> 00:21:57.230 the Communication Workers of America. Thank you, sir. 00:22:07.230 --> 00:22:12.574 President Batjer and Commissioners. Good morning. My name is 00:22:12.586 --> 00:22:17.871 Louis Roach, and I'm a staff representative with the Communication Workers 00:22:17.883 --> 00:22:22.880 of America here in California. We represent over 20,000 workers in the 00:22:22.892 --> 00:22:28.395 telecommunications industry here in California. That includes wireless sector 00:22:28.407 --> 00:22:33.613 workers. We're concerned about the reliability, or better stated, lack of 00:22:33.625 --> 00:22:39.054 reliability of the telecommunication networks in California during wildfires 00:22:39.066 --> 00:22:44.066 and the subsequent power safety shutoffs. Specifically, the inadequate 00:22:44.078 --> 00:22:49.654 measures to ensure network operation during wildfires. CWBA members are repair 00:22:49.666 --> 00:22:54.862 technicians who respond to restore network outages need reliable network, 00:22:54.874 --> 00:23:00.222 first, to be notified. We are also consumers and the Internet, wireline and 00:23:00.234 --> 00:23:05.506 cell phones, when they are all out at the same time, this is unacceptable. 00:23:05.518 --> 00:23:10.590 There's no way to communicate with those that are supposed to go out to 00:23:10.602 --> 00:23:15.871 repair those networks. It's unacceptable not only for the technicians, the 00:23:15.883 --> 00:23:21.164 repair technicians, but also for the consumers. We need reliable networks. 00:23:21.176 --> 00:23:26.380 We need alternative power sources that are planned out in advance and are 00:23:26.392 --> 00:23:31.679 not knee jerk. A company's bottom line cannot dictate capital investments. 00:23:31.679 --> 00:23:38.333 The communications networks, the communication network is prone 00:23:38.345 --> 00:23:44.589 to natural and man-made disasters. It is a reality. We need a enforceable 00:23:44.601 --> 00:23:50.670 and universal guarantee of communication services. Self Policing by the 00:23:50.682 --> 00:23:56.594 company's isn't the path forward. Oversight is. In years past, repair 00:23:56.606 --> 00:24:02.735 technicians went into areas after the wildfires were completely out. Now 00:24:02.747 --> 00:24:08.973 utility power linemen as well as communications we go in while the fire's 00:24:08.985 --> 00:24:14.867 are still raging. And I applaud the CPUCs for its continued oversight 00:24:14.879 --> 00:24:20.942 and urge bold actions to hold all communications companies accountable. 00:24:20.967 --> 00:24:26.164 Thank you, Mr Rocha. We do have on the sign up 00:24:26.176 --> 00:24:31.619 sheet John Kennedy, Regina Costa, and Elizabeth Eccles. The judge has 00:24:31.631 --> 00:24:37.027 asked that you speak during thes scoping portion of the agenda today. 00:24:37.039 --> 00:24:42.139 Having said that, is there anybody else in the audience who would 00:24:42.139 --> 00:24:48.333 like to address the Commission at this time? 00:24:48.358 --> 00:24:54.389 Okay, seeing none, the public comment period, oh, yes, sir. p.lease, 00:24:54.389 --> 00:25:03.409 You could just state your name and your home, your address, 00:25:03.409 --> 00:25:08.541 Eric Bach. I'm with E Tech, and I'm out of Concord, California. So 00:25:08.553 --> 00:25:13.762 thank, thank you, President Batjer and Judge Rizzo. California has been a leader 00:25:13.774 --> 00:25:18.655 in the US in clean energy policy, has really been progressive in innovative 00:25:18.667 --> 00:25:24.011 solutions and when looking at addressing challenges opposed to it. And I think the 00:25:24.023 --> 00:25:29.416 key focus here is innovation. As you take a look at the challenges around providing 00:25:29.428 --> 00:25:34.447 backup generation, in these instances, and how do we go about solving for it? 00:25:34.459 --> 00:25:39.278 And so as we think about this, these are complex problems that really need 00:25:39.290 --> 00:25:44.572 innovative solutions. And so as I think about you, as we move forward to the next 00:25:44.584 --> 00:25:49.839 phase, my ask to the Commission is that to include a part of that phase, to begin 00:25:49.851 --> 00:25:54.860 looking at what type of innovative solutions are there? Whether it's hydrogen 00:25:54.872 --> 00:26:00.068 or the integration of fuel cells with solar, or battery, and energy storage. But 00:26:00.080 --> 00:26:05.095 how do we begin thinking about addressing this, and how do you want to afford 00:26:05.107 --> 00:26:10.365 with it? So I think this is an opportunity for us to continue to take a situation 00:26:10.377 --> 00:26:15.325 that it may be challenging for the residents and everyone in California. How 00:26:15.337 --> 00:26:20.536 do we take it? And how do we think about moving forward and looking at something 00:26:20.548 --> 00:26:25.695 that would take us to where we want to be in the future and in 2045? Thank you. 00:26:25.720 --> 00:26:27.978 Thank you, sir. Is there anyone 00:26:27.990 --> 00:26:29.999 else in the audience would like to address the 00:26:29.999 --> 00:26:35.654 Commission at this time. Reggie. Please come forward 00:26:35.666 --> 00:26:41.177 again. And again, we'll need to have you introduce yourself. Thank you. 00:26:41.202 --> 00:26:47.043 Good morning. I'm Paul Troxell with the California Governor's 00:26:47.055 --> 00:26:53.058 Office of Emergency Services, 911 Communications branch. The challenge today is 00:26:53.070 --> 00:26:58.842 obtaining accurate near-real time data of any significant degradation of the 00:26:58.854 --> 00:27:02.448 telecommunications grid, wireless and wireline, 00:27:02.460 --> 00:27:05.239 so that CalOES can ensure that local 00:27:05.251 --> 00:27:11.546 agencies receive information in system status related to the communication systems. 00:27:11.558 --> 00:27:17.414 Our ability to provide this information to local agencies is solely dependent 00:27:17.426 --> 00:27:23.576 on the data provided by the telecommunication service providers. During the power 00:27:23.588 --> 00:27:29.450 safety power shut offs. The event that occurred October 24th through November 00:27:29.462 --> 00:27:35.680 1st, CalOES obtained data from multiple sources that included the FCC DIRS reports 00:27:35.692 --> 00:27:41.322 in the CUEA reports. During the extended power safety shutoff, hundreds of 00:27:41.334 --> 00:27:47.633 thousands were without wireline, voice over IP, and Internet services. In addition, 00:27:47.645 --> 00:27:53.656 hundreds of wireless sites were offline. Together, these communications systems 00:27:53.668 --> 00:27:59.588 provide the access to 911, the ability of public safety officials to alert the 00:27:59.600 --> 00:28:05.758 community through emergency alerting systems, and provide access to websites that 00:28:05.770 --> 00:28:11.396 provide critical information and are the main communication method used by 00:28:11.408 --> 00:28:17.798 non-public safety agencies to provide the coordinated response and recovery efforts. 00:28:17.810 --> 00:28:21.316 The solution is clear. The wireline, wireless, 00:28:21.328 --> 00:28:24.172 and VoIP providers must be designated 00:28:24.184 --> 00:28:30.109 with sufficient backup power and reliable, redundant backhole connectivity, so 00:28:30.121 --> 00:28:36.415 that outages seen during the October 2019 event can be avoided in the future. Until 00:28:36.427 --> 00:28:42.207 a resilient, reliable communication network is in place, local agencies need 00:28:42.219 --> 00:28:48.584 to know when communications systems used by those in their community are potentially 00:28:48.596 --> 00:28:54.073 impacted by a disaster. Today, the current outage reporting systems have 00:28:54.085 --> 00:29:00.307 many gaps. The data received by Cal OES from DIRS and the CUEA is inconsistent and 00:29:00.319 --> 00:29:06.252 at times the numbers, the number of outages varied significantly. One example, 00:29:06.264 --> 00:29:12.478 we were reported wireline customers out of servicewere 223,973 in the DIRS report, 00:29:12.490 --> 00:29:18.116 while the CUEA report reported 56,898. That's a difference of over 167,000 00:29:18.128 --> 00:29:24.423 customers. As another example, one of the days in the single county, wireless sites 00:29:24.435 --> 00:29:30.291 were out of service. It was reported 133 sites in the DIRS report, while CUEA 00:29:30.303 --> 00:29:36.971 reported nine, a difference of 124 wireless sites. The inconsistency of outage reporting 00:29:36.983 --> 00:29:42.837 means that CalOES does not have a reliable way to report detailed information 00:29:42.849 --> 00:29:48.546 to the local agencies. Here's a snapshot of some of the outage reports from 00:29:48.558 --> 00:29:54.493 that PSPS event. Outage data was not reported by all providers. Some providers 00:29:54.518 --> 00:30:00.261 were very responsive and provided outage data as requested by CalOES. 00:30:00.273 --> 00:30:06.095 While others were slow to respond due to confidentiality concerns related outage data. 00:30:06.107 --> 00:30:09.304 Frankly, information from the wireline and VoIP 00:30:09.316 --> 00:30:12.325 providers was not provided until late in the 00:30:12.337 --> 00:30:18.232 event. Because of lack, the lack of complete reporting, CalOES had to work with Federal 00:30:18.244 --> 00:30:21.038 Communications Commission to activate the 00:30:21.050 --> 00:30:24.258 Disaster Information Reporting System. The DIRS 00:30:24.270 --> 00:30:27.003 report. DIRS does not provide everything 00:30:27.015 --> 00:30:30.162 needed to support response operations. This is 00:30:30.174 --> 00:30:36.194 voluntary information. The detailed reports by carrier are considered confidential by the 00:30:36.206 --> 00:30:39.344 FCC, and the data reported to DIRS is at least 00:30:39.356 --> 00:30:42.506 12 to 24 hours old. By the time this report is 00:30:42.518 --> 00:30:48.463 made public, this means the data cannot be used to support incident management. Further, 00:30:48.475 --> 00:30:51.676 public DIRS data is only listed as an aggregate 00:30:51.688 --> 00:30:54.634 level, which does not provide the necessary 00:30:54.646 --> 00:31:00.329 fidelity of decision making, excuse me, decision making. Wireless data at the county 00:31:00.341 --> 00:31:06.237 level for all carriers while wire line and VoiP data is at the state level. Some of the 00:31:06.249 --> 00:31:09.513 challenges that CalOES faced. Telecommunications 00:31:09.525 --> 00:31:12.600 providers were concerned over confidentiality 00:31:12.612 --> 00:31:18.573 of the data. Aggregated data did not provide information needed to make decisions at the 00:31:18.585 --> 00:31:21.650 local level. And limited reporting due to the 00:31:21.662 --> 00:31:24.740 ability to determine the impact of the entire 00:31:24.752 --> 00:31:27.891 communications system. Again, from our vantage 00:31:27.903 --> 00:31:30.652 point, it appears that telecommunication 00:31:30.664 --> 00:31:36.470 service providers solution to mitigate the PSPS impacts was largely confined to use of 00:31:36.482 --> 00:31:39.681 temporary generators. They called in generators 00:31:39.693 --> 00:31:42.703 in from within and out of the state. In some 00:31:42.715 --> 00:31:48.728 cases, this proved problematic as the out of state generators were not in compliance with 00:31:48.740 --> 00:31:54.699 the California Air Resources Board standards, meaning it took additional time to get the 00:31:54.711 --> 00:32:00.520 generator put in place. CalOES recommends that the service providers look at long term 00:32:00.532 --> 00:32:04.067 solutions that is necessary to ensure communications 00:32:04.079 --> 00:32:06.823 facilities have a minimum of eight hours 00:32:06.835 --> 00:32:09.764 battery backup, permanent generator back up 00:32:09.776 --> 00:32:12.985 with a minimum 72 hours of onsite fuel storage. 00:32:12.997 --> 00:32:18.825 Due to the increased reliance of IP backhaul, allwireless, wireline, VoiP and backhole 00:32:18.837 --> 00:32:24.779 facilities must all have sufficient backup power. The outage reporting regulations being 00:32:24.791 --> 00:32:30.544 developed as we speak in response to SB 670 will address many of the outage reporting 00:32:30.556 --> 00:32:33.685 challenges. Those outage reporting regulations 00:32:33.697 --> 00:32:36.504 will focus on actionable information that 00:32:36.516 --> 00:32:39.317 could be shared with local primary safety 00:32:39.329 --> 00:32:42.610 answering points, fire, law, and EMS agencies in 00:32:42.622 --> 00:32:48.433 California. Ultimately, the employment of the public safety grade standards across the 00:32:48.445 --> 00:32:51.914 telecommunications infrastructure will minimize the 00:32:51.926 --> 00:32:55.072 emphasis we're placing on the outage reporting 00:32:55.084 --> 00:33:00.767 today. As systems will become significantly more resilient and able to withstand the 00:33:00.779 --> 00:33:03.916 hazards that are currently bringing them down. 00:33:03.928 --> 00:33:06.809 Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much. 00:33:06.834 --> 00:33:10.176 Paul thank you very, yes. 00:33:10.188 --> 00:33:13.616 Thank you very much. You have very well stated 00:33:13.628 --> 00:33:17.268 why we're here today and I think OES and Director 00:33:17.280 --> 00:33:20.275 Ghilarducci for all of his extraordinary 00:33:20.287 --> 00:33:26.747 work during this period of time. Thank you. Are there any other members of the public or 00:33:26.759 --> 00:33:30.674 people who are here in the audience? Yes, Supervisor. 00:33:30.686 --> 00:33:33.667 Please come forward and state your name. 00:33:36.929 --> 00:33:39.943 Good afternoon, Commissioners, 00:33:39.955 --> 00:33:43.048 or good morning. Sorry, my electricity wasn't 00:33:43.060 --> 00:33:46.417 working because we're currently in a PSPS in Lake 00:33:46.429 --> 00:33:49.529 County. So sorry about the time mix up there. 00:33:49.541 --> 00:33:52.558 I come to you today to report on the October 00:33:52.570 --> 00:33:55.801 26th power outage, but present some information 00:33:55.813 --> 00:33:58.971 from our special district's coordinator, Janet 00:33:58.983 --> 00:34:01.680 Carpenter, about telecommunications and 00:34:01.692 --> 00:34:04.977 how it affected us in Lake County, for our sewer 00:34:04.989 --> 00:34:08.219 and our water systems. And just for information 00:34:08.231 --> 00:34:11.522 wise, AT&T went down immediately in Lake County. 00:34:11.534 --> 00:34:14.231 And that runs all of our sewer systems, 00:34:14.243 --> 00:34:17.531 that runs our alarm systems. So we had gentlemen 00:34:17.543 --> 00:34:20.506 out there, a lot of folks out there working 00:34:20.518 --> 00:34:26.388 with generators, but they weren't able to communicate with the system, as it went down 00:34:26.400 --> 00:34:29.751 immediately with no backup generation, obviously, 00:34:29.763 --> 00:34:32.454 from their end, to communicate with our 00:34:32.466 --> 00:34:35.823 systems, and that really put us in a dire straits 00:34:35.835 --> 00:34:38.935 situation. It also created at least one spill 00:34:38.947 --> 00:34:42.167 that was uncontainable. And that's unacceptable 00:34:42.179 --> 00:34:45.142 at this point, it also lasted multiple days 00:34:45.154 --> 00:34:47.907 after the power had come back on for our 00:34:47.919 --> 00:34:51.090 facilities and our alarm systems. There wil be 00:34:51.102 --> 00:34:54.320 more information that I will be able to provide 00:34:54.332 --> 00:34:57.563 to the Commission. But I just wanted to be here 00:34:57.575 --> 00:35:00.665 today to make sure that everybody in the PSPS 00:35:00.677 --> 00:35:03.846 is prepared as possible. Just as we're telling 00:35:03.858 --> 00:35:06.742 our communities to be prepared, we need to 00:35:06.754 --> 00:35:09.920 have our telecommunications really be prepared 00:35:09.932 --> 00:35:16.006 for multiple days of outages and definitely being prepared for at least 48 hours to start 00:35:16.018 --> 00:35:19.299 with, would be a real benefit. As a large county 00:35:19.311 --> 00:35:22.201 in the rural areas, after the Valley fire, 00:35:22.213 --> 00:35:25.030 you have the Cobb Mountain area, where we 00:35:25.042 --> 00:35:28.206 consolidated 14 small water companies into one 00:35:28.218 --> 00:35:34.206 facility. We turned that over to now our Cobb Area water district. And they had the same 00:35:34.218 --> 00:35:37.441 problems. All the media comm was down, which is 00:35:37.453 --> 00:35:40.756 our local provider. AT&T completely went down. T 00:35:40.768 --> 00:35:43.983 Mobile. US cellular. Verizon was there, in some 00:35:43.995 --> 00:35:46.887 circumstances, to help us move through the 00:35:46.899 --> 00:35:50.323 process. But this is just multiple problems on top 00:35:50.335 --> 00:35:53.434 the other. Obviously, I've been here to these 00:35:53.446 --> 00:35:56.665 hearings, have been to the Senate hearings that 00:35:56.677 --> 00:35:59.773 happened this week. Saw yourself, Chairwoman, 00:35:59.785 --> 00:36:02.943 over there presenting. And I just want to make 00:36:02.955 --> 00:36:05.787 sure that you know that this is affecting 00:36:05.799 --> 00:36:09.014 us. One thing I mentioned at the Senate hearing 00:36:09.026 --> 00:36:11.984 was, and I heard it a couple times, was oh, 00:36:11.996 --> 00:36:15.150 it's only 24 hours. Well, if you combine those 00:36:15.162 --> 00:36:18.260 with all the times that we have been shut off 00:36:18.272 --> 00:36:21.625 in the rural areas because of these PS PS events, 00:36:21.637 --> 00:36:24.598 it really compounds things. Once again, all 00:36:24.610 --> 00:36:27.766 the children in my school district in Southern 00:36:27.778 --> 00:36:30.677 Lake County are not in school, and they're 00:36:30.689 --> 00:36:33.704 potentially not in school for two more days, 00:36:33.716 --> 00:36:36.945 then they have to Thanksgiving break coming up. 00:36:36.957 --> 00:36:39.842 And so we are really doing a disservice to 00:36:39.854 --> 00:36:43.021 educate the next generation of leaders in this 00:36:43.033 --> 00:36:46.185 country, especially in the state of California 00:36:46.197 --> 00:36:48.890 here. And I will continue coming to the 00:36:48.902 --> 00:36:52.195 meetings providing information. And I appreciate 00:36:52.207 --> 00:36:55.310 the time to speak today. Thank you very much. 00:36:55.335 --> 00:36:57.686 We appreciate you. For the record, please 00:36:57.698 --> 00:37:00.290 restate, you're well known to us, sir, but please restate your name. 00:37:00.290 --> 00:37:03.868 I apologize. Moke Simon, District One 00:37:03.880 --> 00:37:07.815 Supervisor, Lake County. I'm also the tribal chairman of 00:37:07.827 --> 00:37:11.411 the Middletown Rancheria of Pomo Indians. And, it's 00:37:11.423 --> 00:37:15.226 just unacceptable. Like I said before, I've got to get 00:37:15.238 --> 00:37:19.008 back to our district because we have no power now, for 00:37:19.020 --> 00:37:22.597 the next 48 hours, just like I think the number was 00:37:22.609 --> 00:37:26.317 136,000 people in Northern California are affected by 00:37:26.329 --> 00:37:30.255 this PSPS event that's going on. So thank you very much. 00:37:30.280 --> 00:37:36.484 Thank you, sir. Thank you very much. Is there anyone else in the 00:37:36.496 --> 00:37:42.566 audience would like to address the Commission in the public comment period? Anyone? 00:37:42.591 --> 00:37:49.389 Okay. All right, I see none. Then, therefore, that ends the public 00:37:49.401 --> 00:37:56.133 comment portion of the hearing today, and I will turn the hearing back to Judge Rizzo. 00:37:56.158 --> 00:38:00.091 Thank you, President Batjer. The record 00:38:00.103 --> 00:38:03.761 will reflect at the public comment portion of this 00:38:03.773 --> 00:38:08.358 prehearing conference has concluded. The prehearing evidentiary 00:38:08.370 --> 00:38:12.106 portion now resumes. Next, we will proceed with the 00:38:12.118 --> 00:38:15.893 service list and party status. So we will begin with 00:38:15.905 --> 00:38:19.906 identifying the representatives from the communications 00:38:19.918 --> 00:38:23.985 industry that are present. One by one. Please state your 00:38:23.997 --> 00:38:27.790 name and your, the company from which you represent. 00:38:27.790 --> 00:38:34.416 Good morning. Sorry about that. My name is John 00:38:34.428 --> 00:38:40.750 Gotter. I am the regional senior vice president for Comcast. 00:38:40.775 --> 00:38:44.738 Good morning. Alison Ellis, senior vice 00:38:44.750 --> 00:38:48.794 president, regulatory affairs for Frontier Communications. 00:38:48.819 --> 00:38:54.248 Morning. Amon O'Leary, vice president, network operations for Sprint. 00:38:54.273 --> 00:39:00.361 Good morning. My name is Rudy Reyes. I am Vice President and associate 00:39:00.360 --> 00:39:03.875 general counsel for Verizon in the Western United 00:39:03.887 --> 00:39:06.921 States. I lead legal regulatory, government 00:39:06.921 --> 00:39:11.309 affairs and community engagement throughout the west. 00:39:11.334 --> 00:39:15.708 Morning. My name is Jeff Long, I am the vice President of construction and 00:39:15.720 --> 00:39:19.956 operation for the West region, responsible for both wireless and wireline facilities. 00:39:19.981 --> 00:39:23.312 Morning. David Gallagher, I'm the 00:39:23.324 --> 00:39:26.792 senior vice president for T Mobile responsible for the 00:39:26.804 --> 00:39:30.361 Western United States, including California. I live here 00:39:30.373 --> 00:39:33.880 in Northern California, so been a resident for 24 years 00:39:33.905 --> 00:39:37.938 Good morning. My name is Sam Matisha. I'm the senior 00:39:37.950 --> 00:39:42.055 vice president and region manager for Cox Communications, California. 00:39:42.080 --> 00:39:47.298 Good morning. I'm Deborah Piccolo, Charter Communications, 00:39:47.310 --> 00:39:52.472 senior vice president of field operations, including the state of California. 00:39:52.497 --> 00:39:58.410 Thank you. Next, I will have parties who are here 00:39:58.410 --> 00:40:01.410 to make an appearance, come to the mic and state their 00:40:01.422 --> 00:40:04.050 name and their organization. We will begin with. 00:40:08.183 --> 00:40:17.018 John Kennedy, Rural County Representatives of California 00:40:17.043 --> 00:40:20.480 as you approach the mic line up 00:40:24.233 --> 00:40:32.601 Shawnee Lee, senior counsel, Regulatory Southern California Gas 00:40:32.626 --> 00:40:37.404 Laurie Dulquist, California Water Association. 00:40:37.429 --> 00:40:40.944 Good morning. Paul Goodman with the Greenlining 00:40:40.956 --> 00:40:44.758 Institute. We're not currently a party, but I did, Paul Goodman with 00:40:44.770 --> 00:40:48.154 the Greenlining Institute. We're not currently a party. I did 00:40:48.166 --> 00:40:51.780 fill out a yellow form although I'm not sure where it got off to. 00:40:53.050 --> 00:40:55.430 Okay, I will get that. And when 00:40:55.442 --> 00:40:57.783 we get to the motions for party status, we'll 00:40:57.795 --> 00:41:02.286 address it. Thank you. So I only would like to hear from the parties who are currently, 00:41:02.298 --> 00:41:04.262 I would like to hear at this point from 00:41:04.274 --> 00:41:06.756 organizations that are currently parties of the 00:41:06.768 --> 00:41:11.290 proceeding. And then we'll handle motions for party status after we conclude this round. 00:41:11.315 --> 00:41:15.306 Thank you, Your Honor. Regina Costa of the 00:41:15.318 --> 00:41:20.203 telecommunications policy director for TURN, the Utility Reform Network. 00:41:20.228 --> 00:41:24.410 Good morning. Melissa Kaznitz, 00:41:24.422 --> 00:41:27.861 legal director with Center for Accessible 00:41:27.860 --> 00:41:30.593 Technology, one of the consumer groups. I'll also 00:41:30.605 --> 00:41:33.020 note that a representative from the National 00:41:33.020 --> 00:41:38.340 Consumer Law Center, which was identified in the pre hearing conference notice, is not 00:41:38.340 --> 00:41:41.120 here in attendance today. She's based in Washington, 00:41:41.132 --> 00:41:43.450 D. C. That's Olivia Wein, but I'm aware that 00:41:43.450 --> 00:41:46.158 she is monitoring through the Webcast. 00:41:46.183 --> 00:41:47.061 Thank you. 00:41:48.434 --> 00:41:53.489 Good morning, Your Honor and Commissioners. Chris 00:41:53.501 --> 00:41:58.490 Lyons, attorney on behalf of San Diego Gas and Electric Company. 00:41:58.515 --> 00:42:02.463 Good Morning Commissioners. Patrick Rossball 00:42:02.475 --> 00:42:06.070 appearing for the Small Ex and Consolidated Communications. 00:42:06.070 --> 00:42:10.258 Good morning. I'm Jean Armstrong, 00:42:10.270 --> 00:42:14.390 outside counsel for CTIA. The Wireless Association. 00:42:14.390 --> 00:42:19.302 Good morning. Mike Morelli, Southern California 00:42:19.314 --> 00:42:23.930 Edison and Vice President of the business Customer division. 00:42:23.955 --> 00:42:28.483 Good morning, Olivia Samad with 00:42:28.495 --> 00:42:33.413 Southern California Edison. I'm the attorney for SCE 00:42:33.438 --> 00:42:39.683 Good morning, Jermoe Candelaria with the California Cable 00:42:39.695 --> 00:42:45.794 and Telecommunications Association. Where am I am Vice President and counsel. 00:42:45.819 --> 00:42:49.899 Good morning. I'm Stacey Walter, 00:42:49.911 --> 00:42:53.753 attorney for Pacific Gas and Electric Company. 00:42:53.778 --> 00:42:58.984 Good morning, Deborah Phones from Pacific 00:42:58.996 --> 00:43:04.214 Gas and Electric Company, vice president of customer service 00:43:04.239 --> 00:43:07.793 Sharlan Hook, representing Public 00:43:07.805 --> 00:43:11.371 Advocate's office. And we also have our director, 00:43:11.383 --> 00:43:17.669 Elizabeth Eccles, here today who would like to make a statement at the appropriate time. 00:43:17.694 --> 00:43:20.813 Your Honor. James McTarnahan, 00:43:20.825 --> 00:43:23.768 representing Charter. It wasn't clear if those 00:43:23.780 --> 00:43:26.935 of us who have people at the table needed to enter 00:43:26.947 --> 00:43:29.741 appearance. So for clarification, should we? 00:43:29.766 --> 00:43:30.362 Yes. 00:43:30.387 --> 00:43:34.168 All right. Well, I'm James McTarnahan 00:43:34.180 --> 00:43:37.646 from Perkins Kui representing Charter Communications. 00:43:37.671 --> 00:43:40.019 Good morning, Commissioners. 00:43:40.031 --> 00:43:41.639 And Your Honors this is Suzanne 00:43:41.651 --> 00:43:45.328 Toller from Davis Wright Tremaine amounts. I outside counsel for Comcast. 00:43:45.353 --> 00:43:47.669 Good morning, Your Honor's 00:43:47.681 --> 00:43:50.008 Leon Bloomfield for T Mobile, outside counsel. 00:43:50.033 --> 00:43:53.613 Good morning, Your Honor. Steve 00:43:53.625 --> 00:43:57.140 Kutka for Sprint, director and senior counsel. 00:43:57.165 --> 00:44:01.734 Good morning, Your Honors, 00:44:01.746 --> 00:44:06.132 Kristen Jacobson, outside counsel for Sprint. 00:44:06.157 --> 00:44:09.353 David Disher with AT&T 00:44:09.378 --> 00:44:15.119 Good morning, Sara Banola, outside counsel for Frontier 00:44:15.144 --> 00:44:22.778 Hi, it's Susan Lipper with Director of Government Affairs for T Mobile. 00:44:22.803 --> 00:44:29.003 Good morning, Zeb Zankell, outside counsel for Cox. 00:44:29.027 --> 00:44:35.080 Good morning. My name's has Jesus Ramana, I'm with Verizon. Thank you. 00:44:35.105 --> 00:44:39.334 Hi. Good morning. I'm Josh Trouter. I'm 00:44:39.346 --> 00:44:43.359 senior government relations counsel for Crown Castle. 00:44:43.384 --> 00:44:46.768 Thank you. Is there any other party 00:44:46.780 --> 00:44:50.175 that needs to identify their appearance today that 00:44:50.187 --> 00:44:53.310 has not already? Seeing none. We'll be off the 00:44:53.322 --> 00:44:56.857 record for a moment. At this point, I will entertain 00:44:56.869 --> 00:45:00.106 motions for party status. If you haven't already 00:45:00.118 --> 00:45:03.500 filled out the yellow form, now would be the ideal 00:45:03.512 --> 00:45:06.821 time to do it. Is there anyone present that would 00:45:06.833 --> 00:45:10.021 like to obtain party status to this proceeding? 00:48:06.189 --> 00:48:09.641 Received one request for party status. We 00:48:09.653 --> 00:48:13.116 will address this via a ruling following this prehearing 00:48:13.128 --> 00:48:16.829 conference, given the time sensitivity that we're all under. 00:48:16.841 --> 00:48:20.250 So thank you for your motion. Next, we will address the 00:48:20.262 --> 00:48:23.656 categorization of this proceeding. In phase one of this 00:48:23.668 --> 00:48:27.621 proceeding, the Commission determined that this proceeding would 00:48:27.633 --> 00:48:31.155 be qualified legislative, therefore preliminarily Phase 2 00:48:31.167 --> 00:48:34.822 will also be considered quasi-legislative. Pursuant to Rule 00:48:34.834 --> 00:48:38.531 8.2a of the Commission's rules of practice and procedure, ex 00:48:38.543 --> 00:48:42.373 parte communications are therefore allowed without restriction 00:48:42.385 --> 00:48:45.601 or reporting requirement. I remind parties to please 00:48:45.613 --> 00:48:49.267 familiarize yourselves with the Commission's ex parte rules 00:48:49.279 --> 00:48:52.978 and refer to Article Eight of our rules. Consistent with the 00:48:52.990 --> 00:48:56.519 Commission's rules and the Public utilities code, a final 00:48:56.531 --> 00:49:00.054 determination of the categorization for phase two of this 00:49:00.066 --> 00:49:03.601 proceeding will be finalized in a scoping memo and ruling 00:49:03.613 --> 00:49:07.126 issued by President Batjer, the assigned Commissioner. It 00:49:07.138 --> 00:49:10.785 is also possible that there will be an adjudicatory portion 00:49:10.797 --> 00:49:14.256 to this proceeding in which a subsequent ruling would be 00:49:14.268 --> 00:49:17.860 issued for that track. The Commission's adjudicatory rules 00:49:17.872 --> 00:49:21.449 would apply prohibiting ex parte communication pursuant to 00:49:21.461 --> 00:49:24.867 Article eight of the Commission's rules of practice and 00:49:24.879 --> 00:49:28.462 procedure. Now I will turn to the scope of Phase 2. In the 00:49:28.474 --> 00:49:32.130 Assigned Commissioner Administrative Law Judges ruling, the 00:49:32.142 --> 00:49:35.961 preliminary scope for today's discussion is as follows. First, 00:49:35.973 --> 00:49:39.500 responsiveness of the communications providers during the 00:49:39.512 --> 00:49:43.033 latest wildfires in public safety power shut offs to keep 00:49:43.045 --> 00:49:46.639 telecommunication services, and two, their compliance with 00:49:46.651 --> 00:49:50.351 Commission Decision 1908025, and three, their engagement and 00:49:50.363 --> 00:49:54.198 timely responsiveness to requests from the Office of Emergency 00:49:54.210 --> 00:49:57.916 Services and the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. 00:49:57.928 --> 00:50:01.220 Now, I turn the president Batjer for the first issue. 00:50:01.220 --> 00:50:06.023 Thank you, Judge Rizzo. I will begin with questions 00:50:06.035 --> 00:50:10.649 for the wireless providers on their responsiveness during the latest 00:50:10.661 --> 00:50:15.738 wildfires and public safety power shut off, PSPS, to keep telecommunication 00:50:15.750 --> 00:50:19.633 services operating. Regarding public disclosure of outage 00:50:19.645 --> 00:50:24.585 information, Verizon's response to the Commission, Verizon stated, quote, 00:50:24.597 --> 00:50:29.214 it intends to publicly disclose Verizon's specific outage percentage 00:50:29.226 --> 00:50:33.837 information during disasters, so that people can compare our network 00:50:33.849 --> 00:50:38.674 performance during disaster to aggregate industry information collected 00:50:38.686 --> 00:50:43.548 and released by the FCC and it's DIRS reporting. It's on page six of the 00:50:43.560 --> 00:50:48.368 Verizon response. It is critical that the public know how communication 00:50:48.380 --> 00:50:53.115 providers perform, especially during times of crisis, as we have heard 00:50:53.127 --> 00:50:57.406 this morning in public comment. As I consider the scope of this 00:50:57.418 --> 00:51:02.083 next phase, I would like each company today to address whether public 00:51:02.095 --> 00:51:06.772 disclosure of outage information is necessary to ensure public safety 00:51:06.784 --> 00:51:11.322 in the time of crisis. I would like you to address this question in 00:51:11.334 --> 00:51:15.816 light, also, of the comments made by the representative of CalOES. 00:51:21.386 --> 00:51:24.924 Okay, so, now would be the time for the parties 00:51:24.936 --> 00:51:28.260 to respond to President Batjer. Who would like to go first? 00:51:28.285 --> 00:51:29.540 Why don't we start from? 00:51:29.540 --> 00:51:33.748 Left to right? We will do that. Mr Gotter? Please 00:51:33.760 --> 00:51:37.850 and say your name and the corporation from which you represent. 00:51:37.850 --> 00:51:42.638 Sure. John Gotter, regional senior vice president for 00:51:42.650 --> 00:51:47.102 Comcast in California. You know, as these PSPS events have been 00:51:47.114 --> 00:51:51.630 unprecedented, and it has been a challenge, one, to work through 00:51:51.642 --> 00:51:56.100 them, and two, define the right level of communication based on 00:51:56.112 --> 00:52:00.903 the requests that have come in. Our first focus, as we're continuing 00:52:00.915 --> 00:52:05.579 to learn through these PSPS events, was on public safety, employee 00:52:05.591 --> 00:52:10.458 safety, making sure that we support our customers and the communities 00:52:10.470 --> 00:52:14.443 in which we live and work. The first request that we got 00:52:14.455 --> 00:52:19.027 for information was for wireless providers. We are not a wireless 00:52:19.039 --> 00:52:23.971 facilities-based provider, so we did not respond to that. Subsequently 00:52:23.983 --> 00:52:28.491 we provided CalOES with updates twice a day on existing outages. 00:52:28.503 --> 00:52:32.676 As you know, in these events, they're widespread, sporadic, 00:52:32.688 --> 00:52:37.402 and a bit chaotic at times. So those numbers fluctuate. But we feel 00:52:37.414 --> 00:52:42.001 that, we responded as well as we could in a unique situation. And 00:52:42.013 --> 00:52:46.315 are certainly open to continuing to work with the agencies to 00:52:46.327 --> 00:52:50.990 understand how we can better provide information and support them. 00:52:51.015 --> 00:52:52.220 Do you 00:52:52.220 --> 00:52:59.450 know whether you responded with that data to OES as result of Director Ghilarducci 00:52:59.450 --> 00:53:05.150 letter? Or did you do it as a matter of course? 00:53:05.175 --> 00:53:09.130 I believe we have done it previously 00:53:09.130 --> 00:53:12.151 during other instances with North 00:53:12.163 --> 00:53:14.763 Bay fires, with the Paradise Butte County 00:53:14.775 --> 00:53:17.705 Fire. So I think we have a history of providing 00:53:17.717 --> 00:53:19.985 it even without the initial request. 00:53:20.010 --> 00:53:21.420 Okay. Thank you. 00:53:21.420 --> 00:53:26.821 I believe Miss Kaznitz. You'd like to respond or to make a comment. 00:53:26.846 --> 00:53:29.030 Have a question, if I may, 00:53:29.030 --> 00:53:32.454 Please. For the record, state your name and your organization. 00:53:32.479 --> 00:53:37.137 Thank you, Melissa Kaznitz with the Center for Accessible 00:53:37.149 --> 00:53:41.153 Technology, one of the consumer advocates. I very much appreciate 00:53:41.165 --> 00:53:45.526 the reference by President Batjer to responses provided by Verizon, but 00:53:45.538 --> 00:53:49.911 I'd like to note that as a party on the service list of the proceeding, 00:53:49.923 --> 00:53:54.205 we were only given non-confidential responses by four of the carriers, 00:53:54.217 --> 00:53:58.208 Charter, T Mobile, Cox and Comcast. So I would like to request on 00:53:58.220 --> 00:54:02.690 behalf of the parties that the information provided by the other carriers 00:54:02.702 --> 00:54:06.820 be served on the service list at the earliest possible opportunity, 00:54:06.820 --> 00:54:13.621 Noted for the record. Thank you. Commissioners, would you like to ask a 00:54:13.633 --> 00:54:20.525 question to Comcast? Okay. All right, we'll move down the line to the next. I apologize. 00:54:20.550 --> 00:54:24.082 Thank you, again, Alison Ellis, I'm senior vice 00:54:24.094 --> 00:54:27.421 president of regulatory affairs for Frontier Communications. 00:54:27.433 --> 00:54:31.135 First, I want to thank you for the opportunity to provide an update 00:54:31.147 --> 00:54:34.589 on our response to public safety power shut off events and the 00:54:34.601 --> 00:54:38.136 recent wildfires. Let me start by assuring you that every member 00:54:38.148 --> 00:54:41.805 of the Frontier team shares the state's concerns for public safety 00:54:41.817 --> 00:54:45.304 and take seriously our responsibility to provide communications 00:54:45.316 --> 00:54:48.979 services to our customers. Frontier's undertaken proactive efforts 00:54:48.991 --> 00:54:52.628 to maintain our network and address the current and future impacts 00:54:52.640 --> 00:54:56.343 to our customers during these unprecedented and extended commercial 00:54:56.355 --> 00:54:59.615 power outages. We're committed to addressing the challenges 00:54:59.627 --> 00:55:03.118 created by the PSP events for our operations, our customers and 00:55:03.130 --> 00:55:06.442 the communities we serve. That is why, from the outset we've 00:55:06.454 --> 00:55:09.996 been working collaboratively with California agencies, including 00:55:10.008 --> 00:55:13.654 daily reporting to CalOES, governments, utilities, and communities 00:55:13.666 --> 00:55:17.050 to mitigate to the extent possible the impact to our services 00:55:25.290 --> 00:55:31.019 I'm not sure. Same question that I must ask Mr Gotter. 00:55:31.031 --> 00:55:36.313 Do you know whether Frontier responded with data that was requested? 00:55:36.325 --> 00:55:41.715 Or that typically is distributed to CalOES in an emergency? Or did you 00:55:41.727 --> 00:55:46.900 only respond after you received a letter from Director Ghilarducci? 00:55:46.925 --> 00:55:51.486 It's my understanding that we had already been in communication 00:55:51.498 --> 00:55:55.902 with CalEOS prior to receiving that letter. We did also respond to the letter. 00:55:55.927 --> 00:56:00.340 Okay, Thank you. There'll be further questions on this later. 00:56:00.365 --> 00:56:03.178 As part of your 00:56:03.190 --> 00:56:06.077 question, also Verizon committed to disclosing 00:56:06.089 --> 00:56:08.909 specific outage percentage information during 00:56:08.921 --> 00:56:11.814 disasters. As part of your question, President 00:56:11.826 --> 00:56:14.626 Batjer, if each of these providers willing to 00:56:14.638 --> 00:56:17.451 commit to that same level of public reporting 00:56:17.463 --> 00:56:20.331 because I didn't hear it in answer from either 00:56:20.343 --> 00:56:22.978 Comcast or Frontier to that specific point 00:56:23.003 --> 00:56:26.217 And that is the data that we're looking 00:56:26.229 --> 00:56:28.918 for, that OES was looking for at the time as well. 00:56:28.943 --> 00:56:32.488 I could tell you that we worked hard 00:56:32.500 --> 00:56:35.925 to provide the reporting to the best of our ability 00:56:35.937 --> 00:56:39.092 based on the expedited requests. I can tell you 00:56:39.104 --> 00:56:42.337 that they are, they come at a time, and they are 00:56:42.349 --> 00:56:45.830 resource intensive, when we are focusing our efforts 00:56:45.842 --> 00:56:49.204 on emergency preparedness, emergency response, and 00:56:49.216 --> 00:56:52.704 maintenance of services. We're actually currently in 00:56:52.716 --> 00:56:56.150 the process of reviewing our internal processes and 00:56:56.162 --> 00:56:59.437 procedures to ensure that we can provide the most 00:56:59.449 --> 00:57:03.130 accurate and timely information possible. To the extent 00:57:03.142 --> 00:57:06.489 that there are recommended changes to the way that 00:57:06.501 --> 00:57:09.793 the reporting is being provided in in the future, 00:57:09.805 --> 00:57:13.149 we're absolutely prepared to take those under into 00:57:13.161 --> 00:57:17.043 consideration and under advisement and provide information 00:57:17.055 --> 00:57:20.339 to the CPUC as to what level of detail we're able 00:57:20.351 --> 00:57:23.580 to provide, you know, in such a short timeframe. 00:57:23.580 --> 00:57:30.463 When we're in the midst of a PSPS, and I think you used the word 00:57:30.475 --> 00:57:37.207 expedited request. It wasn't an expedited request. We were in emergency, so it was 00:57:37.219 --> 00:57:43.946 in the normal course of the event. And there wasn't, across the board as Paul from 00:57:43.958 --> 00:57:50.777 OES stated well, uniformed information coming into the center where we all were and 00:57:50.789 --> 00:57:57.736 dispatched, and the downstream impacts that that has on emergency services and indeed 00:57:57.748 --> 00:58:04.382 on impacted customers is extraordinary. So, to my colleague's comments, we do, we 00:58:04.394 --> 00:58:08.182 would like to know whether or not you're going 00:58:08.194 --> 00:58:11.428 to be making, as I asked, and I quoted, 00:58:11.440 --> 00:58:18.080 Verizon, available that kind of information. So if we could continue with Sprint. 00:58:18.105 --> 00:58:23.870 Amon O'Leary vice president, network operations with Sprint. During the 00:58:23.870 --> 00:58:26.403 emergency events, we have had 00:58:26.428 --> 00:58:30.058 You need to speak a little closer to the mike. Please, sir, 00:58:30.083 --> 00:58:33.661 I'm sorry. That's better. During the emergency 00:58:33.673 --> 00:58:37.320 situations, we had a representative at the Emergency Operations 00:58:37.332 --> 00:58:40.659 Center, the CalOES, at all times, and we have provided and 00:58:40.671 --> 00:58:43.953 commit to provide any other information that you require. 00:58:43.978 --> 00:58:48.652 Okay, just for the record, on that Saturday, I don't remember 00:58:48.664 --> 00:58:52.951 the date, the room that's designated for the telecommunications was pretty 00:58:52.963 --> 00:58:57.614 much empty in the morning. It was only after Mark Ghilarducci literally had calls 00:58:57.626 --> 00:59:02.005 out to the telcos that the representatives appeared later in that afternoon. 00:59:02.030 --> 00:59:04.364 That may be the case. In the 00:59:04.376 --> 00:59:06.879 future, we commit absolutely there at all times. 00:59:06.904 --> 00:59:08.140 And I hope you will also 00:59:08.140 --> 00:59:10.177 provide the outage data so that our first responders 00:59:10.189 --> 00:59:12.160 can get to people that desperately need assistance. 00:59:12.160 --> 00:59:13.323 We shall 00:59:13.348 --> 00:59:15.068 Thank you 00:59:15.093 --> 00:59:17.268 next. 00:59:17.292 --> 00:59:21.647 Thank you. President Batjer and Commissioners, ALJ. 00:59:21.659 --> 00:59:26.026 Thank you for the opportunity to appear and testify before you 00:59:26.038 --> 00:59:30.607 today. Verizon welcomes the opportunity to provide the Commission 00:59:30.619 --> 00:59:34.645 with additional information regarding our robust disaster 00:59:34.657 --> 00:59:39.362 relief preparedness and response efforts during the recent multiple 00:59:39.374 --> 00:59:43.606 public safety proactive shut offs and wildfire events. As we 00:59:43.618 --> 00:59:48.051 strove to demonstrate regarding our recent announcement that we 00:59:48.063 --> 00:59:52.370 will now publicly disclose our percentage of in service sites 00:59:52.382 --> 00:59:56.877 during the activation of the FCCs Disaster Information Reporting 00:59:56.889 --> 01:00:01.258 system, Verizon recognizes that collaboration and transparency 01:00:01.270 --> 01:00:05.910 among stakeholders is critical, particularly in this extraordinary 01:00:05.922 --> 01:00:10.227 and unprecedented and unprecedented new reality of power shut 01:00:10.239 --> 01:00:14.668 offs and wild scale wildfires as a result of climate change. We 01:00:14.680 --> 01:00:19.052 strongly believe that our network is best in class in terms of 01:00:19.064 --> 01:00:23.290 network resiliency, overlapping cell site design, and backup 01:00:23.302 --> 01:00:27.819 power availability. I'm pleased to report that our network fared 01:00:27.844 --> 01:00:33.409 very well during the recent proactive shut off events. Verizon was 01:00:33.421 --> 01:00:38.712 able to maintain service for the vast majority of our wireless sites that 01:00:38.724 --> 01:00:44.366 lost commercial power during the shut offs due to our robust backup power plan 01:00:44.378 --> 01:00:49.747 and network design. For example, President Batjer, you cited data from the 01:00:49.759 --> 01:00:55.541 FCC DIRS reports that at the height of the event on October the 28, the wireless 01:00:55.553 --> 01:01:00.704 industry collectively reported approximately 50%, 57% of its cell sites 01:01:00.716 --> 01:01:06.075 out of service. But by comparison, as you will see from the public reports 01:01:06.087 --> 01:01:11.673 were now making, only8% of Verizon cell sites were out of service and Verizon 01:01:11.698 --> 01:01:14.856 Is that in the impacted area? Because some of the 01:01:14.868 --> 01:01:18.084 statistics that I'm given are statewide statistic, is far off the mark 01:01:18.109 --> 01:01:20.523 In the impacted area, President 01:01:20.535 --> 01:01:23.130 Batjer. By county, DIRS is reported by county. 01:01:23.155 --> 01:01:24.404 Thank you, just wanted to clarify. Thank you. 01:01:24.429 --> 01:01:28.117 And in our letter that we submitted in response 01:01:28.129 --> 01:01:31.327 to your recent letter, we provided additional data 01:01:31.339 --> 01:01:34.782 regarding Napa and Sonoma counties, and we can provide 01:01:34.794 --> 01:01:37.998 any data you request regarding the other counties. 01:01:38.023 --> 01:01:40.871 I appreciate that greatly 01:01:40.895 --> 01:01:45.595 And then, to finally answer your question, instead of 01:01:45.607 --> 01:01:50.610 continuing with a prepared statement, I will just say that we strove 01:01:50.622 --> 01:01:55.546 to proactively, communicate regularly with CalOES and state leaders 01:01:55.558 --> 01:02:00.493 and this Commission regarding our, before and throughout the recent 01:02:00.505 --> 01:02:05.263 events. We do recognize that there's always room for improvement, 01:02:05.275 --> 01:02:09.900 and we are very much open to partnering with the Commission and 01:02:09.912 --> 01:02:14.675 CalOES, state and local leaders, to see how we can do better as a 01:02:14.687 --> 01:02:19.680 company and individually and collectively as an industry. Thank you. 01:02:19.680 --> 01:02:21.522 Thank you. Next. 01:02:21.547 --> 01:02:24.963 My name is Jeff Long. I'm the vice 01:02:24.975 --> 01:02:28.759 president of construction and operation for AT&T. My 01:02:28.771 --> 01:02:32.837 team is responsible for the construction and maintenance 01:02:32.849 --> 01:02:36.282 and operations of wireless and wireline network 01:02:36.294 --> 01:02:39.998 across the West, including California. I would like 01:02:40.010 --> 01:02:43.799 to say that, first off, I appreciate the opportunity 01:02:43.811 --> 01:02:47.593 to come here and speak to you about the efforts that 01:02:47.605 --> 01:02:51.399 we've taken to ensure the reliability of our network 01:02:51.411 --> 01:02:54.756 and ensure that our customers stayed connected 01:02:54.768 --> 01:02:58.769 throughout these trying times. We absolutely agree that 01:02:58.781 --> 01:03:02.490 communications is vital to our community. And we're 01:03:02.502 --> 01:03:05.937 fully committed to continue to provide the most 01:03:05.949 --> 01:03:09.726 reliable network that we can and continue to enhance 01:03:09.738 --> 01:03:13.456 our network to ensure that it is greater, even more 01:03:13.468 --> 01:03:17.037 reliable than it is, going to future, considering 01:03:17.049 --> 01:03:20.773 the unprecedented type of actions and, that's being 01:03:20.785 --> 01:03:24.412 driven by climate change and these power shutoffs. 01:03:24.424 --> 01:03:28.205 I'll tell you that from my team perspective, we have 01:03:28.217 --> 01:03:31.635 worked tirelessly, tirelessly with thousands of 01:03:31.647 --> 01:03:35.648 employees, thousands of assets prior, during, and after 01:03:35.660 --> 01:03:39.218 each of these events to ensure that we have great 01:03:39.230 --> 01:03:43.014 reliability from event to event. And although from a 01:03:43.026 --> 01:03:46.518 overall impact area perspective, 90%, 97% of the 01:03:46.530 --> 01:03:50.177 population maintained wireless service. There are, 01:03:50.189 --> 01:03:53.960 unfortunately, 3%, which is still too high, in terms 01:03:53.972 --> 01:03:57.898 of services not connecting, and we are put the actions 01:03:57.910 --> 01:04:01.401 in place. And actually, we have taken actions in 01:04:01.413 --> 01:04:05.059 place to actually improve the reliability of those 01:04:05.071 --> 01:04:08.773 networks. Specific to, in terms of the reporting of 01:04:08.785 --> 01:04:12.499 the information, I'm gonna go ahead and defer to my 01:04:12.511 --> 01:04:16.219 colleague as I am responsible for the operation and 01:04:16.231 --> 01:04:19.880 not reporting side of what AT&T's responsible for. 01:04:19.880 --> 01:04:22.650 Are you his colleague? Please state 01:04:22.662 --> 01:04:25.280 your name and for the record, your organization. 01:04:25.280 --> 01:04:28.910 My name is Walid Abdul Rahim. 01:04:28.922 --> 01:04:32.065 I'm an assistant vice president and counsel 01:04:32.077 --> 01:04:35.427 for AT&T. With regard to the reporting issues, 01:04:35.439 --> 01:04:38.230 I was personally involved in, from the 01:04:38.242 --> 01:04:41.570 beginning of October through the second PS PS, 01:04:41.582 --> 01:04:44.710 in the reporting efforts to CalOES. In the, 01:04:44.722 --> 01:04:50.917 I understand one of your questions is as to how that reporting went with regard to the 01:04:50.942 --> 01:04:53.961 if I may. Not to interrupt, 01:04:53.973 --> 01:04:56.815 but most importantly is the reporting of the 01:04:56.827 --> 01:04:59.663 data. What you reported also is important as 01:04:59.675 --> 01:05:02.586 when did you report it? And at what point did 01:05:02.598 --> 01:05:05.478 you report it? In other words, did you report 01:05:05.490 --> 01:05:08.382 it voluntarily, or did you only report it and 01:05:08.394 --> 01:05:11.217 did you only appear at the operations center 01:05:11.229 --> 01:05:14.127 once asked, directed by Director Ghilarducci? 01:05:14.152 --> 01:05:19.054 The answer is from the very beginning, we have 01:05:19.066 --> 01:05:23.618 had a presence at the State Operations Center, and that's been 01:05:23.630 --> 01:05:28.538 a process we've had for the last two years. We've had an individual 01:05:28.550 --> 01:05:32.747 through our external affairs organization at the desk. My 01:05:32.759 --> 01:05:37.592 understanding is that the way it works is that, when the operation 01:05:37.604 --> 01:05:42.521 center is activated, CUEA, is a permanent member of that operation. 01:05:42.533 --> 01:05:47.516 CUEA in turn will get a representative from the utilities to appear. 01:05:47.528 --> 01:05:52.089 AT&T is, I cannot say all the time there, but my understanding 01:05:52.101 --> 01:05:57.222 is pretty much all the time there. Now, with regard to data reporting, 01:05:57.234 --> 01:06:01.571 from the very first instance, at the beginning of the first 01:06:01.583 --> 01:06:06.058 large PSPS, CalOES put out an Excel spreadsheet, said, please 01:06:06.070 --> 01:06:10.702 fill this out. And that was the data sought, by county wireless 01:06:10.714 --> 01:06:15.114 sites down, and other information related to that. From that 01:06:15.126 --> 01:06:19.900 beginning, it was a three times per day when they were requesting 01:06:19.912 --> 01:06:24.680 the information. That spreadsheet changed over time, but from the 01:06:24.692 --> 01:06:29.254 very beginning, we were reporting that information through the 01:06:29.266 --> 01:06:33.659 long standing process of providing it through CUEA. That's a 01:06:33.671 --> 01:06:38.653 multiyear process that was in place. At some point, CalOES expressed 01:06:38.665 --> 01:06:43.424 that they wanted the information directly. Now, during this time, 01:06:43.436 --> 01:06:48.208 very chaotic, three times a day, we were reporting it through the 01:06:48.220 --> 01:06:52.759 normal process. There was this transition and shift. That took 01:06:52.771 --> 01:06:57.612 time. Once we we got through that, though, AT&T was reporting that 01:06:57.624 --> 01:07:02.097 information timely directly to CalOES. I will say there was a 01:07:02.109 --> 01:07:06.956 transition time, but I would beg some understanding because we had 01:07:06.968 --> 01:07:11.795 this long standing process through CUEA. With regard to the public 01:07:11.807 --> 01:07:16.213 reporting of outage percentages that Verizon was discussing. 01:07:16.225 --> 01:07:20.913 This is a concept that AT&T is new as far as a public reporting. 01:07:20.925 --> 01:07:25.626 However, it's not new with regard to AT&T involvement with first 01:07:25.638 --> 01:07:30.179 responders and CalOES. We have a longstanding external affairs 01:07:30.191 --> 01:07:34.889 organization that is in direct contact with first responders and 01:07:34.901 --> 01:07:39.520 CalOES, municipal, county, pretty much at every level. And that 01:07:39.532 --> 01:07:44.308 is a process that is entrenched, robust, and we will continue on. 01:07:44.333 --> 01:07:46.305 As to the 01:07:46.317 --> 01:07:48.758 specific commitment Verizon made, you're still 01:07:48.770 --> 01:07:53.310 thinking about it? I didn't hear the answer. Would you do it? Are you gonna do it or not? 01:07:53.310 --> 01:07:57.647 I haven't. I'm afraid I don't have a ready answer for you. 01:07:57.672 --> 01:08:01.312 Okay. That would be something 01:08:01.324 --> 01:08:04.367 we'd be very interested in hearing back from you. 01:08:04.392 --> 01:08:06.812 We'll get back to you. Thank you. 01:08:06.836 --> 01:08:10.822 Morning. David Gallagher, senior 01:08:10.834 --> 01:08:15.062 vice president, T Mobile, Engineering, responsible for 01:08:15.074 --> 01:08:19.065 West Region and California. I live here. I lived in 01:08:19.077 --> 01:08:22.927 Northern California for the last 24 years. I have 01:08:22.939 --> 01:08:26.619 had friends and family and even personally been 01:08:26.631 --> 01:08:30.939 impacted by the power shut offs and the fire events. So 01:08:30.951 --> 01:08:34.869 this is personal for me. T Mobile prides itself in 01:08:34.881 --> 01:08:38.810 having strong collaboration with state, local, and 01:08:38.822 --> 01:08:42.655 federal government. We and other stakeholders, we 01:08:42.667 --> 01:08:46.435 look forward to seeing how we can collaborate in 01:08:46.447 --> 01:08:50.748 meaningful ways to provide and improve a better outcome 01:08:50.760 --> 01:08:54.764 in future emergency events. As far as the question, 01:08:54.776 --> 01:08:59.074 we did voluntarily provide information on a three times 01:08:59.086 --> 01:09:02.934 a day basis before being asked to do so. T Mobile 01:09:02.946 --> 01:09:06.788 worked closely with the government affairs Office 01:09:06.800 --> 01:09:10.731 of Emergency Services and the California Utilities 01:09:10.743 --> 01:09:14.647 Emergency Association, and we provided regular and 01:09:14.659 --> 01:09:18.806 ongoing network status reports throughout the events. 01:09:18.818 --> 01:09:22.805 We embedded members of our engineering team as well 01:09:22.817 --> 01:09:26.509 as our government affairs teams in CalOES State 01:09:26.521 --> 01:09:30.736 Operations Emergency Center during the PSPS events and 01:09:30.748 --> 01:09:34.590 wildfires to ensure realtime communication on the 01:09:34.602 --> 01:09:38.593 status of our network. We also work with CalFire to 01:09:38.605 --> 01:09:42.376 ensure that we were taking all actions necessary 01:09:42.388 --> 01:09:46.294 to support their fire fighting operations. We also 01:09:46.306 --> 01:09:50.685 assisted Sanoma County during the fires to provide their 01:09:50.697 --> 01:09:54.763 emergency operations center with status updates from 01:09:54.775 --> 01:09:58.545 about our network. And we also provided coverage 01:09:58.557 --> 01:10:02.543 through cell and wheels and another means to radius 01:10:02.555 --> 01:10:06.321 evacuation centers within the county. The county 01:10:06.333 --> 01:10:10.171 also assisted us with gaining access to our sites 01:10:10.183 --> 01:10:14.110 once conditions permitted and it was safe to do so 01:10:14.135 --> 01:10:18.891 Again. I'm not sure we heard whether 01:10:18.903 --> 01:10:23.586 or not you're committed to putting forth, making public 01:10:23.598 --> 01:10:28.276 your data on on the outages. And also, not as important 01:10:28.288 --> 01:10:32.643 a question, but do you know whether you were at OES 01:10:32.655 --> 01:10:37.246 immediately when the PSPS was called? Or did you go to 01:10:37.258 --> 01:10:41.694 the center at the direction of Director Ghilarducci? 01:10:41.706 --> 01:10:46.554 First question is most important. Committed to, committed 01:10:46.566 --> 01:10:50.840 to reporting outages? As Horizon has committed to. 01:10:50.840 --> 01:10:54.502 Yes, we can commit to doing that. 01:10:54.514 --> 01:10:57.703 The second question was, when did we appeared 01:10:57.715 --> 01:11:01.209 at the CalOES center? I'm not sure exactly when. I 01:11:01.221 --> 01:11:04.590 believe that we were there prior to being asked. 01:11:04.615 --> 01:11:06.302 I'm gonna have you all, so we 01:11:06.314 --> 01:11:07.980 don't belabor this. I'm gonna have you all check 01:11:07.980 --> 01:11:10.859 your records on this. Because, as I said earlier, I 01:11:10.871 --> 01:11:13.650 was present. I was there with Director Ghilarducci 01:11:13.650 --> 01:11:23.730 and Director Porter. And it only was at the direction of of Mr Ghilarducci did y'all 01:11:23.730 --> 01:11:28.990 mostly, did y'all show up. So that's not as important as the other question. So I don't 01:11:28.990 --> 01:11:31.201 want to belabor that. We could move on. 01:11:31.226 --> 01:11:32.278 We'll move on. Next. 01:11:33.839 --> 01:11:37.328 President Batjer, Commissioners, 01:11:37.340 --> 01:11:40.258 ALJ. My name is Sam Matisha. I'm senior 01:11:40.270 --> 01:11:46.848 vice president and regional manager for Cox Communications. Here in California. I live in 01:11:46.860 --> 01:11:53.212 San Diego. And we take our obligation very serious to maintain and operate our network 01:11:53.224 --> 01:11:59.807 safely and make sure that those communities and customers that we serve, that rely on our 01:11:59.819 --> 01:12:03.238 network for critical information or 911 or the 01:12:03.250 --> 01:12:06.534 ability to get messages in times of tragedy, 01:12:06.546 --> 01:12:13.054 are that we focus on maintaining available. So I'm not aware of any issues in regards to 01:12:13.066 --> 01:12:19.494 providing OES data. We operate in Southern California only. Our network fared very well 01:12:19.506 --> 01:12:22.934 during the four PSP events that we were a part 01:12:22.946 --> 01:12:26.166 of a as well as our customers. And so right 01:12:26.178 --> 01:12:32.371 before the third PSPS event, for the first time, we were contacted by OES asking for 01:12:32.383 --> 01:12:35.801 information, and we worked with OES to provide 01:12:35.813 --> 01:12:38.879 them that information. To the best of our 01:12:38.891 --> 01:12:45.309 knowledge, that was satisfactory to them. And we didn't receive a letter or any kind of 01:12:45.321 --> 01:12:48.962 communication from OES saying that it wasn't, and 01:12:48.974 --> 01:12:52.335 we are planning an in person meeting with OES 01:12:52.347 --> 01:12:58.689 to follow up so we can better coordinate our information with OES. I do want to answer 01:12:58.701 --> 01:13:05.274 what I think will be your next question is we were not present at OES during wth the psps 01:13:05.286 --> 01:13:08.922 events. Again, we operate in Southern California. 01:13:08.934 --> 01:13:11.999 We have very strong coordination with our 01:13:12.011 --> 01:13:15.142 local OES, as well as SDG&E, who we are in 01:13:15.154 --> 01:13:18.663 constant contact with, as well as SoCal Edison. 01:13:18.688 --> 01:13:22.055 Can I just follow up on, 01:13:22.067 --> 01:13:25.446 I was a little disturbed to read in your response that 01:13:25.458 --> 01:13:28.769 you said you don't have the resources to send someone 01:13:28.781 --> 01:13:32.104 up to OES during these events. Is that your position? 01:13:32.129 --> 01:13:35.460 I mean, right now, all of our resources have really 01:13:35.460 --> 01:13:38.481 been focused on exercising our business continuity 01:13:38.493 --> 01:13:41.110 plan. And I think that focus has been a part 01:13:41.110 --> 01:13:46.040 of why our customers have been faring so well as well as everything else we've done. It 01:13:46.040 --> 01:13:48.556 is something that we're open to have a conversation 01:13:48.568 --> 01:13:50.610 with. One of the avenues is we are part of 01:13:50.610 --> 01:13:55.980 the CUEA organization, and we would look at potentially designating the California 01:13:55.980 --> 01:14:01.770 Utilities Organization as our representative at OES. That's something we we want to 01:14:01.770 --> 01:14:05.490 talk more fully about with OES. 01:14:05.515 --> 01:14:09.024 Thank you. We'll move on. 01:14:10.453 --> 01:14:13.010 Hi. My name is Deborah 01:14:13.022 --> 01:14:16.018 Piccolo, I am Senior Vice President for Charter, 01:14:16.030 --> 01:14:21.363 and thanks so much for the opportunity to speak to you today. Charter's overall impact 01:14:21.375 --> 01:14:26.455 was mostly in Southern California, very much like the Cox's impact. We did respond 01:14:26.467 --> 01:14:31.928 timely to all CPUC requests on the daily and weekly basis as they were requested. We did 01:14:31.940 --> 01:14:34.185 not get any requests from the OES for 01:14:34.197 --> 01:14:37.309 information. We did also verify that that was the 01:14:37.321 --> 01:14:42.702 case, so we didn't get it. And then we also called them to ensure that they did not ask 01:14:42.714 --> 01:14:48.089 for it. And we have confirmed that. We're very open to working with the CPUC and OES on 01:14:48.101 --> 01:14:53.304 exactly what information they need. So we look forward to having meetings coming up. 01:14:54.810 --> 01:14:59.661 I have many more questions, but I want to share the 01:14:59.673 --> 01:15:04.400 questions for this portion of the agenda with my fellow Commissioners. 01:15:04.400 --> 01:15:08.003 Your Honor, I apologize. I'm counsel 01:15:08.015 --> 01:15:11.149 for Comcast and Mr Gotter, and this is my fault not 01:15:11.161 --> 01:15:14.288 his fault, was not prepared with the details of the 01:15:14.300 --> 01:15:17.861 response to your questions. I wanted to just clarify that. 01:15:17.873 --> 01:15:21.178 So first of all, Comcast did have somebody resident in 01:15:21.190 --> 01:15:24.568 CalOES starting on Friday afternoon. That was before we 01:15:24.580 --> 01:15:28.253 were asked to appear there, but we did have a representative 01:15:28.265 --> 01:15:31.467 there and then throughout the duration, and in terms 01:15:31.479 --> 01:15:34.775 of the timing of providing information, we voluntarily 01:15:34.787 --> 01:15:38.155 provided information first to CUEA on Saturday and then 01:15:38.167 --> 01:15:41.530 our understanding had been as it was traditionally CUEA 01:15:41.542 --> 01:15:44.795 would provide that information to CalOES. And then on 01:15:44.807 --> 01:15:48.287 Sunday we got the letter from Director Ghilarducci asking 01:15:48.299 --> 01:15:51.610 for that information to go directly to OES and then we 01:15:51.622 --> 01:15:55.169 gave it directly to OES after that, and sort of consistent 01:15:55.181 --> 01:15:58.377 with what AT&T said, there was some transition time. 01:15:58.402 --> 01:16:01.160 What about releasing your outage data? 01:16:01.185 --> 01:16:04.181 So I think that that is a request 01:16:04.193 --> 01:16:07.096 that we're seeing for the first time come to us, and I 01:16:07.108 --> 01:16:10.005 think it's one that we want to go back and look at and 01:16:10.017 --> 01:16:13.190 figure out. We're also trying to balance, sort of, critical 01:16:13.202 --> 01:16:16.451 network infrastructure confidentiality issues. But of course, 01:16:16.463 --> 01:16:19.251 we also want to do the best that we can to work with 01:16:19.263 --> 01:16:22.255 the Commission and to satisfy their needs and our public 01:16:22.267 --> 01:16:25.430 safety partners need, so we will definitely take that back. 01:16:25.455 --> 01:16:27.702 I think that balancing has 01:16:27.714 --> 01:16:29.780 gone on for a while and I think it's time, 01:16:29.780 --> 01:16:34.790 given the seriousness of these events, that a decision is made. Thank you. 01:16:34.815 --> 01:16:36.896 Okay, thank you. Now we'll turn to 01:16:36.908 --> 01:16:38.876 the other Commissioners. Commissioner Shiroma? 01:16:38.901 --> 01:16:39.950 Just want to make a comment. 01:16:39.950 --> 01:16:44.889 First of all, I did observe as the letters were 01:16:44.901 --> 01:16:49.440 coming in from the telcos, that only Verizon 01:16:49.440 --> 01:16:53.571 didn't have confidentiality, confidential on the 01:16:53.583 --> 01:16:57.810 letters everyone else had, it's said confidential. 01:16:57.810 --> 01:17:06.920 So appreciate the willingness into provide information. In the end, it is about safety 01:17:06.920 --> 01:17:14.540 and that our first responders have the best communication, that our Californians 01:17:14.540 --> 01:17:16.778 have the best information. I appreciate that T 01:17:16.790 --> 01:17:19.040 mobile. If I heard you correctly, you committed 01:17:19.040 --> 01:17:24.190 to following Verizon's lead on providing, but I didn't hear it from anybody else. So I do 01:17:24.190 --> 01:17:29.206 look forward to hearing from everybody else. Thank you. 01:17:29.231 --> 01:17:32.072 President Richard. This is a bit 01:17:32.072 --> 01:17:39.000 of a tangent, but since it was raised as an issue by AT&T on the 3% outage 01:17:39.000 --> 01:17:41.554 data point, which, as you mentioned, is an 01:17:41.566 --> 01:17:44.310 almost irrelevant number because we're looking 01:17:44.310 --> 01:17:48.840 at communities and the impacted communities. And one community that we heard from today 01:17:48.840 --> 01:17:52.320 was a supervisor from Lake County, as I also 01:17:52.332 --> 01:17:55.980 mentioned earlier. Can you confirm that, today, 01:17:55.980 --> 01:17:58.910 there's someone working with Lake County and 01:17:58.922 --> 01:18:01.930 the supervisors there to prevent another sewer 01:18:01.930 --> 01:18:07.340 spillage? As he mentioned they had back of generation at the site, but were not able 01:18:07.340 --> 01:18:11.540 to communicate with your network. And so if you can do that by the end of the hearing, 01:18:11.540 --> 01:18:16.830 to just, he had a run back, can we make sure there's somebody working with them to 01:18:16.830 --> 01:18:21.022 make sure their sewer and water systems are able to communicate? 01:18:21.047 --> 01:18:22.570 Thank you, Commissioner. 01:18:22.570 --> 01:18:27.640 Actually, I could confirm right now I have been exchanging notes with my operation teams 01:18:27.640 --> 01:18:30.156 in the field. They're in the process of 01:18:30.168 --> 01:18:33.410 assessing, you know, the status of the facilities 01:18:33.410 --> 01:18:36.378 in that area. If the generator is not in place 01:18:36.390 --> 01:18:38.989 now, I could assure you a generator is in 01:18:38.989 --> 01:18:46.060 route to ensure that the operation stays up and running. We definitely apologize for 01:18:46.060 --> 01:18:49.890 what has occurred. This is the first I've heard of it. I will absolutely do a detailed 01:18:49.890 --> 01:18:56.620 review of what did not, what went wrong and make sure that we have addressed going 01:18:56.620 --> 01:18:59.812 forward in the future is absolutely our intention to do that. 01:18:59.837 --> 01:19:01.460 Thank you. And Lake County is one 01:19:01.460 --> 01:19:04.672 of the, on the DIRS report, it shows that 35% outage. 01:19:04.684 --> 01:19:07.370 So I think that's where the 3% is really not 01:19:07.370 --> 01:19:10.592 relevant. And also another example of, you know, 01:19:10.604 --> 01:19:13.310 the water district is a special district. 01:19:13.310 --> 01:19:17.489 You may not have had that communicate, you may have had a communication with a first 01:19:17.489 --> 01:19:20.277 responder. Another reason why this information 01:19:20.289 --> 01:19:22.910 needs to be made public as soon as possible. 01:19:22.910 --> 01:19:26.046 Absolutely. We actually interfaces with 01:19:26.058 --> 01:19:28.850 all industries on. I will have to look into why 01:19:28.850 --> 01:19:31.977 this specific water district was was not 01:19:31.989 --> 01:19:35.510 addressed. I could assure you that we not only 01:19:35.510 --> 01:19:38.633 interact with first responders, we interact with 01:19:38.645 --> 01:19:41.780 hospitals, we interact with public jurisdictions. 01:19:41.780 --> 01:19:46.560 We interact with other utilities and other large customers that have critical needs to 01:19:46.560 --> 01:19:51.900 ensure that all these sites are addressed. I could tell you, for prior events, and even 01:19:51.900 --> 01:19:54.953 for this event, we deployed hundreds of portable 01:19:54.965 --> 01:19:57.780 generators, actually, over the past two days, 01:19:57.780 --> 01:20:03.700 prior to the event occurring, we continue to shift our generators as needed, as PG&E 01:20:03.700 --> 01:20:09.800 issued new maps and adjusted their shut off areas, we continue to follow them. 01:20:09.800 --> 01:20:12.703 My assurance is that every site that can have a 01:20:12.715 --> 01:20:15.630 generator was actually have generators installed 01:20:15.630 --> 01:20:20.018 as of last night. Coming into this morning. In preparation this PS PS event. 01:20:20.043 --> 01:20:23.163 We'll get to that later, I believe 01:20:23.188 --> 01:20:24.408 Are there any? 01:20:24.434 --> 01:20:28.070 Yeah. Other, Commissioners, you have any other remarks on 01:20:28.070 --> 01:20:34.241 this topic you'd like to ask at the moment. Okay. So counsel for the public advocate's 01:20:34.241 --> 01:20:36.925 office indicated that they may have a statement 01:20:36.937 --> 01:20:39.520 they'd like to make on the topic at this time. 01:20:39.520 --> 01:20:42.351 I invite counsel or the public advocates 01:20:42.363 --> 01:20:45.900 representative to come up and make the statement to 01:20:45.900 --> 01:20:49.955 this scoping issue. And when you approach the 01:20:49.967 --> 01:20:54.210 mike, please say your name and your organization 01:20:54.210 --> 01:20:59.050 for the record. 01:20:59.075 --> 01:21:05.788 Good morning. My name is 01:21:05.800 --> 01:21:13.571 Elizabeth Eccles, director of the Public Advocate's 01:21:13.571 --> 01:21:22.060 Office. President Batjer, Commissioners and Judge Rizzo and Judge Emister. Practicing 01:21:22.060 --> 01:21:28.810 and I got it wrong. Judge Bemistfer. Thank you for the opportunity to speak today. 01:21:28.810 --> 01:21:33.340 During the recent power shut offs and again this morning, customers and first responders 01:21:33.340 --> 01:21:41.120 are without basic cell phone service. As you know, over 80% of emergency 911 calls are 01:21:41.120 --> 01:21:48.870 made over cell phones. Californians must be able to dial 911 during a power outage. As 01:21:48.870 --> 01:21:56.880 we heard from CalFire Chief Wilson this is a matter of life and death. Our firefighters 01:21:56.880 --> 01:22:02.050 are putting their lives on the line every day, and they must be able to communicate. 01:22:02.050 --> 01:22:04.778 When they don't have access to the information 01:22:04.790 --> 01:22:07.239 they need, it jeopardizes their safety and 01:22:07.239 --> 01:22:11.157 the safety of our communities. Like many Californians, 01:22:11.169 --> 01:22:14.170 my family and I lost service in two of the 01:22:14.170 --> 01:22:20.030 recent power shut offs. Myself, my Verizon cell phone did not work. My Comcast landline 01:22:20.030 --> 01:22:27.540 and Internet did not work. Public health and safety demands that people have access to 01:22:27.540 --> 01:22:33.880 their phone lines to get emergency evacuation alerts, dial 911 and communicate with their 01:22:33.880 --> 01:22:41.440 loved ones. Consumers are doing their part to prepare for outages by having backup power 01:22:41.440 --> 01:22:44.377 and keeping their cell phones charged. Communication 01:22:44.389 --> 01:22:46.670 Companies must also do their part to keep 01:22:46.670 --> 01:22:50.684 the network up and running. We urge the Commission 01:22:50.696 --> 01:22:54.090 to exercise its authority to require backup 01:22:54.090 --> 01:22:57.523 power standards for wireless facilities, including 01:22:57.535 --> 01:23:00.440 cell sites. These standards should at least 01:23:00.440 --> 01:23:05.630 match wireline backup power standards of 72 hours of onsite power. Thank you. 01:23:10.988 --> 01:23:13.005 Thank you very much, Miss Eccles. 01:23:13.030 --> 01:23:19.010 I don't wantto interrupt on the run of the show, but 01:23:19.010 --> 01:23:22.085 I is it appropriate to ask the parties for 01:23:22.097 --> 01:23:25.400 their comments on that specific recommendation 01:23:25.400 --> 01:23:27.205 that's been raised by Public Advocate's Office. 01:23:31.030 --> 01:23:35.910 The requirement to extend the 72 01:23:35.910 --> 01:23:38.361 hour backup requirement to wireless facilities 01:23:38.386 --> 01:23:44.119 We're going to go down the line, beginning with Comcast on that 01:23:44.144 --> 01:23:51.900 Under normal storm event circumstances, we 01:23:51.900 --> 01:23:57.000 would deploy a generator power up to affected portions of our plan, and we've done so on 01:23:57.000 --> 01:24:03.561 many occasions. Considering the significant fire danger associated with PSPS events and 01:24:03.561 --> 01:24:07.730 with our focus being on public safety, we believe it to be in the best interest of our 01:24:07.730 --> 01:24:10.828 customers and communities to not deploy generators 01:24:10.840 --> 01:24:13.890 during this high risk fire time. We are evaluating 01:24:13.890 --> 01:24:23.020 options. We currently have over 1500 network devices that are between our hubs and our 01:24:23.020 --> 01:24:29.230 customers' homes that require power. All of them have backup power today, lasting from 01:24:29.230 --> 01:24:33.584 anywhere from 4 to 24 hours, we, that has been 01:24:33.596 --> 01:24:37.590 sufficient to date, relative to the outages 01:24:37.590 --> 01:24:44.000 that we face generally related to storms. We are continuing to work with providers of 01:24:44.000 --> 01:24:50.870 battery backup to see what the options maybe going forward 01:24:50.895 --> 01:24:53.160 next. 01:24:53.185 --> 01:24:56.260 Alison Ellis, Frontier. 01:24:56.260 --> 01:25:02.880 We do currently have backup capabilities of 72 hours in our central offices, the 01:25:02.880 --> 01:25:08.660 Central Offices support services too roughly 85% of our subscribers. We do not provide 01:25:08.660 --> 01:25:12.930 cellular service, for those facilities further 01:25:12.942 --> 01:25:16.860 out in our network that support more remote 01:25:16.860 --> 01:25:20.778 areas, they are equipped with either battery 01:25:20.790 --> 01:25:24.719 backup or other types of portable generators. 01:25:24.719 --> 01:25:27.712 During emergency incidents 01:25:27.737 --> 01:25:31.973 We'll continue down the line, 01:25:31.998 --> 01:25:35.080 Just real briefly to address 01:25:35.080 --> 01:25:39.630 the previous question. We did have somebody at the OES office prior to request going 01:25:39.630 --> 01:25:43.515 out, and we did commit to providing the information 01:25:43.527 --> 01:25:46.750 Commissioner. Onto the second question. You 01:25:46.750 --> 01:25:49.368 know, our current strategy is to, we have eight 01:25:49.380 --> 01:25:52.120 hours battery backup at all of our wireless sites. 01:25:52.120 --> 01:25:55.082 We have fixed generators at all our central 01:25:55.094 --> 01:25:58.270 office sites. Our current strategy is to deploy 01:25:58.270 --> 01:26:05.330 portable generators when we have an outage. Now, our experience in past outage events 01:26:05.330 --> 01:26:08.395 did not prepares for the magnitude of the current 01:26:08.407 --> 01:26:10.930 events in this October, November. However 01:26:10.930 --> 01:26:15.322 we we do have, we did have, well over 100 portable 01:26:15.334 --> 01:26:18.960 generators in California market stage, and 01:26:18.960 --> 01:26:21.478 we have brought in several hundred more in the 01:26:21.490 --> 01:26:24.020 meantime, and we are learning, as we go through 01:26:24.020 --> 01:26:27.205 this process, with the much larger outage 01:26:27.217 --> 01:26:30.870 situations, and we plan to have all our portable 01:26:30.870 --> 01:26:36.500 generators staged and in positions for future events so that, well, we may not have 72 01:26:36.500 --> 01:26:39.740 hours of batteries at a site, or fixed generators 01:26:39.752 --> 01:26:43.070 at the site. We do plan to have portable generators 01:26:43.070 --> 01:26:45.968 rolled out in time and staged prior to future 01:26:45.980 --> 01:26:48.890 outages. As an example, for the current outage 01:26:48.890 --> 01:26:51.972 that's happening today, I believe we have about 01:26:51.984 --> 01:26:54.950 75 sites that will be affected, and we already 01:26:54.950 --> 01:26:57.289 have portable generators at about 68 of those and 01:26:57.301 --> 01:26:59.370 getting portable generators to the remainder 01:26:59.370 --> 01:27:05.658 sites today. Does that address your question? 01:27:05.683 --> 01:27:11.400 Yes, but the question is, do you support a 01:27:11.400 --> 01:27:14.963 requirement? I understand that's the practice, and 01:27:14.975 --> 01:27:18.130 I appreciate the commitment, but the question 01:27:18.130 --> 01:27:21.745 is going forward, would you support this as as a regulatory requirement? 01:27:21.770 --> 01:27:24.843 We look forward to working with the CPUC to 01:27:24.855 --> 01:27:27.940 explore options around that, and I will support the ongoing 01:27:27.940 --> 01:27:30.233 and planning for that. 01:27:30.258 --> 01:27:32.231 We'll continue. 01:27:32.256 --> 01:27:36.800 President, Batjer and Commissioners, again, 01:27:36.800 --> 01:27:39.823 Rudy Reyes for Verizon. So to answer your specific 01:27:39.835 --> 01:27:42.750 question, we welcome working with the Commission. 01:27:42.750 --> 01:27:49.330 We recommend holding technical workshops on coming up with an appropriate standard. 01:27:49.330 --> 01:27:53.408 A one size fits all standard does not take into 01:27:53.420 --> 01:27:57.510 account many of the feasibility and restrictions 01:27:57.510 --> 01:28:01.328 that we have in terms of guaranteeing backup 01:28:01.340 --> 01:28:05.170 power to all sites. But in this unprecedented 01:28:05.170 --> 01:28:08.793 era, yes, we we do recognize there is a need for 01:28:08.805 --> 01:28:12.070 state action here, and we would like welcome 01:28:12.070 --> 01:28:14.958 technical workshops to work out exactly what 01:28:14.970 --> 01:28:17.870 that standard ought to be and what exceptions 01:28:17.870 --> 01:28:25.010 and caveats should be made to that. Regarding Verizon's network. A substantial majority 01:28:25.010 --> 01:28:29.108 of our macro sites have 4 to 8 hours of battery 01:28:29.120 --> 01:28:33.230 backup, and a considerable considerable majority 01:28:33.230 --> 01:28:39.860 also have permanent or fixed generators. With very few exceptions, all of the macro 01:28:39.860 --> 01:28:45.050 sites that do not have permanent generators can be served with portable generators. 01:28:45.050 --> 01:28:51.340 Fixed generators can run for 24 to 72 hours on a single fuel tank, and both fixed and 01:28:51.340 --> 01:28:55.166 portable generators can be refueled indefinitely 01:28:55.178 --> 01:28:58.390 so long as we have access to the site. In 01:28:58.390 --> 01:29:05.239 addition, due to overlapping covered cell site designed, the outage of one macro sight 01:29:05.239 --> 01:29:09.310 does not always cause service disruption or degradation to a customer. So those are some 01:29:09.310 --> 01:29:12.266 of the details that we were welcome being 01:29:12.278 --> 01:29:15.600 addressed in technical workshops as we propose. 01:29:15.600 --> 01:29:18.347 Thank you. We'll continue 01:29:18.372 --> 01:29:25.160 Jeff Long, AT&T. We agree with Verizons Position that 01:29:25.160 --> 01:29:28.224 we would love to engage in technical workshops 01:29:28.236 --> 01:29:31.050 to discuss how the best implement the right 01:29:31.050 --> 01:29:34.736 backup solution. As Verizon mentioned, not all 01:29:34.748 --> 01:29:38.210 cell sites the same. A lot of our cell sites 01:29:38.210 --> 01:29:44.690 are capacity cell sites there to allow us to increase the speed and have the fastest 01:29:44.690 --> 01:29:49.270 network. They're not necessarily cover cell sites, and having one site goes down doesn't 01:29:49.270 --> 01:29:54.090 mean that the network is not functioning. Is probably not running 70 megabits per second? 01:29:54.090 --> 01:29:59.219 But you can get a text through. You can make a phone call. You still are operational. 01:29:59.219 --> 01:30:04.770 So state that every single cell site in the 72 hours of backup in order to provide the 01:30:04.770 --> 01:30:08.424 service that our customers need, customer communities 01:30:08.436 --> 01:30:11.219 need, I don't think that's 100% true, but 01:30:11.219 --> 01:30:15.701 we're absolutely determined and would love to be part of the solution to figure out how 01:30:15.701 --> 01:30:22.820 to do that. In addition to that, you know, to the statement of disclosing in 01:30:22.820 --> 01:30:28.410 terms of number site outages, in the line with was just stated previously, we believe 01:30:28.410 --> 01:30:33.390 that, you know, just stating the number of sites out doesn't really, truly represent 01:30:33.390 --> 01:30:41.570 how many customers is impacted. And how many sites are truly coverage sites that 01:30:41.570 --> 01:30:47.010 are impacting the ability of customers to use their service. However, with that stated, 01:30:47.010 --> 01:30:52.940 I will actually address the question that you asked previously, President Batjer, AT&T 01:30:52.940 --> 01:30:58.910 will publicly disclosed outageinformation, and we'll work through the details associate 01:30:58.910 --> 01:31:02.802 with that. But we're actually committed to that will support that effort. 01:31:02.827 --> 01:31:04.099 Just a follow up. 01:31:04.099 --> 01:31:09.550 Verizon said they support a rule on backup. Mr. Reyes supported a rule on backup power, 01:31:09.550 --> 01:31:14.700 but the specifics need to be worked out. Are you similar committing that you support a 01:31:14.700 --> 01:31:17.777 mandatory requirement for backup power? Just the 01:31:17.789 --> 01:31:20.500 details, with the details to be worked out? 01:31:20.500 --> 01:31:24.598 I am not in on ?????? first team. I will 01:31:24.610 --> 01:31:28.340 fully support being part of a technical advisory, 01:31:28.340 --> 01:31:31.849 a team to evaluate how to enhance the backup 01:31:31.861 --> 01:31:35.460 and ensure that the reliability, whether it is 01:31:35.460 --> 01:31:39.142 a rule, whether you know, this is not my expertise. 01:31:39.154 --> 01:31:42.280 But we absolutely do support actions working 01:31:42.280 --> 01:31:46.792 jointly and collaboratively with the State and 01:31:46.804 --> 01:31:50.750 and industry to ensure that our customers 01:31:50.750 --> 01:31:55.696 have the service when they need it. Absolutely. 01:31:55.721 --> 01:31:56.848 We'llgo on. 01:31:56.872 --> 01:31:59.920 David Gallagher, T Mobile. I 01:31:59.920 --> 01:32:02.939 wanted to address an issue you that my colleague 01:32:02.951 --> 01:32:05.610 here just just touched on. But I think it's 01:32:05.610 --> 01:32:10.145 an important point that I want to make concerning 01:32:10.157 --> 01:32:14.340 what seems to be a common misconception. Maybe 01:32:14.340 --> 01:32:20.690 an understandable misconception. At least with respect to T Mobile's network. And that 01:32:20.690 --> 01:32:28.219 is that the number of sites off the air due to power outage or other events is, you 01:32:28.219 --> 01:32:31.753 know, simply counting the number of sites down 01:32:31.765 --> 01:32:35.010 is not a good proxy for the actual customer 01:32:35.010 --> 01:32:38.082 experience. Historically, T Mobile was forced 01:32:38.094 --> 01:32:41.110 to build many more sites than our competitors 01:32:41.110 --> 01:32:46.780 because we didn't have low band spectrum. Our signal just didn't travel this far. 01:32:46.780 --> 01:32:51.930 Therefore, our sites had to be much closer together, and we had to have many more of 01:32:51.930 --> 01:32:55.041 them. Subsequently we acquired, so therefore, 01:32:55.053 --> 01:32:58.040 we built a much denser grid of sites, if you 01:32:58.040 --> 01:33:01.840 will. We subsequently acquired this low band spectrum where the signal travels much 01:33:01.840 --> 01:33:07.820 further. So now we actually can create and have created for an emergency response, an 01:33:07.820 --> 01:33:12.372 overlay network using a subset off the sites. 01:33:12.384 --> 01:33:16.750 So many of our sites were off the air during 01:33:16.750 --> 01:33:23.950 the recent events, and those sites were used for additional capacity, for improved 01:33:23.950 --> 01:33:27.890 data throughput speeds, and were not necessarily 01:33:27.902 --> 01:33:31.450 required to provide basic voice and text and 01:33:31.450 --> 01:33:35.313 emergency services. So during emergency situations, 01:33:35.325 --> 01:33:38.530 as the ones we're discussing here today, we 01:33:38.530 --> 01:33:43.640 have designed an overly network that uses a subset of our sites to provide a blanket 01:33:43.640 --> 01:33:46.216 of coverage for voice and texts. Although this 01:33:46.228 --> 01:33:48.650 provides a much more limited data experience 01:33:48.650 --> 01:33:55.640 than our customers would normally enjoy, it is adequate for customers during an emergency 01:33:55.640 --> 01:34:03.370 to make, receive calls, receive text messages from the emergency services etc. 01:34:03.370 --> 01:34:09.280 So again, just because I say is down in off the air does not necessarily mean that 01:34:09.280 --> 01:34:14.960 there's no coverage and that that customer can't make and receive voice calls and text 01:34:14.960 --> 01:34:18.631 messages at that particular location. In addition, 01:34:18.643 --> 01:34:21.820 we compensate for being, for a site, a given 01:34:21.820 --> 01:34:24.805 site, being off the air, by redirecting traffic 01:34:24.817 --> 01:34:27.440 to neighboring sites that are still up and 01:34:27.440 --> 01:34:29.999 running. We use a variety of tools and techniques 01:34:30.011 --> 01:34:32.120 to reach in surrounding sites, including, 01:34:32.120 --> 01:34:38.960 for example, remotely adjusting antenna tilts so that they can automatically and remotely 01:34:38.960 --> 01:34:43.129 be adjusted to cover areas that we don't normally 01:34:43.141 --> 01:34:46.570 cover and are not designed to cover. This 01:34:46.570 --> 01:34:51.920 approach allowed the vast majority of our customers, as well as first responders, 01:34:51.920 --> 01:34:56.350 to retain voice, text and basic services throughout the recent events. And we have 01:34:56.350 --> 01:34:59.466 a number of data points that demonstrate this 01:34:59.478 --> 01:35:02.470 to be the case. Network measurements that we 01:35:02.470 --> 01:35:08.540 took and it indicated during the events, that even at locations where there was no power, 01:35:08.540 --> 01:35:12.547 customers were able to make and receive calls. 01:35:12.559 --> 01:35:15.980 In addition, the overall traffic volumes 01:35:15.980 --> 01:35:22.810 that we measured were similar to the prior week when there was no event. Lastly, 01:35:22.810 --> 01:35:26.479 calls to our customer care organization, where 01:35:26.491 --> 01:35:29.780 in the normal range, so all these indicate 01:35:29.780 --> 01:35:32.276 that there, although obviously there were areas 01:35:32.288 --> 01:35:34.430 where customers couldn't make and receive 01:35:34.430 --> 01:35:40.610 calls and the network was degraded, the vast majority of our customers were actually able 01:35:40.610 --> 01:35:46.790 to make calls at those locations. The focus on the number of sites has unfortunately 01:35:46.790 --> 01:35:49.835 resulted in misunderstanding and misperceptions 01:35:49.847 --> 01:35:52.840 of our network performance. It is not necessary 01:35:52.840 --> 01:36:00.610 to harden all of the sites in the network to provide the resilience required. Nor is 01:36:00.610 --> 01:36:04.437 hardening all sites practical due to access, 01:36:04.449 --> 01:36:08.800 landlord issues, local jurisdictional restrictions, 01:36:08.800 --> 01:36:13.510 structural issues on the site, etcetera. So even if we wanted to harden every site, it 01:36:13.510 --> 01:36:18.260 would be a limit to our ability to do that. But as I stated earlier, I don't think it's 01:36:18.260 --> 01:36:26.969 necessary. In terms of the backup, I'd say that, we've learned a lot in the last 01:36:26.969 --> 01:36:30.516 month. I think I think we will all agree. Everyone 01:36:30.528 --> 01:36:33.739 being involved in these incidents have learned 01:36:33.739 --> 01:36:41.390 a lot and I think that this cries out for a collaborative discussion to assess what 01:36:41.390 --> 01:36:46.460 worked and what didn't work and what needs to change in the future. The issues are very 01:36:46.460 --> 01:36:51.590 complex and the solutions will be complex. So getting all the stakeholders engaged to 01:36:51.590 --> 01:36:54.454 examine what happened and to help design the 01:36:54.466 --> 01:36:57.469 solutions that have the potential for improving 01:36:57.469 --> 01:37:00.723 the situation without further regulation would be 01:37:00.735 --> 01:37:03.740 our preference, or it may be that we find that 01:37:03.740 --> 01:37:09.530 working differently, using the Commission's existing rules could yield better results. 01:37:09.530 --> 01:37:14.800 We would ask that you allow for a process that takes a holistic view before you make 01:37:14.800 --> 01:37:20.783 any decisions on what to do from a regulatory perspective. 01:37:20.808 --> 01:37:24.130 Can I make a comment about scope? 01:37:24.130 --> 01:37:29.860 Because both AT&T and T-Mobile mention this? This notion that you know calls and 01:37:29.860 --> 01:37:35.630 texts are adequate. I think there needs to be a conversation within the scope about what 01:37:35.630 --> 01:37:38.789 is the the minimum service necessary? Because I 01:37:38.801 --> 01:37:41.840 get that, you know, maybe gaming and streaming 01:37:41.840 --> 01:37:46.010 Disney movies isn't necessary? But being able to go on a utility website to see the 01:37:46.010 --> 01:37:49.528 status of the PSPS and other basic information 01:37:49.540 --> 01:37:52.770 like that is really now kind of the sort of 01:37:52.770 --> 01:37:57.810 the minimum that you need in an emergency situation. So I would encourage that to be 01:37:57.810 --> 01:37:59.140 part of the discussion. 01:37:59.165 --> 01:38:01.216 our voice and data networks are 01:38:01.228 --> 01:38:03.130 not separate, so there would be access to data 01:38:03.130 --> 01:38:08.360 if you had access to voice. It may not be a great experience in terms of download speeds 01:38:08.360 --> 01:38:11.099 or being able to look at video content, et cetera, 01:38:11.124 --> 01:38:13.140 but we need to have a discussion about what that means. 01:38:13.140 --> 01:38:14.530 absolutely 01:38:14.555 --> 01:38:16.527 and that is like a reasonable 01:38:16.539 --> 01:38:18.699 position Commission ran up that we will consider 01:38:18.699 --> 01:38:21.771 and just as a follow up, my 01:38:21.783 --> 01:38:24.760 understanding is that what you're raising is correct, as 01:38:24.760 --> 01:38:32.830 one indicator, maybe a proxy even. But what CalOES has been asking for is maps of outage, 01:38:32.830 --> 01:38:36.233 of the coverage that's actually out. And that's, 01:38:36.245 --> 01:38:39.591 right, and that you've declined to provide that. 01:38:39.591 --> 01:38:42.857 Well, I don't think we've declined 01:38:42.869 --> 01:38:45.540 to provide it. I think it's challenging with 01:38:45.540 --> 01:38:49.272 the tools that are currently being used across 01:38:49.284 --> 01:38:52.550 the industry to provide a unified view of 01:38:52.550 --> 01:38:57.180 what that coverage looks like. I mean, we all operate slightly differently, so I think 01:38:57.180 --> 01:39:02.640 this needs to be a collaborative approach on, you know, what that standard for coverage 01:39:02.640 --> 01:39:05.502 looks like that's a true and accurate representation 01:39:05.514 --> 01:39:07.900 of the actual customer experience. You know, 01:39:07.900 --> 01:39:12.820 versus a fairly crude proxy that we use today, which is the number of sites off the 01:39:12.820 --> 01:39:16.184 air or the number of generators deployed, et cetera. 01:39:16.209 --> 01:39:18.660 If that is not the right measurement. 01:39:18.660 --> 01:39:22.910 Please, you all need to help us know what the right measurement is. I understand. I 01:39:22.910 --> 01:39:25.600 mean, I don't want us demanding of things that 01:39:25.612 --> 01:39:27.969 are not going to get us to the objective, 01:39:27.969 --> 01:39:30.268 that we want we're talking about. At the end. 01:39:30.280 --> 01:39:32.590 At the end, we're talking about your customers 01:39:32.590 --> 01:39:35.808 and whether they can be safe and whether they 01:39:35.820 --> 01:39:38.910 can have reliable communications in the time 01:39:38.910 --> 01:39:41.669 of an emergency. And that's not just a wildfire. 01:39:41.681 --> 01:39:44.170 My colleagues mentioned earlier earthquakes. 01:39:44.170 --> 01:39:46.182 Some of the things that I'm very concerned 01:39:46.194 --> 01:39:48.360 about that have been talked about, that you've 01:39:48.360 --> 01:39:53.980 learned lessons in the last three weeks. On our preparedness, on our backup, on where 01:39:53.980 --> 01:39:58.223 we are. We have been experiencing the historic 01:39:58.235 --> 01:40:02.219 extraordinary fires now for three years, and 01:40:02.219 --> 01:40:08.600 we know what how prone we are to devastating earthquakes. So it's sort of stunning that 01:40:08.600 --> 01:40:13.610 you go, well, we just learned a lot in the last three weeks. Where's the preparedness 01:40:13.610 --> 01:40:16.515 for resiliency? That's a concern. 01:40:16.540 --> 01:40:21.620 Thank you, Madam President. You know, we, our network 01:40:21.620 --> 01:40:24.772 is resilient. We take it extremely seriously. It's 01:40:24.784 --> 01:40:27.699 a priority for a company to provide resilience. 01:40:27.699 --> 01:40:31.960 I think what we're talking about here is a true representation to the public of what 01:40:31.960 --> 01:40:38.450 the actual state of the network is. And I think the industry struggles with that, 01:40:38.450 --> 01:40:42.620 quite frankly, and I think there is an opportunity for us to collaborate. 01:40:42.645 --> 01:40:44.010 Mr. Gallagher, sir, you 01:40:44.010 --> 01:40:48.954 mentioned a basic level of making a call? Of sending a text. 01:40:48.979 --> 01:40:50.980 in an emergency. Yes, 01:40:50.980 --> 01:40:54.483 Right. Is that not something 01:40:54.495 --> 01:40:57.890 you can provide? A coverage map? What is in a basic level 01:40:57.890 --> 01:41:00.701 for people to actually know do I have coverage? 01:41:00.713 --> 01:41:03.300 Can I make a phone call or send a text? That 01:41:03.300 --> 01:41:07.106 seems to be the basic common public understanding 01:41:07.118 --> 01:41:10.860 of does my cell service provide me basic service? 01:41:10.860 --> 01:41:15.130 And that's what OES, has been asking for. If you don't want to use the proxy of the 01:41:15.130 --> 01:41:20.230 cell tower, don't use that proxy. But give him a map of where your coverage is actually 01:41:20.230 --> 01:41:24.659 providing service or it's out. Not just T Mobile 01:41:24.684 --> 01:41:28.989 I believe we, along with all the other major 01:41:28.989 --> 01:41:31.518 carriers, are working with experts to provide 01:41:31.530 --> 01:41:33.960 that industry wait outreach program. I think 01:41:33.960 --> 01:41:36.940 there's an advice letter to the Commission 01:41:36.952 --> 01:41:40.430 outlining that plan. I'm not sure if we're talking 01:41:40.430 --> 01:41:50.710 about the same topic here, but, I believe there is work ongoing to provide the 01:41:50.710 --> 01:41:56.423 website, an industry-wide website, for the purposes 01:41:56.435 --> 01:42:01.170 of making coverage available to the public. 01:42:01.170 --> 01:42:04.087 If I may have elected to kind of address your 01:42:04.099 --> 01:42:06.730 question. Yeah, I can't speak to regulations. I can't 01:42:06.730 --> 01:42:13.050 speak to legislation. I'm a network operator, so but from my perspective, you know, RF 01:42:13.050 --> 01:42:17.780 propagation, RF engineering is a very complex science. It's not black and white, and 01:42:17.780 --> 01:42:22.690 I do agree with your statement that we got first define what is the minimum level of 01:42:22.690 --> 01:42:27.900 service that we think is appropriate, right? Is it just sending, receiving emergency text 01:42:27.900 --> 01:42:30.586 message? Is it making a phone call? Is a certain 01:42:30.598 --> 01:42:33.020 level of data rate to ensure that people are 01:42:33.020 --> 01:42:37.600 able to stream the latest information so that they have the most current information? I 01:42:37.600 --> 01:42:40.343 think we as an industry needs to get together 01:42:40.355 --> 01:42:43.110 and define what that is before we could answer 01:42:43.110 --> 01:42:45.850 the question of what is the what is the coverage 01:42:45.862 --> 01:42:48.390 right? You got to first define what you want, 01:42:48.390 --> 01:42:51.750 and then you could base it on the definition of what it means, what level 01:42:51.750 --> 01:42:57.210 of service that we have that we all desire. Then we could determine what is possible 01:42:57.210 --> 01:43:01.470 from a propagation perspective, and I think that's what we could create from an industry 01:43:01.470 --> 01:43:06.900 perspective, a commonality in terms of we are all interpreting the rules the same way and 01:43:06.900 --> 01:43:13.300 reporting and truly allowing our customers and our community to understand how this 01:43:13.300 --> 01:43:18.520 how these type of natural disasters are impacting their ability to communicate so 01:43:18.520 --> 01:43:21.682 way are fully supportive of engaging and working 01:43:21.694 --> 01:43:24.350 together to define those items and coming 01:43:24.350 --> 01:43:25.881 up with a solution on that. 01:43:25.906 --> 01:43:29.510 I don't think there's anything stopping you guys to collaborate 01:43:29.510 --> 01:43:34.859 and get together. We don't have a rule against that. 01:43:34.884 --> 01:43:37.517 Okay, we'll continue. 01:43:37.542 --> 01:43:39.199 So, Sam Matisha 01:43:39.199 --> 01:43:42.926 with Cox Communications. Cox is not a wireless 01:43:42.938 --> 01:43:46.199 provider in California. We don't have any 01:43:46.199 --> 01:43:49.568 wireless infrastructure or have user customers. 01:43:49.580 --> 01:43:52.820 But we do provide back haul to wireless towers 01:43:52.820 --> 01:43:58.790 and in many cases, the equipment that we have at the wireless tower, at many times at the 01:43:58.790 --> 01:44:04.770 request of the wireless carrier, is plugged into their power network. So we benefit from 01:44:04.770 --> 01:44:08.325 the hardening of the wireless facilities there 01:44:08.337 --> 01:44:11.449 with our own edge equipment. Backup power 01:44:11.449 --> 01:44:14.419 is an area in my closing comments. I'm, I had an 01:44:14.431 --> 01:44:17.170 ask out to the to the Commission that I think 01:44:17.170 --> 01:44:22.811 back up power is very complex. There's been a lot of changes to backup power. There's 01:44:22.811 --> 01:44:28.230 a lot of new technology potentially on the horizon of backup power. So one of my closing 01:44:28.230 --> 01:44:32.199 asks of the Commissioners, I think that is a very good area to have a workshop on to 01:44:32.199 --> 01:44:35.396 bring in some key folks to really understand 01:44:35.408 --> 01:44:38.760 what the opportunities are around backup power, 01:44:38.760 --> 01:44:42.430 given the complexity of the environment that all of us operate in. We want to make sure 01:44:42.430 --> 01:44:46.920 that if we deploy backup power, it's done in a way that we don't create additional safety 01:44:46.920 --> 01:44:51.688 issues. But are there technologies that we can take advantage of? 01:44:51.713 --> 01:44:54.900 Okay, we'll keep moving on next. 01:44:54.925 --> 01:44:57.276 Okay? And like Cox, Charter 01:44:57.288 --> 01:44:59.551 is not a wireless provider here in the state 01:44:59.551 --> 01:45:01.151 of California. 01:45:01.176 --> 01:45:03.621 All right, if there's nothing else on 01:45:03.633 --> 01:45:05.950 this issue, I'll turn it over to ALJ Bermisterfer 01:45:08.490 --> 01:45:16.010 I'm gonna turn to the second of the three scoping issues. 01:45:16.010 --> 01:45:19.956 Compliance with Decision 1908025. The ordering 01:45:19.968 --> 01:45:23.420 paragraphs of that decision are addressed 01:45:23.420 --> 01:45:28.020 to all providers of telecommunications service 01:45:28.032 --> 01:45:32.350 in this state, including landline providers, 01:45:32.350 --> 01:45:37.045 emergency service providers, lifeline providers, 01:45:37.057 --> 01:45:40.900 VOIP providers, carriers of last resort, 01:45:40.900 --> 01:45:45.295 and wireless providers, including both facilities 01:45:45.307 --> 01:45:48.920 based and non facilities based providers. 01:45:48.920 --> 01:45:56.790 The decision's ordering paragraphs includes specific directions to each type of provider 01:45:56.790 --> 01:46:03.230 detailing actions the provider is required to take after a gubernatorial or presidential 01:46:03.230 --> 01:46:06.603 declaration of emergency. Without listing in 01:46:06.615 --> 01:46:10.150 detail the contents of the ordering paragraphs, 01:46:10.150 --> 01:46:17.060 which I assume you've all read, I will note that the scope of this issue will include, 01:46:17.060 --> 01:46:20.921 for each designated type of provider, an examination 01:46:20.933 --> 01:46:24.440 of the degree to which the provider has complied 01:46:24.440 --> 01:46:31.690 with the decision and consideration of the steps to be taken to correct noncompliance. 01:46:31.690 --> 01:46:36.335 Let me turn now to the Commissioners. Commissioner 01:46:36.347 --> 01:46:40.090 Batjer. I believe you have some questions 01:46:40.090 --> 01:46:41.898 on this issue. 01:46:41.923 --> 01:46:47.321 Yes, judge. Thank you. I'll start with questions for the wireless 01:46:47.320 --> 01:46:55.260 providers and their compliance with D.19-08-025, decision that adopted 01:46:55.260 --> 01:46:59.449 the Emergency Disaster Relief Program measures. 01:46:59.461 --> 01:47:02.699 On page three of the AT&T response to 01:47:02.699 --> 01:47:08.130 my letter essentially stated that it does not believe rules should be applied to carry 01:47:08.130 --> 01:47:14.560 your companies, and instead the spirit of innovation should be the basis of solutions. 01:47:14.560 --> 01:47:20.771 Well, I agree that we need to innovate. I am deeply concerned that the communication 01:47:20.771 --> 01:47:26.130 companies have not adequately innovated and created best practice to meet the challenges 01:47:26.130 --> 01:47:34.510 of today. As I stated just moments ago, in fact, in terms of the preparedness 01:47:34.510 --> 01:47:40.750 that that we have witnessed or lack thereof in terms of the latest disasters. Decision 01:47:40.750 --> 01:47:49.020 1908025 required wireless providers to deploy of cells on wheels, which you all refer to 01:47:49.020 --> 01:47:52.248 as COWS and cells on light trucks referred to 01:47:52.260 --> 01:47:55.360 as COLTS to supplement the disrupted service 01:47:55.360 --> 01:48:00.002 in the areas that needed need additional coverage 01:48:00.014 --> 01:48:03.830 to ensure access to 911 and E911 service. 01:48:03.830 --> 01:48:08.860 You've touched a bit on this. But how do you prioritize the deployment of the COWS and 01:48:08.860 --> 01:48:12.696 the COLTS in the disaster when the these devices 01:48:12.708 --> 01:48:15.770 might have been booked for other events 01:48:15.770 --> 01:48:20.560 when they're not needed in California? We heard a little bit about some of your backup 01:48:20.560 --> 01:48:26.420 diesel efforts, but I'd like to just hear how do you all prioritize the deployment of 01:48:26.420 --> 01:48:31.110 COWS & COLTS? And if you'd like to expand on some of that, that would be helpful as 01:48:31.110 --> 01:48:35.911 well, in terms of preparedness. 01:48:39.822 --> 01:48:44.120 Well, I'm addressing this to the, yeah to the wireless. 01:48:44.120 --> 01:48:48.124 this is for the wireless carriers 01:48:48.136 --> 01:48:51.780 and Mr Reyes, I see you poking at your microphone 01:48:51.780 --> 01:48:55.494 you, Judge Bemisterfer, so, as a 01:48:55.506 --> 01:48:59.470 general, we're very familiar with decision 1908025 01:48:59.470 --> 01:49:06.570 And, um, we strove not only to comply with it but to really lean in and do as much as 01:49:06.570 --> 01:49:11.970 we can during these unprecedented events. You mentioned deployment of COWS, charging 01:49:11.970 --> 01:49:19.620 stations, the provisional WiFi, data relief and and the provisional temporary phones. 01:49:19.620 --> 01:49:26.720 We did all of these things to the best of our abilities. Specifically, we engaged 01:49:26.720 --> 01:49:33.429 in considerable disaster relief efforts, and we pride our partnership with the Red Cross, 01:49:33.429 --> 01:49:36.287 local jurisdictions and our other public safety 01:49:36.299 --> 01:49:39.110 partners. We donated $100,000 to the California 01:49:39.110 --> 01:49:42.325 Fire Foundation. We provided data text, voice, 01:49:42.337 --> 01:49:45.290 overage relief to customers and communities 01:49:45.290 --> 01:49:52.060 impacted by the wildfires. We have a relief team which runs to the crisis. That's part 01:49:52.060 --> 01:49:55.413 of our credo, internally, to run to the crisis, 01:49:55.425 --> 01:49:58.580 to provide assistance to evacuation shelters, 01:49:58.580 --> 01:50:03.950 first responders and local governments. For example, we were instrumental in ensuring 01:50:03.950 --> 01:50:07.719 that Cal Fire's base camp in Ventura County had 01:50:07.731 --> 01:50:11.040 communication service throughout the fires 01:50:11.040 --> 01:50:13.719 because the base camp was unable to have data 01:50:13.731 --> 01:50:16.480 lines brought in. We provided four WiFi routers 01:50:16.480 --> 01:50:19.701 We activated four mobile phone numbers for Cal 01:50:19.713 --> 01:50:22.740 Fire's existing cradle point routers, loaned 01:50:22.740 --> 01:50:26.038 10 phones and 10 jetpacks to enable the camp 01:50:26.050 --> 01:50:29.360 to run its communications seamlessly. We also 01:50:29.360 --> 01:50:32.814 try to do as much help for the state as possible 01:50:32.826 --> 01:50:36.010 during the wildfires. The San Bernadino Field 01:50:36.010 --> 01:50:39.053 Office experienced service disruption for its 01:50:39.065 --> 01:50:42.120 office phones due to an underground connection 01:50:42.120 --> 01:50:49.120 cut. We immediately loaned 12 4G LTE wireless home phones to the DMV at no cost. We've 01:50:49.120 --> 01:50:54.520 detailed all of our compliance efforts in response to your advice letter filings, and 01:50:54.520 --> 01:50:56.783 we detailed them in response, President Batjer, 01:50:56.795 --> 01:50:59.070 to your letter. I won't read all of them because 01:50:59.070 --> 01:51:08.440 there are pages and pages. WiFi, Red Cross shelters, local EOCs. And if you're going to 01:51:08.440 --> 01:51:11.118 get to this later, I would say there is another 01:51:11.130 --> 01:51:13.540 area that, respectfully, I do, Verizon does 01:51:13.540 --> 01:51:17.723 see a need for state action in terms of communicating 01:51:17.735 --> 01:51:21.230 with local EOCS. That, we tried our very best 01:51:21.230 --> 01:51:28.500 to do that. But to our knowledge, there is not a single unified list of local EOC 01:51:28.500 --> 01:51:31.567 contacts. So we really relied on disseminating 01:51:31.579 --> 01:51:34.330 that information centrally through CalOES. 01:51:34.330 --> 01:51:39.450 But if we could work with the Commission to come up with a protocol to make sure there 01:51:39.450 --> 01:51:45.929 are local emergency operation centers and first responders are as notified as the state 01:51:45.929 --> 01:51:49.044 is, that would be one area where a partnership 01:51:49.056 --> 01:51:51.850 with the Commission could help. Thank you, 01:51:51.850 --> 01:51:56.791 Thanks, Mr Reyes. Let's hear from AT&T 01:51:56.816 --> 01:52:01.130 Thank you. Appreciate it. Appreciate 01:52:01.130 --> 01:52:06.280 it. So, in terms of the innovation and the solutions associated with the problem that 01:52:06.280 --> 01:52:11.860 we face, the issues, the shut off that has occurred is unprecedented. I think that's 01:52:11.860 --> 01:52:17.850 been stated several times. The power outage that has occurred is 10 times what any 01:52:17.850 --> 01:52:21.119 of us have dealt with in the past. Prior to this 01:52:21.131 --> 01:52:24.010 position, I actually have disaster recovery 01:52:24.010 --> 01:52:32.460 responsibility nationwide, and I cannot recall another situation where you have that 01:52:32.460 --> 01:52:35.628 level of power outage that's occurring across 01:52:35.640 --> 01:52:38.750 such a big geographic area, impacting so many 01:52:38.750 --> 01:52:46.179 customers. You know, we're dependent on the semi-reliable power grid in order to maintain 01:52:46.179 --> 01:52:50.390 adequate service. However, understanding that this is the new reality that we're living 01:52:50.390 --> 01:52:55.290 in, I think we gotta approach this issue both ways. We gotta approach this issue 01:52:55.290 --> 01:52:57.947 from an innovative perspective, and I would 01:52:57.959 --> 01:53:00.750 argue that AT&T is probably more innovative in 01:53:00.750 --> 01:53:03.665 terms of how we address it. And we also got to 01:53:03.677 --> 01:53:06.790 approach issue issue from a practical perspective. 01:53:06.790 --> 01:53:09.570 From a practical perspective, we are absolutely 01:53:09.582 --> 01:53:12.199 increasing our investment of fixed generators 01:53:12.199 --> 01:53:14.593 We're absolutely investing, increasing our 01:53:14.605 --> 01:53:17.290 investment in securing more portable generators, 01:53:17.290 --> 01:53:20.124 we don't believe is a one or the other type of 01:53:20.136 --> 01:53:22.800 solution, we believe is a right mix of both. 01:53:22.800 --> 01:53:25.523 both of those items and those are the ones 01:53:25.535 --> 01:53:28.460 that will provide immediate relief and improve 01:53:28.460 --> 01:53:31.235 reliability. In addition to that, innovation is 01:53:31.247 --> 01:53:33.860 actually keys to this thing, to the solution, 01:53:33.860 --> 01:53:39.340 and my team is already underway and in the process of implementing numerous innovative 01:53:39.340 --> 01:53:41.941 solutions, we do have fuel cells in our network. 01:53:41.953 --> 01:53:44.140 We have hundreds of yourselves already in 01:53:44.140 --> 01:53:48.690 place in the network. Do I believe it's the right solution across the board? Absolutely 01:53:48.690 --> 01:53:55.570 not. We're looking a different battery technology from lithium ion to nickel cadmium 01:53:55.570 --> 01:54:02.739 batteries. Absolutely, battery is a solution and will absolutely prolong the reliability 01:54:02.739 --> 01:54:05.056 on network. We're looking at artificial intelligence. 01:54:05.068 --> 01:54:06.880 We're looking at automation. We're looking 01:54:06.880 --> 01:54:13.460 at ways of reshaping the RF characteristics of the cell sites to ensure that we have the 01:54:13.460 --> 01:54:19.120 coverage and the speed and the capability necessary to support emergency requirements. 01:54:19.120 --> 01:54:24.739 But maybe not support the same level of service that customers would utilize on 01:54:24.739 --> 01:54:29.449 the day to day basis. So all those items are underway. We have teams of people that are 01:54:29.449 --> 01:54:35.179 investigating that, and we're happy to leverage our learnings, ensure that across 01:54:35.179 --> 01:54:38.491 the industry, to ensure that we're applying the 01:54:38.503 --> 01:54:41.480 best practices to ensure that our community 01:54:41.480 --> 01:54:47.590 in California are able to be, you know, have a sustainable and reliable network that they 01:54:47.590 --> 01:54:54.240 deserve. Relative to cells on wheels and cells on COLTS, we have, we have one of the 01:54:54.240 --> 01:54:59.330 largest fleets of cells on wheels and cells on COLTS. Many of these cells on 01:54:59.330 --> 01:55:02.573 wheels and cells on COLTS are actually satellite 01:55:02.585 --> 01:55:05.640 links, so we are able to operate independently 01:55:05.640 --> 01:55:10.720 of the power, of independently of the wire line network, independently of any other 01:55:10.720 --> 01:55:14.703 any other type of requirement. These assets are deployed 01:55:14.715 --> 01:55:18.780 on a regular basis to provide coverage to EOCs, evacuation 01:55:18.780 --> 01:55:21.506 centers and anywhere that our first responders need 01:55:21.518 --> 01:55:23.940 us to be. And we have deep level of engagement 01:55:23.940 --> 01:55:27.728 within our EA team with the most communities 01:55:27.740 --> 01:55:31.540 and local jurisdictions across that the state 01:55:31.540 --> 01:55:34.116 and the country. The reason why cells on wheels 01:55:34.128 --> 01:55:36.500 and cells on COLTS wasn't utilized for these 01:55:36.500 --> 01:55:39.404 PSPS events was that typically cells on wheels 01:55:39.416 --> 01:55:41.960 and on cells on light trucks are utilized 01:55:41.960 --> 01:55:48.580 when a site is down, is damaged, when a fire has destroyed the site. Most of these 01:55:48.580 --> 01:55:51.652 locations were down because of a lack of power. And 01:55:51.664 --> 01:55:54.570 when it is lack of power it is a whole lot easier 01:55:54.570 --> 01:55:57.451 to drag a generator out to a site, plug it in 01:55:57.463 --> 01:56:00.230 and turn it on, than to bring a big vehicle, 01:56:00.230 --> 01:56:05.150 a big truck and have set it up, raise a mast, do all the installation. Our restoration 01:56:05.150 --> 01:56:12.870 effort was a lot quicker with a portable generators then, with these other assets. 01:56:12.870 --> 01:56:17.650 But we absolutely have them at our disposal. And we did have a limited number deployment 01:56:17.650 --> 01:56:23.965 throughout the event, but that wasn't the right solution for this problem. 01:56:23.990 --> 01:56:27.928 Thank you, Mister Long. Mr Gallagher. 01:56:27.953 --> 01:56:30.774 Yes. So we we filed a number 01:56:30.786 --> 01:56:33.501 of advice letters as required by the decision 01:56:33.500 --> 01:56:37.108 on this topic. We took several steps to help 01:56:37.120 --> 01:56:40.740 customers and consumers in general, including 01:56:40.740 --> 01:56:47.360 some that went beyond the requests of the Commission. Specific to the decision, we did 01:56:47.360 --> 01:56:54.650 deploy both COWS and COLTS. The COWS at the Sonoma Marin fairgrounds and the COLTS 01:56:54.650 --> 01:57:00.820 at the Sonoma County Fairgrounds. I think the question was about prioritization. Our 01:57:00.820 --> 01:57:04.802 first priority is to help with first responders 01:57:04.814 --> 01:57:08.891 and also evacuation centers, to provide consumers 01:57:08.891 --> 01:57:12.534 whether T mobile customers or not, with access 01:57:12.546 --> 01:57:15.890 to connect with the people that matter most 01:57:15.890 --> 01:57:21.320 to them during the these trouble troubling times. So our priority in deploying these 01:57:21.320 --> 01:57:27.750 mobile resources are to, and as my colleague from AT&T stated, they are independent, you 01:57:27.750 --> 01:57:34.000 can operate, you know, in pretty much any location because of the back haul with 01:57:34.000 --> 01:57:38.311 microwave satellite, et cetera. So we deployed to 01:57:38.323 --> 01:57:42.300 the fairgrounds. As I said, we also positioned 01:57:42.300 --> 01:57:50.010 a mobile command center at the Sonoma County Fairgrounds. And this is a large truck that 01:57:50.010 --> 01:57:56.810 provided mobile responders with a place to use WiFi and to recharge their phones. We 01:57:56.810 --> 01:58:05.270 distributed free activated phones with free service to many individuals, not necessarily 01:58:05.270 --> 01:58:15.400 T mobile customers, including to three CBO's supporting low income groups. We provided 01:58:15.400 --> 01:58:22.660 WiFi hot spots and customer support trucks with free charging stations and free WiFi 01:58:22.660 --> 01:58:31.469 service for use by the public. We distributed free charging banks, handheld chargers, 01:58:31.469 --> 01:58:35.102 wall chargers, car chargers and cables, et cetera. 01:58:35.114 --> 01:58:38.330 We provided billing support for our customers 01:58:38.330 --> 01:58:41.212 in the area where the shut offs and the fires 01:58:41.224 --> 01:58:44.180 occurred, including placing on hold collections 01:58:44.180 --> 01:58:48.420 activity and ensuring that both T mobile and Metro by T Mobile customers did not 01:58:48.420 --> 01:58:55.330 lose their service due to an inability to add or reload their accounts. We additionally 01:58:55.330 --> 01:59:03.650 provided the public with free M95 smoke masks, water, hand sanitizers, sunscreen, 01:59:03.650 --> 01:59:11.020 plastic gloves, trash bags and even supplies for dogs and cats and large animals. We also 01:59:11.020 --> 01:59:22.690 sent food trucks to the impacted areas serving free hot meals toe over 1000 people. 01:59:22.690 --> 01:59:24.483 Thank you. 01:59:24.508 --> 01:59:27.896 I'm sorry. That was another part to the question. 01:59:27.920 --> 01:59:29.375 I think that was okay. 01:59:29.400 --> 01:59:29.860 Think 01:59:29.860 --> 01:59:32.707 you answered most of it. And I appreciate the 01:59:32.719 --> 01:59:35.950 additional information that you just now provided in 01:59:35.950 --> 01:59:38.608 terms of the things that you provided to the communities 01:59:38.633 --> 01:59:41.920 I think we haven't heard from Sprint. 01:59:41.945 --> 01:59:44.975 Thank you. We do have COWS available 01:59:44.987 --> 01:59:47.800 to deploy in state of California, when required. 01:59:47.800 --> 01:59:51.510 However, for sites that are with a power is faster to deploy a generator and get them 01:59:51.510 --> 01:59:56.380 back on air because generally the towers are higher than the cows and they provide better 01:59:56.380 --> 02:00:01.680 coverage. We did have two sites destroyed. We determined that it was faster, once we were 02:00:01.680 --> 02:00:04.342 able to get back into that area, it was faster 02:00:04.354 --> 02:00:06.800 for us to rebuild those towers and get them 02:00:06.800 --> 02:00:13.390 back on air, which we're doing right now. With regard to the other aspects of the 02:00:13.390 --> 02:00:16.799 order, we did provide charging in all our stores, 02:00:16.811 --> 02:00:19.890 we provided WiFi in all ourstores. We offered 02:00:19.890 --> 02:00:22.756 loaner mobile phones at shelter locations for 02:00:22.768 --> 02:00:25.520 used by nonprofit agencies, etcetera. We did 02:00:25.520 --> 02:00:28.418 implement billing adjustments by providing 02:00:28.430 --> 02:00:31.610 unlimited talk text data to all our customers. 02:00:31.610 --> 02:00:37.640 At no extra charge. We did collaborate and coordinate efforts with the CalOES, CUEA, 02:00:37.640 --> 02:00:42.340 and the other utilities by having Sprint employees presence at the State Operation 02:00:42.340 --> 02:00:46.822 Center in Sacramento. So we were available to help. Thank you. 02:00:46.847 --> 02:00:48.530 Thank you very much. 02:00:48.530 --> 02:00:52.865 Other Commissioners have questions for the 02:00:52.890 --> 02:00:57.100 Just as a follow up to the COWS and the COLTS. 02:00:57.100 --> 02:01:02.050 On that issue, but as well as your back haul too. There was a community 02:01:02.050 --> 02:01:05.346 of north at Blue Lake Rancheria that was sharing 02:01:05.358 --> 02:01:08.260 a concern that involved First Net, that one 02:01:08.260 --> 02:01:17.730 company serves area cell sites with a single fiber back haul service to AT&T's 02:01:17.730 --> 02:01:21.701 cell sites. If that back hall were to to go out, 02:01:21.713 --> 02:01:25.370 do you have any sort of mutual aid agreements 02:01:25.370 --> 02:01:29.989 with other providers that have a back haul in the area? And it's a question across the 02:01:29.989 --> 02:01:34.760 board. Essentially, what kind of mutual aid do you have amongst yourselves for both back 02:01:34.760 --> 02:01:39.695 haul and even these COWS and COLTS? 02:01:44.911 --> 02:01:47.449 Yeah, yeah, I need to go investigate from 02:01:47.449 --> 02:01:53.090 a mututal aid perspective, I would tell you that I think we're all absolutely open to 02:01:53.090 --> 02:02:02.530 assisting our peers in terms of restoration efforts. We believe that is important for 02:02:02.530 --> 02:02:09.930 us for us all to restore service and provide good service to our customers 02:02:09.930 --> 02:02:16.170 in terms of the reliability of the network. You know, we believe that from a wireline 02:02:16.170 --> 02:02:22.820 perspective, we have a very robust network. We have thousands of employees that 02:02:22.820 --> 02:02:26.024 are well trained, assets in place, ready to this 02:02:26.036 --> 02:02:29.120 dispatch on an immediate basis when issues does 02:02:29.120 --> 02:02:34.330 arise. And we have been doing that for many, many years, here in the state of California. 02:02:34.330 --> 02:02:36.062 I'm sorry. So you do have 02:02:36.074 --> 02:02:37.818 mutual aid agreements amongst your peers or you do not? 02:02:37.843 --> 02:02:40.824 I cannot speak to that. 02:02:40.836 --> 02:02:44.909 Unfortunately, I will need to investigate that. 02:02:44.934 --> 02:02:46.980 I'm not sure what you're 02:02:46.980 --> 02:02:50.020 referring to about a mutual aid agreement, but 02:02:50.032 --> 02:02:53.020 we do have the ability to roam on each other's 02:02:53.020 --> 02:02:57.380 networks. And we we implement that during states of emergency. For example, the recent 02:02:57.380 --> 02:03:04.710 hurricane an AT&T switch location in Baton Rouge was completely taken off the air and 02:03:04.710 --> 02:03:10.780 T Mobile allowed AT&T customers to rule on the T mobile network in that case, and 02:03:10.780 --> 02:03:16.990 similarly, I can recall in Puerto Rcio where it was the major disaster a couple of years 02:03:16.990 --> 02:03:20.069 ago, we opened our network to others, to our 02:03:20.081 --> 02:03:23.790 competitor's customers to roam on our network in those 02:03:23.790 --> 02:03:29.932 situations. And that's a fairly standard process during emergencies 02:03:29.957 --> 02:03:32.780 and I could, I have recollections 02:03:32.780 --> 02:03:35.713 of that occurring, as well too, in terms of 02:03:35.725 --> 02:03:38.870 where AT&T has helped other carriers as well. I 02:03:38.870 --> 02:03:44.200 can't go into specifics, but that does occur. And I also do believe, I think, with 911 02:03:44.200 --> 02:03:47.029 service. I need verify this, but I did believe 02:03:47.041 --> 02:03:49.640 with 911 service, if you could get a signal 02:03:49.640 --> 02:03:55.489 on your device, regardless of network, your 911 call will go through. That is part of 02:03:55.489 --> 02:03:58.467 the protocol for 911 but I will double check 02:03:58.492 --> 02:04:01.180 That is correct on the 911 issue, we 02:04:01.180 --> 02:04:03.978 can, provided the phone is compatible. Obviously, 02:04:03.990 --> 02:04:06.350 with the technology and the point I wanted 02:04:06.350 --> 02:04:10.800 to make about, I think, where you were, what you're alluding to was, can we share cows 02:04:10.800 --> 02:04:13.301 and colts? I think one of the challenges without 02:04:13.313 --> 02:04:15.620 the equipment is different. We have different 02:04:15.620 --> 02:04:20.760 vendors. We have different frequencies that we operate at, etcetera. So a COW from AT&T 02:04:20.760 --> 02:04:24.205 or Verizon, for example, is not necessarily 02:04:24.217 --> 02:04:27.909 compatible with with with T mobile frequencies. 02:04:27.909 --> 02:04:34.964 So the ability to to lend each other assets is pretty limited. 02:04:34.989 --> 02:04:38.100 Other questions. Commissioner Shiroma, 02:04:38.100 --> 02:04:40.067 did you want to say anything? 02:04:40.092 --> 02:04:44.679 Just to answer, we also have roaming agreements in place, so if our 02:04:44.679 --> 02:04:48.990 site goes off, our customers will attempt to roam if the, if some of the other carriers 02:04:48.990 --> 02:04:51.243 have service, 02:04:51.268 --> 02:04:55.453 Thank you. Judge Bemisterfer. 02:04:55.465 --> 02:04:59.351 Yes. So in the decision referred to by the judge, 02:04:59.363 --> 02:05:03.710 paragraph, order paragraph eight, landline and wireless 02:05:03.722 --> 02:05:07.769 providers, as identified in ordering Paragraph one, 02:05:07.781 --> 02:05:12.047 which is pretty much everybody. Landline and wireless. 02:05:12.059 --> 02:05:16.104 Talks about providing a plan for customer outreach, 02:05:16.116 --> 02:05:19.921 of the various protections, in English, Spanish, 02:05:19.933 --> 02:05:24.217 Chinese, including Cantonese and Mandarin, Tagalog and 02:05:24.229 --> 02:05:28.483 Vietnamese, as well as Korean and Russian, where those 02:05:28.495 --> 02:05:32.218 languages are prevalent within the landline and 02:05:32.230 --> 02:05:36.645 wireless service providers service territories. Customer 02:05:36.657 --> 02:05:40.619 outreach shall also be communicated in formats for 02:05:40.631 --> 02:05:44.655 customers with disabilities impacting their ability 02:05:44.667 --> 02:05:48.781 to use standard forms of communication. So jsust the 02:05:48.793 --> 02:05:52.901 brief status of complying with paragraph order eight 02:05:52.913 --> 02:05:56.800 of the 2019 decision that the Commission adopted. 02:05:56.825 --> 02:06:01.409 for this. I think we will go down the line and we'll start the 02:06:01.409 --> 02:06:08.580 far end. Mr. Blomfield, you have a remark you'd like 02:06:08.605 --> 02:06:12.909 Your Honor. Leon Bloomfield, on 02:06:12.909 --> 02:06:18.020 behalf of T Mobile. I just want to, I know, at least for Mr Gallagher. I mean, he's our 02:06:18.020 --> 02:06:22.239 engineering expert, and this is a little bit outside of that balliwick. I just wanted 02:06:22.239 --> 02:06:27.540 this is in advice letters I think have been filed by all the wireless carriers, at least, 02:06:27.540 --> 02:06:30.084 But the wireless carriers have actually gotten 02:06:30.096 --> 02:06:32.489 together, and we, everyone submitted the, we 02:06:32.489 --> 02:06:38.199 created a plan, a joint plan, to provide this kind of public outreach. Unlike the IOU's 02:06:38.199 --> 02:06:40.860 who have specific territories, obviously, your 02:06:40.872 --> 02:06:43.260 honors, will know that we serve the entire 02:06:43.260 --> 02:06:46.495 state. So in order to make sure our messaging was 02:06:46.507 --> 02:06:49.429 consistent and to overlap and to be efficient 02:06:49.429 --> 02:06:57.199 about it, we have come together to create a single plan that will meet the requirements 02:06:57.199 --> 02:06:59.639 of the order that your ordering paragraph that 02:06:59.651 --> 02:07:02.050 you're talking about, and then each individual 02:07:02.050 --> 02:07:07.199 carrier may have things that they're doing in addition to that. But we wanted to provide 02:07:07.199 --> 02:07:13.600 this more unified approach to help all of our consumers get the same information and 02:07:13.600 --> 02:07:15.804 have just one place to go. 02:07:15.829 --> 02:07:17.770 Did you implement the plan? 02:07:17.796 --> 02:07:18.697 I'm sorry. 02:07:18.722 --> 02:07:21.400 Was the plan implemented over these past PSPSs? 02:07:21.400 --> 02:07:24.230 The ordering paragraph required the 02:07:24.242 --> 02:07:26.929 plan to be provided, which it was provided. I forget 02:07:26.929 --> 02:07:33.949 the exact date. I apologize, and, currently it's underway. It's being implemented, and 02:07:33.949 --> 02:07:36.845 I think that in the plan we projected, someone's 02:07:36.857 --> 02:07:39.350 gonna have to keep me straight here, but I 02:07:39.350 --> 02:07:50.030 think some time Q1 2020 for the plan to go into operation. I believe that's correct. 02:07:50.030 --> 02:07:51.910 Thank you. 02:07:51.935 --> 02:07:54.761 David Fisher, with AT&T. Like 02:07:54.773 --> 02:07:57.550 Mr Bloomfield described on the wireless side 02:07:57.550 --> 02:08:01.183 for AT&T, we're working with the other carriers. 02:08:01.195 --> 02:08:04.170 On the wireline side, we filed an advice 02:08:04.170 --> 02:08:09.360 letter setting forth the plan on compliance. And we are, we've implemented some aspects, 02:08:09.360 --> 02:08:13.004 and we're working on implementing other aspects. 02:08:13.016 --> 02:08:16.150 I just saw, last few days, work on working 02:08:16.150 --> 02:08:20.763 with other wireline carriers to get the translations 02:08:20.775 --> 02:08:24.790 done and uniform. So, like I said, it's a work 02:08:24.790 --> 02:08:28.760 in progress. Some we've done and some we're actively working on implementing. We filed 02:08:28.760 --> 02:08:34.950 that plan in compliance with the decision and detail in that advice letter. What 02:08:34.950 --> 02:08:36.008 we're doing. 02:08:36.033 --> 02:08:37.646 I'm sorry, but did you Mr. Dish, 02:08:37.658 --> 02:08:39.181 did you say your name and your organization? 02:08:39.180 --> 02:08:40.433 david Disher with AT&T. 02:08:40.458 --> 02:08:42.360 Thank you. And then for those that are approaching the mic, 02:08:42.360 --> 02:08:44.983 I remind you to say your name in your organization 02:08:44.995 --> 02:08:47.320 even if your principles already spoken. Thank 02:08:47.320 --> 02:08:49.498 you. We'll proceed 02:08:49.523 --> 02:08:52.562 And I'm gonna see in 02:08:52.574 --> 02:08:56.031 advance. Okay? Deadlines and so far and so on. But 02:08:56.030 --> 02:08:58.995 we're hearing about farmworker populations who 02:08:59.007 --> 02:09:01.730 didn't know was going on, Spanish speaking, 02:09:01.730 --> 02:09:05.593 you know, et cetera, and you talk about innovation, 02:09:05.605 --> 02:09:08.810 well there's also innovation in making sure 02:09:08.810 --> 02:09:12.185 people and your customers actually know what's 02:09:12.197 --> 02:09:15.080 going on. I'm sorry. Go ahead. Whoever's 02:09:15.080 --> 02:09:16.260 next. 02:09:16.285 --> 02:09:18.136 Commissioners, Thank you. That's 02:09:18.148 --> 02:09:19.800 my name is Kristen Jacobson, and I am speaking 02:09:19.800 --> 02:09:25.510 on behalf of Sprint. So, like, Mr Blomfield explained, we're collaborating as an industry 02:09:25.510 --> 02:09:30.760 to put together what we think is going to be a comprehensive, streamlined approach to 02:09:30.760 --> 02:09:34.985 make sure to be able to disseminate information 02:09:34.997 --> 02:09:38.970 that is digestible and consistent and timely. 02:09:38.970 --> 02:09:43.980 We've developed a plan, the plan that's been developed, like Mr Bloomfield said, is 02:09:43.980 --> 02:09:52.100 not yet implemented. But carriers, Sprint in particular, still has a communications with 02:09:52.100 --> 02:09:58.870 customers in the events of emergency. So we just don't have them in the languages yet 02:09:58.870 --> 02:10:05.080 that required, and not in accordance with the new combined effort that is forthcoming. 02:10:05.080 --> 02:10:09.023 Sprint did provide information, it had a dedicated 02:10:09.035 --> 02:10:12.680 landing page on its website, providing resource 02:10:12.680 --> 02:10:20.440 information as well as other accommodations regarding billing and contact information. 02:10:20.440 --> 02:10:25.100 That information was also disseminated to the customer care organizations 02:10:25.100 --> 02:10:28.237 for all of the Sprint entities, so any customer 02:10:28.249 --> 02:10:31.530 could call with questions and be given information 02:10:31.530 --> 02:10:35.226 and direction in that manner as well. 02:10:35.251 --> 02:10:39.128 Thank you, Miss Toller. I think you're up. 02:10:39.153 --> 02:10:43.494 Thank you, Your Honor, Suzanne Toller on behalf of Comcast. 02:10:43.506 --> 02:10:47.635 So there's two different things going on in terms of communication, and I 02:10:47.647 --> 02:10:51.827 don't want us to get them mixed up. So in ordering Paragraph 8 of the 2019 02:10:51.839 --> 02:10:56.030 decision, there was a requirement that landline and wireless providers put 02:10:56.042 --> 02:11:00.386 forward this customer outreach plan. And you heard Mr Broomfield talk about a 02:11:00.398 --> 02:11:04.754 wireless effort, right, to come up with a joint program. I think on the cable 02:11:04.766 --> 02:11:08.836 side, companies have been doing that individually. We also, Comcast also 02:11:08.848 --> 02:11:13.266 submitted an advice letter back in October when that was due outlining a plan. 02:11:13.278 --> 02:11:17.453 It had a number of steps for outreach, including in all the languages that 02:11:17.465 --> 02:11:21.875 have been required, and we some, as AT&T reference, some of those have already 02:11:21.887 --> 02:11:26.012 occurred. Our website has launched in the multiple languages, some of the 02:11:26.024 --> 02:11:30.273 other forms of outreach, for example, you've asked for billing inserts on a 02:11:30.285 --> 02:11:34.463 reasonable basis or ongoing basis. The bill inserts have not yet gone into 02:11:34.475 --> 02:11:38.832 customers' bills, but that's kind of the communication that says if something 02:11:38.844 --> 02:11:43.084 happens to you in a fire, right, this is the relief that you're entitled to 02:11:43.096 --> 02:11:47.292 because that's pretty much what that that decision did. It said, You know, 02:11:47.304 --> 02:11:51.530 there's eight things, right? If you're a VoIP provider, VoIP customer, that 02:11:51.542 --> 02:11:55.948 you're entitled to in terms of relief. Separate and apart from that, though we 02:11:55.960 --> 02:12:00.137 have been, and Sprint was referencing this as well, communicating with our 02:12:00.149 --> 02:12:04.505 customers about the ongoing PSPS events and to the extent that there has been 02:12:04.517 --> 02:12:08.523 fire events, we haven't, the Kincaid fire didn't affect Comcast Service 02:12:08.535 --> 02:12:13.056 territory, but the PSPS obviously did. We have in communication with our client, 02:12:13.068 --> 02:12:17.247 our customers about that through multiple means, through email and through 02:12:17.259 --> 02:12:21.507 text, through social media, through press alerts, through the customers can 02:12:21.519 --> 02:12:25.747 log on to their account remotely. It's called my account. And see that. And 02:12:25.759 --> 02:12:30.166 some of those notices have also been translated in Spanish as well. So there's 02:12:30.178 --> 02:12:34.245 just those two different things, that communication for the emergency's, 02:12:34.257 --> 02:12:38.503 right, and I think that's already underway and obviously happening with the 02:12:38.515 --> 02:12:42.857 emergencies. Communication about and the formal outreach plan. That's talking 02:12:42.869 --> 02:12:47.056 about relief that customers are entitled to in progress, right? But that's 02:12:47.068 --> 02:12:51.082 sort of a longer term, an ongoing requirement, right? That's an ongoing 02:12:51.094 --> 02:12:55.678 requirement from the Commissioner. The disasters are obviously disaster specific. 02:12:55.703 --> 02:12:58.321 Good afternoon. 02:12:58.320 --> 02:13:00.980 I'm Esther Northrop. I'm Cox's executive 02:13:00.992 --> 02:13:04.055 director of state regulatory affairs. Like the 02:13:04.067 --> 02:13:09.814 other communication companies, Cox made its compliance filing in October after Decision 02:13:09.826 --> 02:13:12.750 1908025 was adopted. We, again, only operate 02:13:12.762 --> 02:13:15.763 in parts of Southern California. So it wasn't 02:13:15.775 --> 02:13:18.509 until the October 27th state of emergency 02:13:18.521 --> 02:13:21.725 proclamation that was the only one that affected 02:13:21.737 --> 02:13:24.789 us that was done on a statewide basis. So some 02:13:24.801 --> 02:13:27.540 of the examples of what we were preparing 02:13:27.552 --> 02:13:33.367 for because although we were had fires, near our area, we actually, thankfully, were not 02:13:33.379 --> 02:13:39.124 ultimately impacted by the fires. But we did a few things to prepare for our customers. 02:13:39.136 --> 02:13:44.826 One, we prepared packets of information to distribute at evacuation centers should our 02:13:44.838 --> 02:13:47.886 customer base be evacuated. Evacuation centers 02:13:47.898 --> 02:13:50.762 for our customers were not stood up because 02:13:50.774 --> 02:13:56.384 again, we did not have the fires go through our footprint. Two, we did have a website 02:13:56.396 --> 02:14:02.261 ready to put up, again, should our customers need it. Again, we did not need to implement 02:14:02.273 --> 02:14:05.265 the website, but it was ready to go. And then 02:14:05.277 --> 02:14:08.216 lastly, we did actually implement on account 02:14:08.228 --> 02:14:13.959 wide basis notifications so that customers, if they went into their accounts, they went 02:14:13.971 --> 02:14:17.092 on to our web site, got electronic notification 02:14:17.104 --> 02:14:19.453 that they were, that these would be 02:14:19.465 --> 02:14:22.517 available to them should they need them. We're 02:14:22.529 --> 02:14:25.203 doing other things. This is a continuing 02:14:25.215 --> 02:14:28.208 implementation for us to enhance the outreach 02:14:28.220 --> 02:14:31.160 and notifications to our customers. But this 02:14:31.160 --> 02:14:36.519 is an example of what we've done for the, should we 02:14:36.531 --> 02:14:41.695 have needed it, in the October events. Thank you. 02:14:41.720 --> 02:14:44.059 Thank you. I'm Jim McTarnahan, 02:14:44.071 --> 02:14:46.930 representing Charter communications. And I think that because 02:14:46.930 --> 02:14:51.179 I was involved in the advice letters and some of the plans and Miss Piccolo was not, it 02:14:51.179 --> 02:14:56.010 might be better for me to speak to it. I will direct your attention to the response that 02:14:56.010 --> 02:14:58.793 we filed on Monday that has a lot of detail on 02:14:58.805 --> 02:15:01.660 this particular aspect. In response to questions 02:15:01.660 --> 02:15:08.580 three. But as with the other cable companies, we filed an advice letter in October laying 02:15:08.580 --> 02:15:11.888 out our outreach plan, I believe it was on October 02:15:11.900 --> 02:15:14.830 14. We do have a website up and running with 02:15:14.830 --> 02:15:19.179 the multiple languages required by Decision 02:15:19.191 --> 02:15:23.750 D18, D1908025, and we have engaged in outreach 02:15:23.750 --> 02:15:27.075 to our customers through email and text messaging, 02:15:27.087 --> 02:15:29.900 in at least in English and Spanish. I'm not 02:15:29.900 --> 02:15:33.926 sure on the other languages, but the the website, 02:15:33.938 --> 02:15:37.410 the Spectrum, not Net site, has links to it 02:15:37.410 --> 02:15:44.610 in all the required languages. I'd also note that in addition to, we have also submitted 02:15:44.610 --> 02:15:47.747 advice letters after the fact, as required by 02:15:47.759 --> 02:15:50.840 the decision, outlying our response in detail 02:15:50.840 --> 02:15:56.810 to each one of the disasters that affected us in Los Angeles County and in the North, 02:15:56.810 --> 02:16:02.840 and as well as to the PS PS and have provided daily information to Mr Rubinstein at the 02:16:02.840 --> 02:16:05.719 communications division in response to some of 02:16:05.731 --> 02:16:08.560 these matters. In addition to the requirements 02:16:08.560 --> 02:16:17.760 in the D1908025, we, wherever possible, have provided temporary use wireless phones that 02:16:17.760 --> 02:16:21.578 is a requirement of the decision, at shelters, and 02:16:21.590 --> 02:16:24.969 we have also provided WiFi, free WiFi service 02:16:24.969 --> 02:16:29.949 to not only Charter customers, but to anyone at emergency shelters. There have been 02:16:29.949 --> 02:16:33.112 a couple of instances where the shelters either 02:16:33.124 --> 02:16:35.969 didn't allow us access or the shelters were 02:16:35.969 --> 02:16:40.849 closed, opened and closed very quickly, and we were not able to get in fast enough to 02:16:40.849 --> 02:16:43.414 do it. And there have been instances with 02:16:43.426 --> 02:16:46.309 shelters with one or two people at the shelter. 02:16:46.309 --> 02:16:50.639 Luckily, many people don't have to go to shelters and can relocate to friends and 02:16:50.639 --> 02:16:57.679 family. I also just wanted to take a moment to correct to correct a statement that Miss 02:16:57.679 --> 02:17:03.769 Piccolo made earlier in response to questions about wireless services. And I believe Miss 02:17:03.769 --> 02:17:11.130 Piccolo indicated that Charter does not provide wireless service. That's a a slightly 02:17:11.130 --> 02:17:16.139 inaccurate statement. We do provide wireless service, but we do so as a reseller, and we 02:17:16.139 --> 02:17:23.290 don't own any cell sites. So in the context of the question was that backup power 02:17:23.290 --> 02:17:26.328 for cell sites, we do not own cell sites would 02:17:26.340 --> 02:17:29.000 be a more accurate response than the fact 02:17:29.000 --> 02:17:34.865 that we don't provide wireless service. Thank you, 02:17:34.890 --> 02:17:39.120 Regina Costa of TURN, and I'm making 02:17:39.120 --> 02:17:43.871 a request on behalf of all of the consumer representatives and the public advocate's 02:17:43.871 --> 02:17:47.034 office. It's not to do with what they were 02:17:47.046 --> 02:17:50.590 talking about, but the scope of this proceeding, 02:17:50.590 --> 02:17:52.656 I mean, one of the purpose, and I apologize for 02:17:52.668 --> 02:17:54.530 this, but I think we have to say it because 02:17:54.530 --> 02:18:01.450 we're past 12 o'clock. One of the purposes of this PHC was to scope Phase 2. And 02:18:01.450 --> 02:18:06.599 at page four of the notice, following this PHC, an assigned Commissioner scoping memo 02:18:06.599 --> 02:18:11.450 and ruling shall be issued setting forth the issues to be addressed for phase two and the 02:18:11.450 --> 02:18:14.811 schedule for the remainder of the proceeding. 02:18:14.823 --> 02:18:18.269 We applaud you for jumping on the communication 02:18:18.269 --> 02:18:21.804 outages issue quickly, requiring these companies 02:18:21.816 --> 02:18:25.290 to provide information and asking them pertinent 02:18:25.290 --> 02:18:27.828 questions. But at the same time, what we believe 02:18:27.840 --> 02:18:30.389 is rightfully within the scope of this proceeding 02:18:30.389 --> 02:18:33.405 goes beyond those questions. And, needless to 02:18:33.417 --> 02:18:36.380 say, we do not agree with some of the answers 02:18:36.380 --> 02:18:42.840 that you have received. All right, so what we're asking for is the ability to submit 02:18:42.840 --> 02:18:46.929 written statements regarding the scope of the proceeding. We don't think that you will 02:18:46.929 --> 02:18:52.099 fully address the issues that you intend to address if we're not allowed to be heard. 02:18:52.099 --> 02:18:56.620 And aside from one very short statement from the public advocate's office that went to 02:18:56.620 --> 02:19:02.849 one topic in this notice, they have not had an opportunity to present their full views, 02:19:02.849 --> 02:19:07.920 and also procedurally, they have a pending motion. That's an issue that's appropriate 02:19:07.920 --> 02:19:09.547 for a pre hearing conference. 02:19:09.572 --> 02:19:12.969 So on the last point, their motion is still pending and under 02:19:12.969 --> 02:19:16.981 Commission consideration, so it will be ruled upon 02:19:16.993 --> 02:19:20.780 at a ripe opportunity in the near future. Second 02:19:20.780 --> 02:19:23.790 is, we can grant that by our ruling for parties 02:19:23.802 --> 02:19:26.510 to provide statements that would illuminate 02:19:26.510 --> 02:19:28.887 the issues that the Commission should contemplate 02:19:28.899 --> 02:19:31.050 for this record. further, so you can look for 02:19:31.050 --> 02:19:34.989 that after this pre hearing conference. 02:19:35.014 --> 02:19:36.723 Great. Thank you, 02:19:36.747 --> 02:19:38.440 Thank you. Next. 02:19:38.466 --> 02:19:42.841 Melissa Kaznitz, Center for Accessible 02:19:42.853 --> 02:19:47.240 Technology. With regard to the outreach plans, I'd liketo 02:19:47.240 --> 02:19:49.998 note that the timeliness issue that at least 02:19:50.010 --> 02:19:52.780 one of the carrier representatives said their 02:19:52.780 --> 02:19:58.050 intent was to provide this information in a timely manner, certainly seems not to have 02:19:58.050 --> 02:20:03.360 been effective. Fire season did not come as a surprise to anyone. While the scope of the 02:20:03.360 --> 02:20:05.954 power outages may have been beyond what people 02:20:05.966 --> 02:20:08.351 anticipated, it was well flagged in advance 02:20:08.351 --> 02:20:14.450 that these outages were likely to occur and the carriers were asked repeatedly, not least 02:20:14.450 --> 02:20:23.100 at the workshop a year ago, are you prepared? And the answer was yes. The 02:20:23.100 --> 02:20:29.590 timeliness of the outreach effort and the timeliness of the planning is very much 02:20:29.590 --> 02:20:36.140 less clear than the carriers would like to to assert here. Also, I'd like to note these 02:20:36.140 --> 02:20:38.831 asides that we're ready to provide information, 02:20:38.843 --> 02:20:40.870 oh, except for the in language part. 02:20:40.870 --> 02:20:44.338 and no one even spoke to the issue of accessible 02:20:44.350 --> 02:20:47.120 formats. Those of the people or some of 02:20:47.120 --> 02:20:51.060 the people who are most at risk. So saying we're communicating with the people who are 02:20:51.060 --> 02:20:57.210 easiest to communicate with isn't enough. And I don't think is consistent with the intent 02:20:57.210 --> 02:21:04.560 of that ordering paragraph. Finally, I'll have to verify this, but it's my recollection 02:21:04.560 --> 02:21:06.825 that at least some of the outreach plan was 02:21:06.837 --> 02:21:09.320 contingent on providing information to customers 02:21:09.320 --> 02:21:15.150 who ask. And again, I would say that's not consistent with the intent of the ordering 02:21:15.150 --> 02:21:17.459 paragraph. The idea is that customers won't 02:21:17.471 --> 02:21:19.950 know to ask, and what this Commission is trying 02:21:19.950 --> 02:21:23.238 to do is ensure that customers are aware that 02:21:23.250 --> 02:21:26.550 assistance is available without already having 02:21:26.550 --> 02:21:31.280 some information that they have to ask for help. And maybe if they ask, they'll be told. 02:21:31.280 --> 02:21:37.240 Oh, yeah, we'll do things for you now that you've asked for it. So, the outreach 02:21:37.240 --> 02:21:41.820 effort, the public information effort to all customers and particularly hard to reach 02:21:41.820 --> 02:21:47.790 customers is important. And the fact that it's only anticipated to take place sometime 02:21:47.790 --> 02:21:50.848 in the future after fire season is over is very 02:21:50.860 --> 02:21:53.610 much a cause for concern for the consumers. 02:21:53.610 --> 02:21:56.278 Thank you, 02:21:56.303 --> 02:22:00.237 Sarah Banola, outside counsel 02:22:00.249 --> 02:22:04.281 for Frontier. And I want to speak to Frontier's 02:22:04.280 --> 02:22:09.170 compliance with the decision. Frontier did timely file the advice letters because 02:22:09.170 --> 02:22:15.670 their territory was impacted by some of the recent fires. in addition, Frontier 02:22:15.670 --> 02:22:18.797 has already allowed launched outreach efforts, 02:22:18.809 --> 02:22:21.680 to both local communities, first responders 02:22:21.680 --> 02:22:25.367 and local agencies to provide important information. 02:22:25.379 --> 02:22:28.380 They've used multiple channels in doing so, 02:22:28.380 --> 02:22:33.570 including press releases, customer emails, text messages and dedicated situational Web 02:22:33.570 --> 02:22:40.450 pages. My understanding in terms of both the language and the accessibility parts that 02:22:40.450 --> 02:22:48.423 they have developed those and they're still in the process of implementing them. 02:22:48.448 --> 02:22:51.081 Hi. Sharlan 02:22:51.080 --> 02:22:59.110 Hook for Public Advocates office. Thank you for giving me the last word, I think. But 02:22:59.110 --> 02:23:06.149 I just wanted to say I echo the comments of my colleague Regina Costa from TURN, and 02:23:06.149 --> 02:23:08.778 Public Advocate's Office does generally support 02:23:08.790 --> 02:23:11.210 the direction that this proceeding is going, 02:23:11.210 --> 02:23:18.760 and we agree with the scope as outlined in Decision 1908025 to focus on resilient and 02:23:18.760 --> 02:23:22.539 dependable communications between first responders 02:23:22.551 --> 02:23:25.970 and the public. Ensuring public communications 02:23:25.970 --> 02:23:32.189 during emergencies. We also would request that we be allowed to put in written comments 02:23:32.189 --> 02:23:38.210 as to the scope and schedule for phase two to cover all the technical details. However, 02:23:38.210 --> 02:23:43.410 we do want to state also that we don't think we can wait until the end of phase two for a 02:23:43.410 --> 02:23:50.570 phase two decision before the Commission takes action. As noted earlier, we do have a 02:23:50.570 --> 02:23:56.101 pending motion and I would refer you to that motion. But we do not want to take the time 02:23:56.101 --> 02:23:59.260 for holding technical workshops, and we believe 02:23:59.272 --> 02:24:02.510 the Commission has the authority and the existing 02:24:02.510 --> 02:24:10.200 record to implement an interim on-site backup power requirement of 72 hours, as we stated 02:24:10.200 --> 02:24:13.033 today, and thank you for considering that. 02:24:13.058 --> 02:24:15.800 Thank you Miss Hook. And as I'll reiterate, we 02:24:15.800 --> 02:24:18.877 will issue a ruling allowing parties to submit 02:24:18.889 --> 02:24:21.780 proposed topics that will be included in the 02:24:21.780 --> 02:24:26.729 scope of phase two for consideration shortly after this PHC. So thank you. 02:24:26.729 --> 02:24:30.890 I turn this back over to now to ALJ Bermister. If I, if there's no other comments 02:24:30.890 --> 02:24:36.232 on the topic from the Commissioner's. So ALJ Bermister. 02:24:36.257 --> 02:24:40.430 Thank you, I'm turning back to the final issue 02:24:40.430 --> 02:24:48.560 that we listed in our proposed scope, which is the engagement and timely responsiveness 02:24:48.560 --> 02:24:53.649 to requests from the Office of Emergency Service's and the Department of Forestry and 02:24:53.649 --> 02:24:58.102 Fire Protection. During this year's fire season 02:24:58.114 --> 02:25:02.021 up to and including today, OES and CalFire 02:25:02.021 --> 02:25:04.673 have been communicating with the providers 02:25:04.685 --> 02:25:07.721 regarding perceived shortcomings in the providers 02:25:07.721 --> 02:25:11.121 responses to the emergencies created by the 02:25:11.133 --> 02:25:14.700 season's fires. This portion of the scope will 02:25:14.700 --> 02:25:18.832 address the accuracy and completeness of provider 02:25:18.844 --> 02:25:22.740 responses to those requests, and we'll consider 02:25:22.740 --> 02:25:26.263 steps to be taken if those responses are found 02:25:26.275 --> 02:25:29.660 to be substantially inaccurate or incomplete. 02:25:29.660 --> 02:25:34.676 President Batjer. You want comment on that? 02:25:34.701 --> 02:25:40.149 Yes. Thank you, Judge. We've covered a good deal 02:25:40.149 --> 02:25:46.740 of this in some of the earlier questions and answers and comments. But I will note, 02:25:46.740 --> 02:25:53.330 as was noted just by one of the presenters, that, obviously, I was not here 02:25:53.330 --> 02:25:57.380 at the Commission a year ago, but November 1st 02:25:57.392 --> 02:26:01.540 2018, the PUC held a workshop in this proceeding 02:26:01.540 --> 02:26:04.482 where officials from both OES and Cal Fire and 02:26:04.494 --> 02:26:07.070 Local Emergency Management agencies spoke 02:26:07.070 --> 02:26:09.693 about the lack of coordination between the 02:26:09.705 --> 02:26:12.770 emergency response agencies and the communications 02:26:12.770 --> 02:26:15.607 providers. We talked about that today, however, 02:26:15.619 --> 02:26:18.350 they voiced at that time, and I know they have 02:26:18.350 --> 02:26:21.763 voiced in the most recent period of time and 02:26:21.775 --> 02:26:25.580 indeed was even testified to day before yesterday, 02:26:25.580 --> 02:26:29.752 before a Senate committee, that there is indeed 02:26:29.764 --> 02:26:33.860 frustration still for the lack of coordination, 02:26:33.860 --> 02:26:41.470 transparency and sharing of information in real time from the communication companies. 02:26:41.470 --> 02:26:46.413 So the workshop was held a year ago, and the 02:26:46.425 --> 02:26:51.490 Commission has put forward decisions. We still 02:26:51.490 --> 02:26:58.050 seem to be a bit stuck, and I think we had explanations today. I will go more thoroughly 02:26:58.050 --> 02:27:01.830 through your explanations when I get the transcript, I will look at your letters that 02:27:01.830 --> 02:27:10.101 you sent me more thoroughly. As noted by Commissioner Shiroma, not all of 02:27:10.101 --> 02:27:12.997 you provided data that we were hopeful you 02:27:13.009 --> 02:27:16.120 would. Indeed, it was considered confidential. 02:27:16.120 --> 02:27:24.229 And that has been a a premise that you have put forward often, not only before this body 02:27:24.229 --> 02:27:31.170 before the legislative branch and to the governor's Office of Emergency services 02:27:31.170 --> 02:27:37.290 continually so I'm hoping that we can at one point get to a point where we all agree 02:27:37.290 --> 02:27:43.840 that the data is extraordinarily important in terms of providing your very vital and 02:27:43.840 --> 02:27:50.180 important services and to the people of California in times of emergencies, and 02:27:50.180 --> 02:27:53.763 we're not talking about as Commissione Randolph 02:27:53.775 --> 02:27:56.920 said. We're not talking about gold plated 02:27:56.920 --> 02:27:59.827 abilities in times of emergencies. We're talking 02:27:59.839 --> 02:28:02.460 about being able to reach 911. Being able to 02:28:02.460 --> 02:28:07.311 at least perhaps look at maps that the IOUs are directing their customers to look 02:28:07.311 --> 02:28:14.521 at to find out whether the fire is encroaching on thei properties, et cetera. 02:28:14.521 --> 02:28:24.550 So I think we have certainly pointed it out to all of you. You have responded. 02:28:24.550 --> 02:28:30.040 I'm not sure that some of your responses were the things that I personally witnessed, but 02:28:30.040 --> 02:28:33.175 I will go back with my colleagues and make sure 02:28:33.187 --> 02:28:35.940 that my recollection of the participation, 02:28:35.940 --> 02:28:39.692 the level of participation that was needed, 02:28:39.704 --> 02:28:43.640 required at the time. I'm also a bit concerned 02:28:43.640 --> 02:28:50.990 of you relying on your association to, communicate your data and communicate 02:28:50.990 --> 02:28:55.357 in a timely manner. That's something for you all 02:28:55.369 --> 02:28:59.480 to probably talk among yourselves and resolve 02:28:59.505 --> 02:29:02.093 President Batjer. 02:29:02.105 --> 02:29:04.760 That's especially concerning given what we heard 02:29:04.760 --> 02:29:13.350 from OES, that they were getting inconsistent data from the from DIRS and CUEA 02:29:13.350 --> 02:29:17.663 Suggests there's a real problem in relying on the association's data. 02:29:17.688 --> 02:29:19.101 And in the first 02:29:19.100 --> 02:29:22.104 24 hours it was really critical, we were getting, 02:29:22.116 --> 02:29:24.649 the information that we were getting being 02:29:24.649 --> 02:29:32.920 provided to FCC and not to the state. Again, I will go back and re verify and validate 02:29:32.920 --> 02:29:40.101 that. But I do know that we didn't do well. We all, we didn't do well and we talked about 02:29:40.101 --> 02:29:48.610 it in November. We had, the Commission had an en banc in May. There's a little bit of of 02:29:48.610 --> 02:29:56.580 a feeling that I have that reminds me of what we're doing currently with the I. O. U's. 02:29:56.580 --> 02:30:00.935 They all have to put together wildfire mitigation 02:30:00.947 --> 02:30:04.440 plans by statute and knew it. We review 02:30:04.440 --> 02:30:11.970 them. The flood is coming to my mind. What kind of requirement do we need to make on 02:30:11.970 --> 02:30:18.370 this very, very important service that you all provide to the people of California? 02:30:18.370 --> 02:30:22.966 And how do how do we make sure, as a regulatory 02:30:22.978 --> 02:30:27.010 body, as well as officials of the state of 02:30:27.010 --> 02:30:33.280 California, that information is coming to us in a timely, appropriate manner that can 02:30:33.280 --> 02:30:36.251 indeed be acted upon by the people who most 02:30:36.263 --> 02:30:39.450 need and those are our first responders and our 02:30:39.450 --> 02:30:45.840 emergency managers, and indeed your customers will have to know where the danger is and 02:30:45.840 --> 02:30:49.194 how to get out of that danger and how to report 02:30:49.206 --> 02:30:52.221 medically difficult situations that they or 02:30:52.221 --> 02:30:55.363 their family members are in. So I don't have a 02:30:55.375 --> 02:30:58.260 question from that just a statement, I turn 02:30:58.260 --> 02:31:01.919 to my Commissioners for some comments or statements 02:31:01.931 --> 02:31:05.320 on the question that Judge just posed. Number 3. 02:31:05.320 --> 02:31:09.705 I just would reinforce 02:31:09.717 --> 02:31:13.450 the common earlier that President Batjer also 02:31:13.450 --> 02:31:20.260 alluded to, which is we're in a state where these coverage maps that are are needed from 02:31:20.260 --> 02:31:26.200 the public need to be provided in a timely way, in a robust way, just as the coverage 02:31:26.200 --> 02:31:32.661 maps that we are anticipating from our IOUs and it's no different here. The customers 02:31:32.661 --> 02:31:36.850 need to know where there's coverage, where there's not, and the local responders need 02:31:36.850 --> 02:31:43.340 to know. I did want to note that I saw in Cox's response the planning that's taking 02:31:43.340 --> 02:31:46.285 place at a local level, and I did have a question 02:31:46.297 --> 02:31:48.900 on this for the others, that Cox mentioned., 02:31:48.900 --> 02:31:56.250 They do simulation planning with SDG&E, and I, do any of you do similar simulation 02:31:56.250 --> 02:31:59.928 planning with your respective I. O. U's particularly, 02:31:59.940 --> 02:32:02.810 obviously, that was, some of the PSPS have 02:32:02.810 --> 02:32:08.420 been happening and preventing some of these holes that are occurring in both coverage 02:32:08.420 --> 02:32:11.128 and responsiveness? 02:32:11.153 --> 02:32:16.032 To date, we have not, but we're 02:32:16.044 --> 02:32:21.390 certainly open to pursuing that in the future. 02:32:21.415 --> 02:32:22.366 Okay. AT&T? 02:32:22.391 --> 02:32:25.045 So we do a lot of simulations 02:32:25.070 --> 02:32:27.811 in terms and practices in terms 02:32:27.811 --> 02:32:31.659 of disaster recovery for all type of activity, 02:32:31.671 --> 02:32:35.120 specifically to interacting with the IOUs. 02:32:35.120 --> 02:32:39.720 We have both formal and informal interaction with them. So we get the maps everybody else 02:32:39.720 --> 02:32:43.990 gets. But we also have a direct link with all the used and have a great relationship 02:32:43.990 --> 02:32:46.865 to ensure that we are aligned with whatever type 02:32:46.877 --> 02:32:49.470 of outage, whatever type of shut off they're 02:32:49.470 --> 02:32:51.583 gonna be performed to make sure that our network 02:32:51.595 --> 02:32:53.590 are alligned with that, I mean, a good example 02:32:53.590 --> 02:32:59.630 of that is that for this current PS PS event, we do not have a single cell, macro 02:32:59.630 --> 02:33:05.350 cell sites down at this time because of the interaction that we have with the i. O. U's 02:33:05.350 --> 02:33:08.401 both on the formal basis and informal basis. 02:33:08.426 --> 02:33:11.372 So you have done simulations 02:33:11.384 --> 02:33:13.618 specifically with for example, PG&E? 02:33:13.643 --> 02:33:17.850 I don't think we need to do simulations from the standpoint 02:33:17.850 --> 02:33:23.810 that we're, we are actually operationalizing the activities on the regular basis over and 02:33:23.810 --> 02:33:26.148 over again. So there is no simulation required 02:33:26.160 --> 02:33:28.260 when you're doing PSPS events almost every 02:33:28.260 --> 02:33:34.130 other week. But we are having direct contact to ensure that we are alligned in terms 02:33:34.130 --> 02:33:36.818 of information that's being shared. And how do we 02:33:36.830 --> 02:33:39.745 better support each other with this type of activity. 02:33:39.770 --> 02:33:42.755 You're thinking you're getting to the same end result? 02:33:42.780 --> 02:33:43.508 Absolutely. Yes. 02:33:43.533 --> 02:33:47.853 Okay. I noted too, sir, that you 02:33:47.865 --> 02:33:52.850 mentioned that PS PS events in the last month took a greater 02:33:52.850 --> 02:33:56.910 population than other disasters. AT&T obviously 02:33:56.922 --> 02:34:00.570 serves people across the country, and there 02:34:00.570 --> 02:34:07.011 have been major disasters that have taken out cell towers, all types of communications. 02:34:07.011 --> 02:34:09.222 I mean, Katrina and Rita, back to back 02:34:09.234 --> 02:34:12.100 hurricanes come to mind. The only thing that was 02:34:12.100 --> 02:34:15.760 available at that point was satellite communications 02:34:15.772 --> 02:34:18.820 at one point, but that multiple states large 02:34:18.820 --> 02:34:27.100 population, difficult populations, both rural and urban. And so I'm just thinking 02:34:27.100 --> 02:34:35.010 you have experienced larger disasters that were long lived and multiple populations in 02:34:35.010 --> 02:34:40.465 very different geographies and topographies. 02:34:43.386 --> 02:34:47.010 Absolutely, And I'm really proud of the 02:34:47.010 --> 02:34:53.431 work that my team has performed across the country in response to the disaster. The key 02:34:53.431 --> 02:34:59.512 here is really understanding how this event is significantly different than other 02:34:59.512 --> 02:35:03.892 events from Rita, Katrina to Sandy, other hurricanes, 02:35:03.904 --> 02:35:07.970 tornadoes and wildfires and even volcanic activity 02:35:07.970 --> 02:35:10.053 in Hawaii that we have to deal with, right? The 02:35:10.065 --> 02:35:12.160 difference there is from a hurricane perspective 02:35:12.160 --> 02:35:19.450 you have a forecast. You know where, you know, you kind of know where the storm is 02:35:19.450 --> 02:35:22.471 gonna land. We position assets all throughout 02:35:22.483 --> 02:35:25.450 the territory in anticipation of the forecast 02:35:25.450 --> 02:35:30.930 Hurricane Dorian, for example, was something that we dealt with recently, we were, even 02:35:30.930 --> 02:35:33.957 though that Dorian's path wasn't precise and the 02:35:33.969 --> 02:35:36.760 changes over time, we were able to reposition 02:35:36.760 --> 02:35:41.025 assets on an hourly basis in anticipation of the 02:35:41.037 --> 02:35:44.790 storm coming onshore and impacts associated 02:35:44.790 --> 02:35:47.541 it with that type of activity. What we dealt 02:35:47.553 --> 02:35:50.501 with here in Northern California, unlike what we 02:35:50.501 --> 02:35:56.750 dealt with in Southern California, was that notice was extremely short, that size of the 02:35:56.750 --> 02:36:02.240 outage was very broad and information that was provided changes on the hourly basis. 02:36:02.240 --> 02:36:04.772 For example, this PS PS event that we're doing 02:36:04.784 --> 02:36:07.490 with right now, on hourly basis, we have different 02:36:07.490 --> 02:36:13.220 maps that's coming in, they're showing where where the power is gonna shut off. My team 02:36:13.220 --> 02:36:18.600 deploy 60 generators here in the Bay Area, all day yesterday, in anticipation of this 02:36:18.600 --> 02:36:23.570 event occurring, and then the Bay Area wasn't part of the event anymore, and now we have 02:36:23.570 --> 02:36:25.885 to shift the generator into a different location 02:36:25.897 --> 02:36:27.939 that shut offs that's occurred in community 02:36:27.939 --> 02:36:33.530 that wasn't even part of the event. Without any notice, it is impossible to react with 02:36:33.530 --> 02:36:38.310 that type of situation. We're in Southern California. You know, the information was 02:36:38.310 --> 02:36:41.707 not perfect, but it was very limited in terms of 02:36:41.719 --> 02:36:44.850 where, where occur. And we absolutely believe 02:36:44.850 --> 02:36:49.180 that the combination of fixed generators and portable generator is the right solution, 02:36:49.180 --> 02:36:51.663 because it doesn't make sense for us to go and 02:36:51.675 --> 02:36:53.851 put generators on every single cell site. 02:36:53.851 --> 02:36:56.034 Four carriers, every carriers have the generator 02:36:56.046 --> 02:36:58.151 out there across whole estate. These generators 02:36:58.151 --> 02:37:00.873 of hundreds of gallons of fuel, these generators 02:37:00.885 --> 02:37:03.340 have run on the regular basis to ensure that 02:37:03.340 --> 02:37:08.220 they're reliable. It doesn't make sense from a financial perspective, from environmental 02:37:08.220 --> 02:37:13.680 perspective, from a community perspective to be all staging these generators. But the 02:37:13.680 --> 02:37:18.300 reality is you have portable generators in place. If you have good processes in place 02:37:18.300 --> 02:37:24.840 that identify when and where these outages occur, we could respond to that. We have the 02:37:24.840 --> 02:37:26.666 resources and a commitment to do that. 02:37:26.691 --> 02:37:29.101 You're speaking of northern California. I appreciate 02:37:29.101 --> 02:37:33.788 greatly what you just said very, very helpful. 02:37:33.800 --> 02:37:38.100 So you do, have you made similar statements 02:37:38.100 --> 02:37:46.010 to PG&E? Do you have ideas that you can share in terms of their emergency notification 02:37:46.010 --> 02:37:52.890 and how they're doing it and why and how, when, where and why? I know we've certainly 02:37:52.890 --> 02:38:00.980 talked to them. However, it would be very helpful, I'm sure you coordinate, but your 02:38:00.980 --> 02:38:06.220 experience, what you, what you just stated, sir, is extremely important in terms of your 02:38:06.220 --> 02:38:16.950 own abilities to service your customers. And you are in this in this instance, reliable, 02:38:16.950 --> 02:38:21.785 relying on, excuse me, on the investor owned utility. 02:38:21.810 --> 02:38:24.830 Yes, we have made many comments to 02:38:24.830 --> 02:38:31.230 PG&E. Nothing that I could share publicly at this time. But I would say that because 02:38:31.230 --> 02:38:33.835 of some of the interaction, that's the reason 02:38:33.847 --> 02:38:36.350 why, in this current event, we have no macro 02:38:36.350 --> 02:38:40.960 cell sites out of the service at this time. I think there's more that needs to be done, 02:38:40.960 --> 02:38:47.721 and I am willing and ready, engage with PG&E and support them in any way that they 02:38:47.721 --> 02:38:50.022 can. I think there's a lot of innovation and 02:38:50.034 --> 02:38:52.399 ideas that we could work together on to ensure 02:38:52.399 --> 02:38:57.510 that that they do their part to ensure that we could do our part to keep this network 02:38:57.510 --> 02:38:59.395 up and running for everybody. 02:38:59.420 --> 02:39:03.360 I'll say to you all. As we have said repeatedly in the last month 02:39:03.360 --> 02:39:07.577 and a half. Next fire season cannot, cannot 02:39:07.589 --> 02:39:12.010 look like this one. So your preparedness, your 02:39:12.010 --> 02:39:17.832 innovativeness is absolutely Paramount 02:39:17.857 --> 02:39:20.623 Commission Shiroma. 02:39:20.649 --> 02:39:23.142 I'm sorry. 02:39:23.167 --> 02:39:26.821 Go ahead, please. Just state your name. 02:39:26.846 --> 02:39:30.850 Sorry, David Gallagher, T Mobile. Our ability to respond 02:39:30.850 --> 02:39:34.728 to these events was definitely been impacted 02:39:34.740 --> 02:39:38.630 by but the accuracy and timeliness ff notices 02:39:38.630 --> 02:39:44.450 received from PG&E. In some cases and I would say that it's gotten better 02:39:44.450 --> 02:39:50.830 over the course of the last several events, the first event in early October. In some 02:39:50.830 --> 02:39:54.204 cases, we would pre position our generators in 02:39:54.216 --> 02:39:57.530 a particular noticed area which never actually 02:39:57.530 --> 02:40:02.670 lost power. So we have a generator, we'd wire it up and be ready to go. We have it 02:40:02.670 --> 02:40:08.600 powered up and running in anticipation of an outage that never happened at the location, 02:40:08.600 --> 02:40:12.240 and similarly, meanwhile, that there was other 02:40:12.252 --> 02:40:15.670 locations with no notice that would go, that 02:40:15.670 --> 02:40:20.870 would go down. So we have to be scrambling and relocating generators, which involves 02:40:20.870 --> 02:40:24.224 unwiring from the site, transporting the many, 02:40:24.236 --> 02:40:27.100 many miles, in many cases across, across 02:40:27.100 --> 02:40:35.410 the area to wire them up to into a new site. This has definitely impacted our ability 02:40:35.410 --> 02:40:39.393 to respond. I think that it has gotten better. 02:40:39.405 --> 02:40:42.720 We have learned, we have taken a number 02:40:42.720 --> 02:40:46.391 of steps, including prepositioning generators. 02:40:46.403 --> 02:40:49.850 It is notable that I just got a text from my 02:40:49.850 --> 02:40:55.120 team that during the current outage, we have no sites down in the Bay Area, this time. 02:40:55.120 --> 02:41:00.330 Three sites down in Sacramento. Currently, due to power shut 02:41:00.342 --> 02:41:05.479 off, a very different story from the first event in October. 02:41:09.716 --> 02:41:14.430 I would just like to thank you. 02:41:14.430 --> 02:41:19.109 Thank you, Judge. Sam Matisha with Cox. Commissioner, thank you for calling that 02:41:19.109 --> 02:41:26.780 out. I do want to say we are fortunate that 65% of our network lies in SDG&E service 02:41:26.780 --> 02:41:32.340 territory. And in the last 10 or 12 years, we have developed a very strong collaborative 02:41:32.340 --> 02:41:35.129 relationship with San Diego Gas and Electric and 02:41:35.141 --> 02:41:37.770 the simulation that the Commissioner mentioned 02:41:37.770 --> 02:41:39.825 really took part in an all day business 02:41:39.837 --> 02:41:42.380 continuity plan workshop that we had with SDG&E 02:41:42.380 --> 02:41:45.365 in our County of San Diego Office of Emergency 02:41:45.377 --> 02:41:48.310 Services, seven SDG&E representatives attended 02:41:48.310 --> 02:41:54.460 that, and our topic was the PS PS. How to run a simulation based on different scenarios 02:41:54.460 --> 02:41:58.820 and where it might happen, how that might impact our network and where we might deploy 02:41:58.820 --> 02:42:02.108 resources. I can tell you we have two different 02:42:02.120 --> 02:42:04.939 I. O U's that provide the services. SoCal 02:42:04.939 --> 02:42:12.020 Edison and SDG&E. The maturity level of SDG&E's processes and plans with their 02:42:12.020 --> 02:42:15.139 pre, during, and post communication is commendable. 02:42:15.151 --> 02:42:17.740 Their ability to provide us data at the GIS 02:42:17.740 --> 02:42:23.100 the mapping level so we can take that data and overlay all of our critical 02:42:23.100 --> 02:42:28.340 network infrastructure as well as where our employees live, where are critical customers 02:42:28.340 --> 02:42:35.080 are, and then be able to plan and position react tp that is very helpful, and I will say 02:42:35.080 --> 02:42:41.170 that this micro grid concept of breaking the large grid down into smaller grids is very 02:42:41.170 --> 02:42:48.050 beneficial, not just to Cox but all the folks that rely on SDG&E. So I know 02:42:48.050 --> 02:42:50.829 it's been a, it's been a process to get here, 02:42:50.841 --> 02:42:53.510 and I know there's work left to be done, but 02:42:53.510 --> 02:42:59.170 I do wanna make that statement regarding what SDG&E has done and our partnership with 02:42:59.170 --> 02:43:03.630 them. And we are very appreciative, and I could see that SoCal Edison is working 02:43:03.630 --> 02:43:05.845 really hard, and they're starting to get more 02:43:05.857 --> 02:43:08.180 maturity also. And so we don't have any exposure 02:43:08.180 --> 02:43:11.930 to PG&E. But I do want to just make that statement. So thank you, Commissioner, for 02:43:11.930 --> 02:43:13.735 calling that out. 02:43:13.760 --> 02:43:16.384 Thank you in in this 02:43:16.396 --> 02:43:19.149 same vein, three quick points. First of all, I 02:43:19.149 --> 02:43:22.187 spent 20 years as an elected on the SMUD board 02:43:22.199 --> 02:43:24.990 in Sacramento. And 20 years ago, we learned 02:43:24.990 --> 02:43:28.978 it is us to do with floods and potential levee 02:43:28.990 --> 02:43:32.480 breaks. And when we learned at that time, 02:43:32.480 --> 02:43:35.518 that the communication systems between whether 02:43:35.530 --> 02:43:38.320 it was SMUD, the police, the fire, Sheriff, 02:43:38.320 --> 02:43:46.370 were all disperate. So the governing board said, Okay, we can't have this, if there's 02:43:46.370 --> 02:43:51.019 a levy break. Everyone has got to be communicating 02:43:51.031 --> 02:43:54.870 and have had a plan. So it is so important 02:43:54.870 --> 02:43:58.817 to have the simulations with utility and however 02:43:58.829 --> 02:44:02.060 that is, it comes about, it's got to be 02:44:02.060 --> 02:44:10.791 done. And then, Mr Long, you mentioned technical workshops, and I think that's a 02:44:10.791 --> 02:44:18.560 good thing to look at best practices amongst all of the the telcos for providing this 02:44:18.560 --> 02:44:23.880 innovation. But really before providing a framework for what Commission needs to order, 02:44:23.880 --> 02:44:30.700 frankly, and then finally, the whole notion of enterprise risk management, I think, 02:44:30.700 --> 02:44:40.189 Mr Gallagher, you mentioned that not every cell site that's down is impactful. And so, 02:44:40.189 --> 02:44:45.089 in the San Diego Gas Electric rubric of having 02:44:45.101 --> 02:44:49.700 just visited their operations center, of the 02:44:49.700 --> 02:44:54.540 enterprise risk management of where are the most vulnerable spots? That ought to be the 02:44:54.540 --> 02:45:03.580 top priority. Boom right away. Has got to be infused into the California system 02:45:03.580 --> 02:45:10.324 And that's it. Thank you very much. No further comment for me. 02:45:10.349 --> 02:45:13.000 I have one question, we've 02:45:13.000 --> 02:45:16.957 we heard anecdotally, I think it was in Sonoma 02:45:16.969 --> 02:45:20.600 County that their efforts to test emergency 02:45:20.600 --> 02:45:24.098 alert systems met with resistance. Have any of 02:45:24.110 --> 02:45:27.620 you turned down a request from local government 02:45:27.620 --> 02:45:32.430 to test their emergency alerts or systems? 02:45:32.455 --> 02:45:37.240 Alison Ellis from Frontier. Absolutely not. 02:45:37.240 --> 02:45:39.129 We go down the line and have each of 02:45:39.141 --> 02:45:40.968 you answer Commissioner Rechtschaffen's question. 02:45:40.993 --> 02:45:42.211 John Gotter 02:45:42.210 --> 02:45:44.535 from Comcast. We have not. 02:45:44.560 --> 02:45:50.170 Amon O'Leary from Sprint. I don't believe we have, I'll double 02:45:50.170 --> 02:45:55.280 check, but I would be very, very surprised if we had. I'll double check. 02:45:55.305 --> 02:45:57.520 Rudy Reyes with Verizon. No, 02:45:57.520 --> 02:46:00.202 you know, I don't think we have. I'm not 100% 02:46:00.214 --> 02:46:02.790 sure, but same with Sprint's response, which 02:46:02.790 --> 02:46:07.217 I really seriously doubt it. But we will check. 02:46:07.242 --> 02:46:10.890 David Gallagher, T Mobile. I think it's 02:46:10.890 --> 02:46:16.538 extremely out of character for organization to do that. But I will double check 02:46:16.563 --> 02:46:18.421 Sam matisha 02:46:18.420 --> 02:46:21.833 with Cox. I'm not aware of any, but I think it's a no, but we will double check 02:46:21.858 --> 02:46:22.971 Deborah 02:46:22.970 --> 02:46:32.737 Piccolo with Charter. Well, that is a no, we have not. 02:46:32.762 --> 02:46:35.768 President Batjer. 02:46:35.793 --> 02:46:38.420 Just one final 02:46:38.420 --> 02:46:42.476 note. In terms of preparedness and the future, 02:46:42.488 --> 02:46:46.210 we're getting to an era where we could get, 02:46:46.210 --> 02:46:53.100 we're getting to be more predictive, CalFire, in particular, CalOES, our own division 02:46:53.100 --> 02:47:01.611 of security and enforcement. Their models. The science is getting better. San Diego Gas 02:47:01.611 --> 02:47:09.461 and Electric's Emergency Center and their weather information is extraordinary, and the 02:47:09.461 --> 02:47:14.870 modeling that they've done, the algorithms that they have produced along with 02:47:14.870 --> 02:47:17.610 the outside consultants that they have. And 02:47:17.622 --> 02:47:20.500 some of us are all sharing this. I think we're 02:47:20.500 --> 02:47:24.310 going to and I hope that you all, again we've 02:47:24.322 --> 02:47:28.060 talked about an innovative, innovative things 02:47:28.060 --> 02:47:33.306 to help us into the future, and I would suggest 02:47:33.318 --> 02:47:37.810 that we all think as innovatively as some 02:47:37.810 --> 02:47:41.268 of the other utilities are doing in terms of 02:47:41.280 --> 02:47:44.750 becoming much more predictive of the weather. 02:47:44.750 --> 02:47:50.390 You commented, sir, that it's very difficult when, you know, we don't know from 02:47:50.390 --> 02:47:52.294 hour to hour where the weather is going. Well, 02:47:52.306 --> 02:47:54.221 the models are getting better and we're getting 02:47:54.221 --> 02:47:59.600 and IOUs, hopefully, are learning from those models and sharing with each other, 02:47:59.600 --> 02:48:04.640 and I hope the same will be true with all of you in terms of the collaboration with 02:48:04.640 --> 02:48:10.420 them. I think that's something, we have to really depend on their science that is before 02:48:10.420 --> 02:48:16.842 us and I think could be so, so well used by us. 02:48:16.867 --> 02:48:22.060 Thank you. So now we'll move on to the 02:48:22.060 --> 02:48:27.690 schedule. So as I, as we previously have stated, a ruling 02:48:27.690 --> 02:48:30.662 soliciting topics for proposed scope to phase two 02:48:30.674 --> 02:48:33.300 of this rulemaking will be issued subsequent 02:48:33.300 --> 02:48:38.000 to this pre hearing conference. Following that round, a scoping memo and ruling will 02:48:38.000 --> 02:48:42.840 be released outlining the issues for Phase two that will be resolved and the schedule 02:48:42.840 --> 02:48:45.920 for which the remainder of this proceeding will be outlined. The scopeing memo and 02:48:45.920 --> 02:48:48.757 ruling will be issued by the assigned Commissioner 02:48:48.769 --> 02:48:51.060 here, that is President Batjer. Before we 02:48:51.060 --> 02:48:53.383 close, I'd like to open this opportunity up to 02:48:53.395 --> 02:48:55.780 address any other issues that the Commissioner's 02:48:55.780 --> 02:49:01.290 or parties believe need to be said at this point. We begin with President Batjer. 02:49:01.290 --> 02:49:04.496 I have no further comment. 02:49:04.521 --> 02:49:06.426 Commissioners. 02:49:06.451 --> 02:49:12.140 This goes, well thing, but I'll say it anyway. 02:49:12.140 --> 02:49:17.560 The customers are paying the bills. The customers 02:49:17.572 --> 02:49:21.700 pay their bills every month to sustain 02:49:21.700 --> 02:49:27.138 the system that you're providing and just don't forget that. Thank you. 02:49:27.163 --> 02:49:28.951 And for those 02:49:28.950 --> 02:49:38.220 parties who want to file statements recommending additions or deletions from the 02:49:38.220 --> 02:49:43.983 scope, why don't we give you 10 days to do that? 02:49:44.008 --> 02:49:48.570 Okay. And now we will take comment 02:49:48.570 --> 02:49:50.528 from the microphone. Please state your name and your organization from the record. 02:49:50.553 --> 02:49:53.139 Thank you. Good afternoon. John Kennedy 02:49:53.151 --> 02:49:55.609 with the Rural County Representatives of California. 02:49:55.609 --> 02:50:00.670 We represent 37 of the state's rural counties and we've really been ground zero for all 02:50:00.670 --> 02:50:07.550 of these psps events. Our general overarching position on these events. We understand the 02:50:07.550 --> 02:50:10.666 necessity for powering down in certain situations 02:50:10.678 --> 02:50:13.430 to avoid catastrophic wildfires. At the same 02:50:13.430 --> 02:50:15.788 time, those events have to be carefully planned, 02:50:15.800 --> 02:50:17.880 surgical and impacts to critical facilities 02:50:17.880 --> 02:50:23.550 and sensitive populations have to be avoided and mitigated. Our first real experiences 02:50:23.550 --> 02:50:26.453 were in late 2018 where we experienced pretty 02:50:26.465 --> 02:50:29.380 significant impacts to crucial infrastructures 02:50:29.380 --> 02:50:32.707 as was mentioned with water wastewater facilities 02:50:32.719 --> 02:50:35.590 and with groundwater wells and people going 02:50:35.590 --> 02:50:41.970 without power to provide water, to bathe, to flush toilets, for days at a time. So real 02:50:41.970 --> 02:50:44.829 acute impacts on Californians throughout our 02:50:44.841 --> 02:50:47.840 territory our member counties. Many of the same 02:50:47.840 --> 02:50:53.010 challenges still remain over a year later, and we're very concerned about that. These 02:50:53.010 --> 02:50:57.771 events are already placed in a severe strain on county resources, both with respect to 02:50:57.771 --> 02:51:03.560 distribution of backup generators and really exhausting our local personnel, our public 02:51:03.560 --> 02:51:09.890 safety personnel, and our social services workers. So that's led us to be being really 02:51:09.890 --> 02:51:13.060 strong advocates for promoting the resiliency of 02:51:13.072 --> 02:51:16.060 communities and of the grid and more pertinent 02:51:16.060 --> 02:51:20.430 to today's discussion, given our experiences with communications outages, resiliency of 02:51:20.430 --> 02:51:22.947 our communication systems, because communication 02:51:22.959 --> 02:51:25.229 systems are really the backbone of our local 02:51:25.229 --> 02:51:27.992 public safety and emergency response capabilities. 02:51:28.004 --> 02:51:30.180 They're even more crucial in emergencies 02:51:30.180 --> 02:51:33.330 because the potential loss of lives, so as you 02:51:33.342 --> 02:51:36.100 know it was stated, communication systems 02:51:36.100 --> 02:51:38.290 are integral for enabling police and fire 02:51:38.302 --> 02:51:40.870 departments to coordinate deployment of resources 02:51:40.870 --> 02:51:44.632 and respond to service calls, enabling residents 02:51:44.644 --> 02:51:48.109 to make crucial calls for emergency response. 02:51:48.109 --> 02:51:52.359 Disseminating information to learn about PSPS events. And there's an interesting aspect 02:51:52.359 --> 02:51:57.491 there with, we've had some situations where residents were able to get alerts, but they 02:51:57.491 --> 02:51:59.544 weren't able to click through and access any 02:51:59.556 --> 02:52:01.620 of the information that accompanied the alert 02:52:01.620 --> 02:52:07.729 because of the outages. And then, of course, providing evacuation notices and coordinated 02:52:07.729 --> 02:52:09.675 evacuations. So, given the importance of their 02:52:09.687 --> 02:52:11.770 systems, the communication systems and designation 02:52:11.770 --> 02:52:14.791 as critical facilities and critical infrastructure, 02:52:14.803 --> 02:52:17.370 we were surprised that so many went down and 02:52:17.370 --> 02:52:20.904 that we had 400,000 plus landline customers lose 02:52:20.916 --> 02:52:24.100 access. So as you guys mentioned significant 02:52:24.100 --> 02:52:29.550 outages in Marin County, 39% of towers in Calavars County, humboldt, Lake Napa, Santa 02:52:29.550 --> 02:52:33.346 Cruz, Sonoma counties had about 20% or higher. 02:52:33.358 --> 02:52:36.680 And Sonoma counties experienced, I think, 02:52:36.680 --> 02:52:42.020 is worth spending a minute or so on, just because not only did they lose power, they 02:52:42.020 --> 02:52:45.577 lost gas. It turned cold. They lost cell service. 02:52:45.589 --> 02:52:48.730 Some areas didn't have cell service and they 02:52:48.730 --> 02:52:51.181 lost landlines. So you really have a lot of 02:52:51.193 --> 02:52:53.880 people who, you know, I guess it could be termed 02:52:53.880 --> 02:52:58.050 camping in your own home. But it's really not fun because you have no resources, you're 02:52:58.050 --> 02:53:03.430 losing your food and you can't contact anyone in case of an emergency. So the county 02:53:03.430 --> 02:53:08.110 was already under a PS PS when the Kincaid fire broke out. They made the decision, the 02:53:08.110 --> 02:53:12.420 conscious decision to evacuate early because they feared the consequences of having to 02:53:12.420 --> 02:53:18.290 evacuate when their com system would be down. Fire departments were operating by radios 02:53:18.290 --> 02:53:21.444 alone. They had very limited ability to receive 02:53:21.456 --> 02:53:24.160 data or situational maps, which is really 02:53:24.160 --> 02:53:28.380 troubling for local fire departments. Some county employees had to drive up to an hour 02:53:28.380 --> 02:53:30.896 away to get phone service to figure out whether 02:53:30.908 --> 02:53:32.910 they actually had to come into work to 02:53:32.910 --> 02:53:37.850 provide emergency services, so that was all troubling. And then moving on to Santa Cruz 02:53:37.850 --> 02:53:42.149 County. They're not one of our members, but their experiences are really illustrative 02:53:42.149 --> 02:53:48.140 and I think they aren't isolated experiences either. So, I just learned today about 02:53:48.140 --> 02:53:50.235 the community of Bonny Doon. It's a fairly small 02:53:50.247 --> 02:53:52.010 community of 2000 people. They had little 02:53:52.010 --> 02:53:55.214 cell access on the natural. AT&T doesn't really 02:53:55.226 --> 02:53:58.040 offer copper landlines to more facilities. 02:53:58.040 --> 02:54:01.189 They're phasing out the use of copper in that 02:54:01.201 --> 02:54:04.430 area so those people that had landlines through 02:54:04.430 --> 02:54:10.640 Comcast. Their Comcast went down and they had no way to contact 911. Not an isolated 02:54:10.640 --> 02:54:14.351 incident. And we're hearing about it in more and more communities. And then especially 02:54:14.351 --> 02:54:19.570 important are the local fire departments. The Zionte Fire Protection District couldn't 02:54:19.570 --> 02:54:21.924 communicate with two of its rigs that were out 02:54:21.936 --> 02:54:24.000 in the field during the event. The Felton 02:54:24.000 --> 02:54:28.830 Fire Department had experienced data upload speeds that were so slow they had to revert 02:54:28.830 --> 02:54:32.877 to ham radios for situation alerts and situational 02:54:32.889 --> 02:54:36.390 reports on and Verizon was down, so the only 02:54:36.390 --> 02:54:38.993 crews that could be communicated with were those 02:54:39.005 --> 02:54:41.300 on FirstNet. Boulder Creek Fire Protection 02:54:41.300 --> 02:54:45.391 District kind of the same situation. They had no phones or Internet service at their 02:54:45.391 --> 02:54:49.190 fire departments, and they assumed the same was happening throughout the community, which 02:54:49.190 --> 02:54:52.378 again is troubling if someone needs to contact 02:54:52.390 --> 02:54:55.250 local government. So, given the disruption 02:54:55.250 --> 02:54:57.437 on communications, we're very concerned that, 02:54:57.449 --> 02:54:59.600 one, residents won't be able to contact first 02:54:59.600 --> 02:55:03.741 responders if a fire breaks out. We're seeing more and more small fire started because of 02:55:03.741 --> 02:55:07.910 the increased use of generators. So that is very troubling. And then also in a medical 02:55:07.910 --> 02:55:12.340 emergency, because we're getting more and more calls for 911 service from residents 02:55:12.340 --> 02:55:14.177 who were running out of oxygen or their batteries 02:55:14.189 --> 02:55:15.890 are running out on some of their other medical 02:55:15.890 --> 02:55:21.580 equipment. And then finally on communication and coordination of evacuations in the event 02:55:21.580 --> 02:55:23.485 of a fire. So it's imperative that we increase 02:55:23.497 --> 02:55:25.250 the resiliency of our communication system. 02:55:25.250 --> 02:55:27.701 Just as we are with our electrical distribution 02:55:27.713 --> 02:55:29.920 system and transmission system, and we have 02:55:29.920 --> 02:55:33.610 to invest in this resiliency even as we strive 02:55:33.622 --> 02:55:36.930 to reduce the risk and the extent of PS PS 02:55:36.930 --> 02:55:40.770 event. Because these are just one type of emergency event. We could have an earthquake, 02:55:40.770 --> 02:55:43.072 we could have anything else, and it's absolutely 02:55:43.084 --> 02:55:45.210 imperative that we have a communications grid 02:55:45.210 --> 02:55:47.858 that is accessible for all residents and especially 02:55:47.870 --> 02:55:50.120 all first responders. So thank you very much 02:55:50.120 --> 02:55:56.023 for the opportunity to speak today. Really appreciate it. 02:55:56.048 --> 02:55:57.058 Thank you. 02:55:57.083 --> 02:55:59.280 Regina Costa for TURN. 02:55:59.280 --> 02:56:03.270 just very quickly. And I'm not going into the whole what we're doing in a scoping memo 02:56:03.270 --> 02:56:08.530 comments, Most of the discussion the day has had to do with wireless, and that's totally 02:56:08.530 --> 02:56:13.800 understandable. But wireline is also very, very important and beyond VoIP, because there 02:56:13.800 --> 02:56:19.070 are places in this state where there isn't a wireless service for a long ways. And so 02:56:19.070 --> 02:56:21.735 people rely on those landlines in my neighborhood 02:56:21.747 --> 02:56:24.210 and the Russian River, there's some of us with 02:56:24.210 --> 02:56:28.700 copper lines because we know that the VoIP services probably not going to outlast the 02:56:28.700 --> 02:56:35.000 power outage. Tere is information that we have been receiving that shows, for instance, 02:56:35.000 --> 02:56:40.790 the parts of the traditional copper network failed due to inadequate backup power. There, 02:56:40.790 --> 02:56:46.891 we have information also that, well, let me just rephrase that. It's also important to 02:56:46.891 --> 02:56:49.414 understand that you've got competitive local 02:56:49.426 --> 02:56:52.130 carriers serving customers who leased facilities 02:56:52.130 --> 02:56:57.210 from other companies, and when the networks of those other companies have a problem, that 02:56:57.210 --> 02:57:02.750 means the customer of the other wholesale or ???? companies also have a problem So 02:57:02.750 --> 02:57:05.553 we want to make sure that that is also on your 02:57:05.565 --> 02:57:08.021 radar screen, particularly in cases where 02:57:08.021 --> 02:57:13.109 people are elderly. They've kept their copper lines because they need to rely on them. I 02:57:13.109 --> 02:57:17.284 just want to put that out there. Thank you. 02:57:17.309 --> 02:57:18.299 Thank you. 02:57:18.325 --> 02:57:23.970 Thank you. Will Abrams, I just wanted to sort of read off a few things 02:57:23.982 --> 02:57:29.178 to consider to add to the scope. One is there was a question around the mutual 02:57:29.190 --> 02:57:32.398 assistance agreements and I would say, requiring 02:57:32.410 --> 02:57:34.907 sharing of the SLA's or service level 02:57:34.919 --> 02:57:40.253 agreements between carriers should inform what those mutual assistant agreements 02:57:40.265 --> 02:57:45.715 look like. So between the IOUs and the carriers amongst the carriers themselves, I 02:57:45.727 --> 02:57:51.124 think looking at the service level agreements and what are cycle times associated 02:57:51.136 --> 02:57:56.658 with that and commitments made there could inform the mutual assistance agreements. 02:57:56.670 --> 02:58:01.743 One other area, I would say, would be a good area of consideration is around 02:58:01.755 --> 02:58:07.336 telemetry services, specifically, how those telemetry services are impacted by these 02:58:07.348 --> 02:58:12.545 events. Also as an opportunity. You know, one of the things that we realize as 02:58:12.557 --> 02:58:17.946 residents is that your cell phones aren't often, or landlines, a good vehicle for 02:58:17.958 --> 02:58:23.359 communication. There's an opportunity here to look at telemetry, considering that 02:58:23.371 --> 02:58:25.856 there's a lot of overlap with what the 02:58:25.868 --> 02:58:29.021 electrical infrastructure is about. How do you 02:58:29.033 --> 02:58:34.431 leverage sirens, not sirens of World War 2 era, but there's a lot of modern siren 02:58:34.443 --> 02:58:39.901 systems, and I think that that would be a win win win for utilities, for carriers, 02:58:39.913 --> 02:58:45.119 and for the public, to be able to look at that in the part of this proceeding, 02:58:45.131 --> 02:58:50.378 because that will cut through a lot of these communication questions. The other 02:58:50.390 --> 02:58:55.846 area of collaboration would be unshared infrastructure. So after the fires, we had 02:58:55.858 --> 02:59:01.110 a unique opportunity, in 2017, to look at joint trenching, to look at improving 02:59:01.122 --> 02:59:06.453 our communication infrastructure, and looking at the wildfires is an opportunity 02:59:06.465 --> 02:59:11.912 to to see progress. That wasn't done in 2017 and I would hope you would learn from 02:59:11.924 --> 02:59:17.580 those activities and do more of that going forward. I think speaking to coordination, 02:59:17.592 --> 02:59:22.913 I think there was a lot of, things to learn for L N P, local number portability, 02:59:22.925 --> 02:59:27.929 in terms of how that collaboration occurred there, for those reasons, and I 02:59:27.941 --> 02:59:33.255 think it could be used as a model here in a regulatory structure moving forward. 02:59:33.267 --> 02:59:38.856 Other questions are what are critical Safety services, I think, similar to how we've 02:59:38.868 --> 02:59:43.925 worked at the wildfire mitigation plans with the I O. U's, looking at what's 02:59:43.937 --> 02:59:49.400 critical Infrastructure may be different in terms of the communications versus the 02:59:49.412 --> 02:59:54.927 IOUs. So I think taking a close look at that, and I think it was a great point that 02:59:54.939 --> 03:00:00.268 forecasting when the PS PS events and making sure that that information is honed 03:00:00.280 --> 03:00:05.932 and shared and what is the method for that sharing, I think, would also be important. 03:00:05.944 --> 03:00:11.015 Just like to share that as consideration for adding to the scope. Thank you. 03:00:11.040 --> 03:00:12.677 Thank you, Mr Abrams. 03:00:12.702 --> 03:00:17.510 Leon Bloomfield for T Mobile. This is actually just a couple 03:00:17.510 --> 03:00:22.200 of housekeeping matters. I just wanna make sure I understood what the ALJ said 03:00:22.200 --> 03:00:25.900 ALJ Rizzo, I thought it would you say you were going to issue a ruling soliciting 03:00:25.900 --> 03:00:30.350 comments. And then that was followed by ALJ Beemister statement that you have 03:00:30.350 --> 03:00:35.143 10 days to file comments and it was unclear if that was the ruling. 03:00:35.168 --> 03:00:36.741 No. So the ruling 03:00:36.740 --> 03:00:42.780 will follow this pre hearing conference and within that ruling, a schedule will be set 03:00:42.780 --> 03:00:47.910 which would be a ten day a response from the date of the issuance of that ruling. The 03:00:47.910 --> 03:00:53.149 date of that ruling, I can't tell you what, when, what day, but expect in the near term. 03:00:53.149 --> 03:00:55.198 I know that I wasn't asking. Yeah, thank 03:00:55.210 --> 03:00:57.030 you. you've clarified that for me. And if I could ask 03:00:57.030 --> 03:01:01.729 one other question, then will you also be seeking comment on proposed schedules and 03:01:01.729 --> 03:01:03.747 process in the ruling? 03:01:03.772 --> 03:01:04.149 Yes. 03:01:04.174 --> 03:01:05.279 Thank you. 03:01:05.304 --> 03:01:09.800 Before we, conclude this would be the final opportunity 03:01:09.800 --> 03:01:17.939 for anyone else to bring any final issues before the Commission for consideration. 03:01:17.939 --> 03:01:22.010 Seeing none hearing no additional issues. Thank you for your participation today. This 03:01:22.010 --> 03:01:24.320 pretty hearing conference is now adjourned. We're off record.